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Publicly promoted as the gift of life`, organ donation offers a strong contrast with forms of 
gift giving familiar to anthropologists, where gift exchange is conducted to create and 
maintain relational networks. Allowing the removal of one's organs after death, to be 
transplanted into other bodies for the purpose of enhancing or extending life, is commonly 
understood, certainly in Britain, as a voluntary and anonymous gesture. It is presumed to 
entail no thought for any personal benefit and no intention of establishing a relationship N ith 
the recipients of one's organs. 
Implicit within this understanding of organ donation is a model of the Western person as an 
autonomous and bounded individual, operationalised in anthropology as an analytical tool 
with which to contrast `other' economies of personhood. 
This thesis critically re- assesses public and academic acceptance of the popular image of 
organ donation, and challenges the anthropological model of the Western person, revealing the 
partial nature of both. 
Using ethnographic data from a three year intensive study involving health care professionals, 
the families of deceased organ donors and the recipients of transplanted organs, a framework 
is developed within which human organ transactions can be analysed in their entire cycle. 
A primary focus on attitudes towards the bodies, and body parts, of deceased organ donors 
reveals an array of shifting subjectivities. The term refers both to the diverse perspectives held 
by various categories of participants and to the oscillating perspectives of individual 
participants, the researcher included. 
Studying how human organs circulate undermines the assumption that agency is (only) 
autoproductive. Rather less voluntarism is present than popular imagery suggests. Further, a 
consideration of the relationships within which organs circulate serves to illustrate that the 
production of self implicates other (non) -selves. What emerges is the notion of connective 
personhood, whereby donor families and transplant recipients inevitably participate in a self - 
making social relationship, through sharing the substance of the deceased donor. 
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SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTIONS: THE TRANSACTING OF HUMAN 
ORGANS AS A MORAL ECONOMY 
Introduction 
"[T]he best quantitative measure of the success of clinical transplantation 
is the degree to which it does not receive publicity, that is, the degree to 
which we take its accomplishments for granted" (Sir Peter Medawar,' 
cited in Fox and Swazey 1974:74). 
In this, the first decade of the twenty -first century, it is technologically possible to 
remove an extensive range of tissue and solid organs from one body and place them 
into other bodies, though substantial transplant activity has mostly developed during 
the last thirty years.2 It was only in 1967 that Christiaan Barnard transplanted a human 
heart, an event which attracted prolonged and global media attention. (Not many 
people remember the name of the recipient or the donor.) Kidney transplantation has a 
longer history, but began by using living, genetically related, donors. A little over 
three decades later, the transplantation of all major solid organs has become standard 
health care treatment. It is already becoming difficult to remember a time when 
transplantation was not possible. However, as Illich (1981) has pointed out, rapid and 
successful advances in biomedicine are liable to generate their own nemesis. Despite 
having become almost routine surgical practice, or so we are led to believe, and 
contrary to the statement from Sir Peter Medawar, organ transplantation continues to 
' Medawar's research into the physiological rejection of skin grafts to treat severe burns made a 
contribution to reducing the incidence of rejection of transplanted organs. 
2 For a comprehensive list of these cross -bodily transfers, see Machado 1998:2. Figure 1. 
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receive a great deal of publicity to this day. The success of transplant technology has 
provoked a demand for human organs which, at the present time, far outstrips their 
availability. This contests the public performance of everydayness, or the routine 
status of the practice, culturally speaking. In fact the publicity is necessary not to 
prepare people to receive organs, but to encourage organ donation. It is promoted in 
terms of the `gift of life'.3 
The gift of life is to be given under extraordinary circumstances. Popular 
understandings of gift giving, it is fair to say, tend to envisage living givers and 
receivers. But, although transplantation technology currently permits the removal of 
single kidneys and parts of the liver or lungs from living donors, the majority of 
organs transplanted in Britain are removed from people declared brain stem dead.` 
The legal constraints surrounding organ donation in Britain require those who would 
wish to become organ donors in the event of their death to formally register 
themselves as donors, a system termed required consent or `opting -in', which 
involves carrying a donor card or completing an application to the Donor Register. 
Organ donation is officially promoted, academically debated, and indeed popularly 
understood as a voluntary, anonymous and altruistic gesture towards others -- a gift 
freely given to a stranger, with no desire for a return gesture. Most importantly, there 
is no social relationship envisaged between the giver and the receiver. As if to 
reinforce the impossibility of any relationship, the giver -- that is the organ donor -- is 
deceased as a condition of the gift transaction. 
3 The reader may assume quotation marks hereafter. Their constant inclusion becomes tedious. 
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I discuss the transplantation of the major solid organs -- heart. lungs. liver, kidneys. 
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However, the present study shows that donor families and recipients find it 
difficult to participate in this act of giving without relationships being forged or 
activated; my aim is to account for the disparity between public and academic 
perceptions of organ donation, and the attitudes held by donor families and recipients. 
In doing so, I question the analytical value of a tenacious model of `the 
Western person' which we can see reflected in public and academic interpretations of 
organ donation; a model which also resonates with biomedical discourses on the body. 
It stems from a persistent political ideology with historically specific roots which 
represents (Western) people as separate, autonomous, bounded individuals, "linked 
merely by ... relationships" (Bloch 1988:16; cf. Geertz 1983). As a model, it has been 
operationalised in anthropological studies to present in sharp relief `other' 
understandings of bodies and persons (Becker 1995; Strathern 1988). Similarly, 
discussing the use of human tissue and organs in `bio- technologies', Strathern (l 997) 
contemplates a Western individual which complies with her depiction of Western 
consumer culture, and one I recognised in public discourses and personal 
conversations about organ donation and transplantation. Yet it ill- describes 
personhood as I have found it to be transacted in everyday life in Western settings, or 
so my study of the everyday apprehensions arising from organ donation and 
transplantation suggests. I shall argue that donor families and organ recipients are 
inevitably implicated in a social relationship, through the `inalienable substance' of the 
deceased donor. 
The notion of separate, autonomous, bounded individuals admits of two 
fundamental assumptions. First, they are the authors of their own agency, freely 
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exercising choice in what they do (Strathern 1988, 1997). Second, they are the 
authors of their own selves; who and what they are being shaped by factors internal to 
their boundedness rather than external for example the activities of other people 
(Battaglia 1995). Further, the model presupposes certainty about bodily boundedness, 
"that we know what the boundaries are between one person and another" (Bloch 
1988:16). 
A study of how human organs circulate undermines the assumption that 
agency is (only) autoproductive. Rather less voluntarism is present than the popular 
image suggests. Further, a consideration of the relationships within which organs 
circulate serves to illustrate that the production of self implicates other (non) -selves, 
through "mutable entanglements with other subjects' histories [and] experiences" 
(Battaglia 1995:2). In the present study, those `mutable entanglements' produced an 
array of shifting subjectivities, a term I employ to refer not only to the diverse 
perspectives held by various categories of participants, but also to the oscillating 
perspectives of individual participants, myself included. 
In strong contrast to the model of `the Western person' I have found the 
notions of `relational personhood' (Battaglia 1990) and `connective selves' (Jean - 
Klein 2000; cf Joseph 1994) invaluable to my understanding of the social 
complexities of organ donation and transplantation.' Battaglia (1990:188) has "shifted 
the focus of mortuary analysis away from the dead and their survivors as separate 
social categories." Emergent from her elegant ethnography of the people on Sabarl 
Island is a notion of personhood which acknowledges that "the self [is] defined 
5 Jean-Klein (2000) American Ethnologist 27,1: not printed at time of thesis submission. All page 
references for this article are based on original manuscript, 53pp. 
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through an array of significant relationships with others, past and present, living and 
dead" (Battaglia 1990:188). I am arguing that the connectivity of deceased organ 
donors, their surviving families and the recipients of their organs goes beyond the 
secondary place accorded to relationships in the dominant Western model of the 
individual, thus undermining public, academic and biomedical perceptions of organ 
donation and transplantation which are predicated upon that model. 
Jean -Klein (2000:3) has pushed the analysis of `self -making' further, to argue 
that the production of 'self may actually be located in the bodies of others, which she 
glosses as "the controlled dispersal of self," illustrated from Joseph's (1994) study of 
cross - sibling relationships in Lebanon; a girl's "adherence to the female code of 
morality," in which she is tutored by her brother, is thus an enactment of her brother's 
effectiveness in exercising interpersonal control, influencing his "sense of himself (and 
his recognition by others) as `manly' and `honourable ' (Jean -Klein 2000:4). In the 
current research, there are three, and perhaps four, sets of interpersonal relationships 
to be considered; the issue of `control' is problematic and one which requires further 
exploration. Nevertheless, to illustrate the `dispersed enactment of self with a 
forceful example from the current work, I found that donor families' sense of 
themselves, and more importantly, their ongoing production of the donor's self as 
socially valued, was dependent upon the extent to which health care professionals and 
organ recipients concretised in visible form their appreciation of `the gift' -- 
acknowledging the central role of organ donors and their families in the entire 
process. Where appreciation was not performed in this fashion, donor families felt that 
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they and their deceased relatives were being erased from the landscape of the 
transplantation programme. 
In summary, then, my argument entails rethinking some fundamental, taken - 
for- granted categories in common, everyday, English language use, interwoven into 
our commonly held, yet partially understood processes of self -making. 
Structural presentation of the central thence 
Writing of couples undergoing assisted conception, Franklin (1997:13) comments that 
her book will make sense when the reader gets to the end of it, unlike the couples she 
studied, who struggled to make sense of a process about which they had ambiguous 
and confused perceptions. I offer the same comment. During this research, I found no 
stable viewpoints or categories, and struggled to find a path through a quagmire of 
similarly confused and ambiguous perceptions, shifting subjectivities, held by a diverse 
range of people implicated in giving, waiting for, and receiving, human organs. The 
bodies and organs within the donation and transplantation process would not `stand 
still' to be unequivocally named (cf. Lock 1993:148). 
A constantly shifting terrain provokes representational difficulties for the 
production of a text requiring some structure and logical development of argument. I 
have partly resolved this dilemma through the adoption of a rhetorical device in the 
form of parallel but directionally opposite `perceptual trajectories'. These are not of 
themselves stable, but sufficient to my purpose. The first trajectory reflects shifting 
and conflicting attitudes to `bodies', following an organ donor as he or she moves 
from life to death, as I argue, from being a loved family member to an anonymous 
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body, the container of equally anonymous organs. While alive, potential donors might 
adopt a utilitarian view of their own body; once deceased, their bodies maintain 
affective significance to their families. In hospitals, intensive care unit (ICU) staff face 
the ambiguity of caring for a deceased person, alongside the living, while theatre staff 
must operate on a deceased person. Transplant unit (TU) staff have their own patients 
in view and, whether they would agree with my choice of language or not, utilise a 
potential donor's body as a means to an end -- that end being to save their patient's 
life with a transplanted organ. 
The parallel and opposite trajectory follows the trace of an organ from one 
body to another where I argue that it moves from an anonymous to a personifying 
object. Its anonymity resides in the public domain, where increasingly strident calls for 
more organs take inadequate account of the fact that people have to die to make them 
available, or that those people are the loved members of families who would rather 
see them go on living. Health care professionals are aware of donors as members of 
families, though they bring their own priorities to bear on perceptions of organs. 
Many recipients never know the identity of their donor or surviving family members, 
but they do exist, for recipients, as people who shared each other's lives and are now 
separated by death. The "hidden narratives" of those lives and that death (Helman 
1991:100) -- what I am calling the donor's `intangible substance' -- accompanies the 
tangible substance of the transplanted organ, and is carried within the recipient for 
the rest of his or her life which, as I shall show, can be equally influenced by both the 
intangible and tangible substance of the donor. 
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Excavating the taken-for-granted 
The taken -for -grantedness of everyday life is something anthropologists tend to 
encounter as alterity in the non -Western world of the discipline's primary -- and for 
many years its only -- research field (Bloch 1988:16). Even when the anthropological 
gaze was turned back on itself, to studies in the Western world, the preferred focus 
was "distinct and often marginalised groups" (Okely 1996:5). Contrastively, Okely's 
work has sought to reveal `magical credulities' and `fractured constructs' residing in 
Britain's wider, dominant society and of which their holders are unaware. Bourdieu 
(1977) described this lack of awareness as `practical mastery', in effect "a learned 
ignorance ... as to the generative principles, or sources, from which [one's] cultural 
style derives" (cited in Hockey 1990:17). Thus the concepts and practices comprising 
in general terms `the British way of life', are taken -for -granted, until one is forced to 
confront their inconsistencies and tensions. 
A similar argument could be made regarding anthropological notions of `the 
Western person', which must be homogenised to assist cross -cultural comparative 
enterprises (Strathern 1988; Becker 1995:2 -4). Primary features of this model are its 
"independence, autonomy, and differentiation" (Marsella 1985:290), "anchoring the 
self to a body" (Becker 1995:4). While alluding to its "propensity to stereotype" and 
possible lack of fit with ethnographic data, Becker (1995:4) justifies her own use of 
this 're-ified folk model' as "a reasonable substrate for inquiry into how self 
representations ... inform embodied experience" in Western and Fijian contexts. As an 
analytical tool, the model of the Western person can certainly be identified in 
particular contexts in Britain, as Strathern (1997) has shown in her discussion of 'bio- 
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technologies'. Becker (1995:3) suggests that "Western folk models provide insight 
into culturally particular representations of selfhood that identify core cultural values." 
In Britain, too, representation of `the Western person' as autonomous and bounded is 
culturally particular. In the context of `bio- technologies' it illuminates core cultural 
values such as freedom of choice and individual rights, along with the `successes of 
organ transplantation'. These values jarred glaringly for many of my research 
participants when starkly juxtaposed in their actual involvement with organ donation 
and transplantation. 
It is the clinical practice of organ transplantation itself which creates and 
maintains this tension. In 1973, Baudrillard (1973:126) proclaimed "Today, it is not 
normal to be dead ... nothing else is as offensive as this [and consequently] the dead 
have no place." Whatever its veracity then, three decades later the statement is not 
entirely accurate. Biomedical science certainly regards death as a problem to be 
removed (Illich 1977:113) and will go to extraordinary lengths to do so, one of which 
has been to provide a very useful place for the dead as containers of replacement parts 
for the living. Even for the bereaved family, organ donation is supposed to take the 
sting out of death, or so we are led to believe; promotional materials make a point of 
suggesting some comfort may be derived from knowing other lives have been saved. 
And since the body and its parts would only go to waste anyway, buried or cremated, 
how can anyone object? 
Let us ask, instead, how did we get to here? Barely a century ago, the use of 
bodies for the advancement of science was considered anathema (Richardson 1996). 
Even half a century ago, the possibility of transplanting human body parts was found 
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only in the realms of science fiction (Helman 1991) and mythology (Doniger 1996). 
In the 'bio-technologies' of the twenty -first century, bodies and body parts are "the 
substance of people's interactions" (Strathern 1997:298). Today, refusing to permit 
the removal of organs may be regarded as anathema; "the moral worth of giving [and] 
the heroics of saving lives" (Lock 1996b:164) forms a compelling model of socially 
approved behaviour. 
Its normalisation, heroism even, does not mean the transplantation of tissues, 
organs, even visible limbs, from one body to another has entirely lost its horror aspect 
(Youngner 1996). That the practices remain within these literary realms suggests a 
persistent degree of astonishment and ambivalence towards them, to say the least. 
Such ambivalence is also apparent with regard to the redefinition of death on which 
organ transplantation is predicated.6 Professional and lay people may hold deeply 
ambivalent views when actually confronted by the body of someone declared brain 
stem dead, or the possibility of physically incorporating a major internal organ from a 
body not long before considered equivalent with a person. How people manage these 
extraordinary mental leaps and actual cross -bodily encounters is a moot question in its 
own right, and answers are bound to unsettle what are historically taken -for -granted 
notions of persons as bounded and autonomous units. 
A society's dominant and widely acclaimed values and beliefs need to be 
experienced as unquestioned and enduring (Hockey 1990:28, citing Hertz 1907)). 
Yet, as the tensions and ambiguities inherent within the practice of organ 
transplantation demonstrate, "The events through which we live are forever 
6 On the validity of the definition see e.g. Lamb (1983) and Evans (1994) or Keep (1998) and Gill 
(1999). 
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outrunning the power of our ordinary, everyday moral, emotional and intellectual 
concepts to construe them" (Geertz 1968:101). Our unquestioned and enduring 
values then are more like work in progress. In struggling to defend them, we make 
them, and I would argue, in life and death situations, we catch ourselves making them. 
The process of organ donation and transplantation as I encountered it 
resonates with some of the discipline's prominent theoretical interests: exchange 
systems, the politics of relationships, the conceptualisation of individuals, persons and 
bodies, the inter -relationship of moral values and social actions, interpretations of 
death and mortuary practices. Anthropology is aptly suited to investigate the dramatic 
metamorphoses of taken -for -granted notions, as one moves beyond what I shall call 
the `public performance of organ donation and transplantation' (see Battaglia 
1990:188 -199 for a lucid synopsis of the performance of segaiya), to the actualities of 
participation for organ recipients and the families of deceased organ donors. 
On that note, `the performance of organ donation and transplantation' is 
interchangeable with `participation in the donation and transplantation process'. By 
`public performance' I mean an emergent aesthetic presented as `this is what we do', 
an idea of what involvement in the transacting of human organs `is like'. It is derived 
from various sources, and broadly shared by large numbers of the population, but it is 
nevertheless contestable as a result of actual participation. Within these performances, 
language use `directs' our understanding of what is going on, presents particular ways 
of participating in, or assimilating, events. To illustrate my point, I offer two key 
examples from my research. 
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The term `gifts' applied to human organs made available for transplantation is 
used in this text for convenience rather than analytical accuracy. Western 
understandings of `gifts' are intimately bound up with the representation of organ 
donation as voluntary and altruistic; further, human organs must not be treated as 
commodities to be bought and sold. As I will make apparent, the extent to which 
human organs are gifts is open to question yet no other adequate terms appear to be 
available. `Donor' and `donation' are susceptible to the same argument (cf. Machado 
1999:57 -61) but are also used here for convenience. 
The common term used to describe those who have received an organ from 
another body is `transplant recipient'. Note how attention is drawn to the procedure 
of transplantation and by implication its practitioners, rather than to the substance 
being transplanted which draws attention to its origin in another body, now dead. My 
preferred choice of term is `organ recipient'. Fuller discussion of the impact of 
language use in the performance of organ donation and transplantation is taken up in 
Chapter Three. 
Placing the Researcher 
Conducting research with bereaved people or those who have been forced to confront 
their own mortality and now live `on borrowed time', as one organ recipient phrased 
it, is emotionally demanding and this intensified my own sense of involvement in the 
lives, and indeed the deaths, of ... I find myself hesitating here. `My informants' 
resonates uncomfortably with `tale -telling'; the possessive pronoun is exclusionary. 
`Research participants' has been used for convenience in the text, yet the people I 
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have come to regard as friends were far more than `participants'; they have been the 
raison d'être of my research. Abstracting myself from these emotionally intense, and 
sometimes deeply distressing, relationships would not render the account `objective'; 
it would analytically distort the subject matter, namely the obstinate presence of 
relationships in body part transactions, more concisely the politics of relationships 
within the organ donation and transplantation process. 
We must therefore question the place of the researcher and consider the ability 
of anthropological inquiry to inform matters of policy and practice in institutional 
settings. Unlike allegedly objective research which, in its written findings and even its 
data collection, abstracts the researcher to focus on `the subjects of study', fieldwork 
practice "is always concerned with relationships," thus "the autobiography of 
fieldwork is about [those] lived interactions," and the embodied knowledge which 
one's participation has effected (Okely 1992:2 -3). These views resonate also in the 
current research, which is so fundamentally about relationships. Here, a comment by 
Rowling (1999:179) is apposite. Research into grief and loss, she argues, requires that 
the researcher be empathetic, "without being overwhelmed" or "enmeshed." Rowling 
suggests "being `alongside' and `with' someone "; a resolution resting upon an 
interpretation of people as separate and bounded, the implication being that one can 
conduct such research without being materially affected -- that one walks away with 
the self intact and unaltered. 
The contrary applied in the current situation, where the politics of 
relationships did as much to obscure as it did to reveal understandings of bodies and 
persons. I felt compelled to contribute, using anthropologically inspired insights to 
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present the views of organ donor families and recipients, which I endeavour to do 
from a perspective other than `individual rights'. 
The reader will find, in effect, two theses which grew symbiotically from the 
fabric of my research. One thesis is anthropologically motivated; a study of organ 
donation and transplantation has much to contribute to theoretical development within 
the discipline. Buts as the thesis works both ways, it maintains alongside this a social 
policy orientation, where I turn the insights anthropology has to offer back upon 
policies and practices within the transplantation programme. In doing so, I hope to 
add to the cross -disciplinary literature on organ donation, into which anthropology 
has begun to venture. 
The study sees a manifold need to hark back to the purpose behind Mauss's 
essay on The Gift (1990), which was after all a commentary on the political 
philosophy guiding welfare provision in Mauss's own contemporary (early twentieth - 
century) society (Douglas 1990: viii). Mauss's classic text on gift exchange has been 
directly linked to policy oriented studies of gifts of life within Britain's National 
Health Service, offering valuable insights on matters of policy and practice which 
influence the lives of those who give and those who receive (e.g. Titmuss [1970] on 
blood; Sque and Payne [ 1994] on organs). Anthropological studies of `bio- 
technologies', though not commenting on policy matters, nevertheless demonstrate 
the possible contributions to a fuller understanding of these phenomena. 
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Developing a Model for Multi -sited Research on Cross -bodily Transfers of Human 
Organs 
As gifts of life, human organs travel from one body to another; they are physically 
removed and (re)placed in a transfer which requires extensive, expert, third party 
biomedical intervention. Interestingly enough, analyses of 'bio- technologies' have 
mostly focused on one party (e.g. Franklin 1997; Konrad 1999; Titmuss 1970), or 
they have subscribed to a dyadic model of relationships (Strathern 1997). In doing so 
the commentators abide by the 'de-relationing' ideology that permeates the subject 
matter. This study extends the focus to draw in those third party relationships that are 
insisted upon in the transplant programme. 
The politics of relationships permeated every aspect of the current research, 
including endeavours to recruit participants. Within anthropology a persistent myth 
circulates that we arrive at our research location, find a place to stay, and `start 
networking', to employ contemporary phraseology. The actualities of my own entry 
into the field could not have been more different. Organ recipients form a tiny 
minority of the UK population; the occurrence of brain stem death is even less 
frequent. At the same time, donor families and organ recipients are not `distinct and 
marginalised groups'; they are located within Britain's dominant and wider society. 
The only physical location where `clusters' form is hospital units; here, legislation and 
ethical codes entwine, protecting first the privacy of patients and their families and 
second their well -being if approached to take part in research.' Relatives are not 
patients but do fall under the rubric of `healthy volunteers'. General methods of 
For brief history of medical research ethics committees see Alberti (1995:639 -640); for national 
guidelines see Dept. of Health (1991); for critique of variegated practices see Kent (1999). 
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networking were seriously curtailed while introduction to the politics of relationships 
in health care contexts was proportionately increased. 
Fifteen months were spent in negotiations with hospital units and Research 
Ethics Committees (RECs) in Scotland, for access to the families of deceased people 
who did or did not become organ donors, as well as to potential and actual organ 
recipients. One application was successful, giving access to organ recipients only. 
Three were unsuccessful, for two broad reasons. First, hospital unit staff and /or REC 
members were deeply concerned about my lack of experience in dealing with seriously 
ill or bereaved people; concern was not alleviated by my participation in a 
bereavement counselling course. The second reason for unsuccessful applications can 
be located in a lack of fit between anthropological research and biomedical research, 
exacerbated by the research application process (Wilson 1997; Wilson 1998; 
Appendices 7 and 8). Disguising processual, flexible, qualitative research in a 
structure of quantitative methodology is one possible solution, though it de- 
emphasises the very strong benefits of the former approach. Concurrently, RECs 
remained unconvinced that my work met the criteria by which it was to be judged -- 
to benefit particular patients or contribute to medical knowledge -- because of a 
prevailing view that my research would be intrusive, that it would not be beneficial for 
bereaved families to talk about the person who had died. Ironically, social isolation is 
more often the cause of emotional or psychological ill health for bereaved people 
(McLaren 1998:275 -290, esp p279). 
Where research involves those cloaked by the protective mantle of medical 
ethics, we must inquire into precisely when `research- can be said to have started. 
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Health care professionals /REC members held that research began when and if REC 
applications were approved. Yet negotiations required numerous conversations with 
hospital staff in different specialisations and at several levels of hospital administration 
and clinical practice, affording excellent opportunity to contemplate the influence of 
taken -for -granted notions in the formulation and execution of health care policies and 
practices. Additionally, twenty formally recognised one hour `interviews' were 
arranged with nursing staff, physicians, surgeons and other professionals; numbers 
were biased towards transplantation, where access to staff was more readily 
negotiable. General information from both forms of discussion is employed here as 
research data, with every effort to maintain the anonymity of contributors. 
Networking with Donor Families and Organ Recipients 
Other avenues were required to recruit those most directly involved in giving and 
receiving the gift of life. A co- ordinator in Scotland's transplant programme had 
informed me of the British Organ Donor Society (BODY) which holds an annual 
Convention each year in Cambridge. Delegates include organ recipients and families, 
donor families, and health care professionals predominantly from nursing. Attendance 
at the 1997 Convention introduced me to the Transplant Support Network (TSN). 
Both organisations have been invaluable in facilitating contact with donor families and 
organ recipients throughout Britain. 
Twenty open- ended, face to face conversations, two -three hours in length, 
were conducted with donor families and organ recipients. Numerous telephone 
18 
conversations and exchanges of letters, particularly with two donor families, have 
been an invaluable source of qualitative data. 
During 1999, a small -scale survey provided a secondary source of data 
channelled towards specific aspects of participation in the organ donation and 
transplantation process. The survey was not conducted to produce representative 
percentages or any form of randomised, or allegedly objective, results. Rather, I 
sought to elicit the personal viewpoints of a geographically dispersed range of donor 
families and recipients on opportunities for their direct communication with each 
other, a fraught issue, as I discovered. Questionnaires were distributed to donor 
NQEN 
families via BODY, the Midlands Donor Family and the co- ordinators 
at Freeman Hospital in Newcastle. Organ recipients were invited to take part via the 
Transplant Support Network's newsletter. Basic collated data and sample 
questionnaires are reproduced in Appendices 1 -5; illuminating comments offered by 
donor family members or organ recipients are incorporated into the text. TSN 
Newsletter published an edited version of the research findings (TSN, No. 13, 1999), 
reproduced as Appendix 6. 
Research has drawn on official promotional materials and articles in the 
general media happened upon by chance, thus reflecting the sort of information which 
is accessible to the public and which may form the topic of discussion with friends and 
family, at work, at home, on the bus, or wherever people chat about events in the 
news. Such materials provided useful data by which to illuminate and dissect aspects 
of the public performance of organ donation. Three leaflets produced by the 
Department of Health feature with some prominence; these are reproduced as Plates 
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1 -6 at the end of Part One, to facilitate the reader's own interpretation of their implicit 
and explicit messages. 
Summary 
This research considers how organs circulate in gift -of -life transactions, and their 
impact on everyone involved, paying particular attention to the visibility of organ 
donors and their families. Donor families can feel that they and their deceased relative 
are erased from the public performance of organ donation and transplantation. 
The initial research project envisaged direct observation of interactions with 
and around the bodies of organ donors, and organ recipients, to support and query 
data collected in interviews. Achieving adequate contextualisation presented quite a 
challenge, not least because the management of organ donation and transplantation, as 
aspects of our health care service, features significant discontinuities, described in the 
Introduction to Part Two, which tend to fragment the perspectives of all those 
involved. 
In any event, no access was permitted to hospital units for the purpose of 
direct observation. The general picture I offer has been constructed from the 
individual perspectives of all research participants. Despite the partiality of my 
research focus and the disparate degrees of access to donor families, recipients and 
health care professionals, I do want to emphasise a roundedness to my own work, 
which can be missing elsewhere when research parameters do not encompass the 
wider cycle of exchange transactions involved in giving and receiving human organs. I 
now outline the presentation of my research in the structure of this thesis. 
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Part One elucidates dominant popular and academic perspectives on Britain's 
transplantation programme. Chapter One addresses scholarly discourses which 
underpin the public performance of organ donation and transplantation as `the heroics 
of saving lives' and `the moral worth of giving'; analysis of the imagery presented in 
histories of the development of transplantation activity is followed by an overview of 
academia's defence of altruism, particularly in its articulation with health care 
provision. Chapter Two engages anthropological and health care scholarship which 
treats the matter of gift exchange. An alternative perspective is offered on the 
`Western person'; the variegated connective capabilities of human tissue and organs 
are considered, and human organs are proposed as `a kind of property' with dispersed 
ownership in other bodies. 
Part Two takes as its overarching theme the partiality and positionality of 
knowledges of the body. The process of becoming an organ donor or organ recipient 
is viewed as unfamiliar territory where the bodies of donors and recipients are 
processed in an administrative /clinical system, landscapes being mapped by 
biomedicine. Certain events or issues marked on those bodies seem to provide 
signposts for donor families and recipients as they journey through these confusing, 
frightening realms. 
In the Introduction to Part Two, the personal backgrounds of donor families 
and recipients are presented. The realms of the donor and recipient are described in 
terms of discontinuities encountered by research participants. The role of donor co- 
ordinators is briefly outlined. 
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Chapter Three unsettles the representation of organs as gifts by considering 
their role as `resources' in a health care context increasingly permeated by market 
economics. Becoming an organ donor is traced as an anonymising process contested 
by shifting subjectivities, followed by theoretical explication of this oscillating process. 
The chapter concludes by reviewing proposed methods to increase the supply of 
organs for transplantation, contextualising the vigour of public campaigns for 
deceased donation. 
As the crux of this thesis, Chapter Four takes as its central focus the erosion 
of voluntarism and the erasure of (donor /donor family) persons from the public 
performance of organ donation and transplantation. The process of becoming a donor 
family is reviewed in some detail. Attitudes towards bereaved people, which amplify 
their sense of erasure, are then discussed. The chapter concludes by tracing the 
gradual erosion of voluntarism as first, `card -carrying' organ donors then second, 
donor families move through the process of organ donation. Fundamentally, there is 
no conclusion to this process. 
Chapter Five carries forward the process of becoming an organ recipient. 
Themes of guilt and gratitude emerge. Health care professionals may seek to keep the 
`narratives of life and death' hidden to protect the well -being of recipients and donor 
families. Various methods are used to deflect the attention of each away from the 
other. Such strategies serve to submerge, if not to sever, the connectivity of recipients 
and donor families. 
Part Three amplifies the tension between autonomy and connectivity. The 
clinical practice of organ transplantation articulates with the nation -state in a 
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discourse of individual rights and consumer values; concurrently, giving and receiving 
human organs generates the `dispersed enactment of self (Jean -Klein 2000:5) through 
the connectivity of donor families and organ recipients, where enactment encompasses 
`the present absence' of the deceased donor (cf. Battaglia 1990:196). 
The Conclusion revisits the central argument of this thesis, that the transacting 
of human organs is a moral economy, ill -served by its public performance as 
voluntary, anonymous and altruistic. 
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PART ONE HUMAN ORGANS AS GIFTS: HEGEMONIC DISCOURSES 
AND THEORIES OF EXCHANGE 
Chapter One 
The Moral Worth Of Giving And The Heroics Of Saving Lives: Quotidian 
Perspectives On The Transplantation Programme 
When it comes to matters of life and death anthropology understands that the 
moment of death' is culturally variable, as are opinions about what should, or should 
not, be done to dead bodies (e.g. Bloch & Parry 1982; Metcalf & Huntington 1991). 
In Britain, these are issues over which biomedical science has considerable, though 
not total, influence. Historically, in Britain, deaths at any age were frequent 
occurrences, life expectancy was comparatively low, and the majority of people died 
at home in the presence of family and friends (Gittings 1984:6 -7). 
Today, most deaths occur in professional care facilities, among the very old 
(Sidell 1993:151). Death has become a wholly negative event, excepting instances 
where it brings release from painful and prolonged dying. Whatever the historical 
processes proposed for death's displacement beyond our social margins (compare for 
example Gittings [ 1984] and Houlbrooke [19891), improvements in health care over 
the course of the twentieth- century have had an impact, though disproportionate 
emphasis may be given to curative rather than preventive developments (Coleman et 
al. 1993:2 citing McKeown 1979). Medical and surgical treatments, as well as broader 
improvements in many areas of our daily environment, have brought death under 
control to an unprecedented degree. For those whose lives are threatened, biomedical 
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science can and does offer dramatic forms of intervention, hence their continued high 
public profile. 
Taking the internal organs -- the heart, lungs, liver and kidneys -- from a body 
which has been declared dead, and transplanting them into other bodies to ward off 
their death is an example of such intervention (O'Neill 1996:5 -6). Transplant surgeons 
today may not achieve the international status of Christiaan Barnard, who carried out 
the first heart transplant. In fact, one surgeon I interviewed remarked that there was 
no glamour left in the specialisation, which was suffering because it lacked the 
`bazazz' to attract new surgeons. Yet among their patients, surgeons may still be 
treated with a degree of religious awe. As one recipient remarked to me, "my wife 
thinks Mr X walks on water." Transplant surgery still resonates with "the heroics of 
saving lives" (Lock 1996b:164, cf. Machado 1998:2 -3). It should not be forgotten, 
though it often is, that the success of transplantation depends upon failure in another 
area of health care (cf. Lock 1996a:219). Without the phenomenon of brain stem 
death, we can safely surmise that the transplantation programme today would have 
looked very different indeed. 
This chapter demonstrates how historical accounts of transplantation present 
the development of this clinical enterprise as a heroic journey. It goes on to look at 
the redefinition of death as brain stem death, and controversy over the nature of its 
interconnection with the development of transplantation. Current promotional 
literature for organ donation is then reviewed. The current ethnography lends support 
to Lock's view of the situation in the USA, that "the desire to save lives has 
apparently overridden most concerns about the remaking of death" (Lock 
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1996b:164). As the title of this chapter indicates, "the moral worth of giving to needy 
others coupled with the heroics of saving lives' (Lock 1996b:164) renders organ 
donation a highly commendable action. Machado (1998:5) has suggested the hero is 
more likely to be "modern medicine" than the organ donor (cf. Fox and Swazey 
1974). Nevertheless, organ donation is promoted and widely understood as an act of 
altruism; a selection of materials illustrate subtle and not so subtle metaphorical 
representations of organ donation as an altruistic gift. By way of illustrating the 
tenacity of the notion of altruism, the chapter ends with a review of academic 
literature produced in its defence as a guiding principle of Britain's welfare system. 
Particular reference will be made to the National Health Service, within which organ 
transplantation is located. My own arguments cannot ignore the strength of altruism's 
defence, carried as it is into health care scholarship on organ donation, to which l turn 
in Chapter 2. 
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I The Development of Organ Transplantation 
In his Introduction to a recent medical textbook, the editor noted that the history of 
transplantation is by itself an introduction to modern clinical advance' (Hakim 
1997:1). Where histories of organ transplantation are recounted, a sense of pioneering 
heroism and "trailblazing" is often apparent (Kahan 1996:129; cf. Machado 1998: I - 
2). The researcher witnessed one such presentation at a public meeting where `a very 
eminent and pioneering surgeon', as he was introduced to the audience, regaled us 
with a number of `ripping yarns' about the early days of transplantation, as when the 
speaker had conducted `retrieval operations' on donors in ambulances as they 
whizzed towards the potential recipient's transplant unit. Anecdotes of this kind can 
be used to add spice to the more `matter of fact' tone of textbooks, and consciously 
or unconsciously take the sting out of early failures. By way of marking a significant 
step in the treatment of kidney disease, one textbook (Hakim 1997:6) refers to the 
surgeon who made an early dialysis machine from "sausage casing and tomato cans." 
His patients nevertheless died. Of these efforts he was heard to remark "it was a good 
thing the boss was away!" 
Histories of transplantation may locate contemporary practices within a very 
long tradition. Teeth, we learn, were transplanted in many countries of the ancient 
world (Peer 1995:25 -29). Skin grafting was recorded in a Sanskrit text of "at least the 
second or third century BC" (BODY 1991). The extraordinary story of Cosmas and 
Damian transplanting a human leg has been recorded in numerous works of art from 
the Middle Ages (see prints in Barkan 1996:229 -35). Barkan (1996) cautions against 
drawing analogies between contemporary transplantation practices and these ancient, 
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or not so ancient, examples. Analogies are drawn, nevertheless, though the beginnings 
of organ transplantation as we know it today' tend to be given their origins in the 
eighteenth or nineteenth century at the earliest. Bone grafting for example was 
successfully carried out by William MacEwen in Glasgow in 1 881 (BODY 1991:1). 
Having established clinical transplantation's historical credentials, stories 
tracing its development proceed genealogically, as a linear progression from one 
'breakthrough' to another. First `successful' attempts are marked by date, place and 
surgeon, though the measure of success has altered over the years. The first 
`successful' kidney transplant was carried out in Boston in 1954 by Thomas Starzl; 
the patient lived for eight days. Today, success is measured in terms of years -- for 
example 75% survival at one year. Failures are not forgotten, but are presented as 
laying valuable foundations for future research or as courageous pioneering of the sort 
discussed by Fox and Swazey Q19745 in the book aptly titled The Courage to Fail. 
Other significant landmarks in the advance of transplantation are noted -- the 
discovery of `rejection' where the host body's immune system acts to dispel `alien' 
tissue; work on immunosuppressant drugs to counter this effect; the importance of 
tissue typing; the release of Cyclosporin, the most powerful anti -rejection drug, in the 
mid 1980s. Thereafter, transplantation of all the major solid organs multiplied and 
spread world -wide. From a handful of liver transplant operations in 1983, over 6,000 
were being performed per year by 1992 (New et al. 1994:14). 
Yet the most extraordinary development in transplantation happened outwith 
the transplant programme. Kidneys could be transplanted from living donors since 
they are paired organs and otherwise healthy people can survive adequately with one. 
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The transplantation of other major solid organs developed through using the bodies of 
the dead. 
Brain Stem Death 
Until comparatively recently, permanent cessation of heartbeat and breathing were the 
standard signs of death, "followed almost immediately by death of the brain" (Lamb 
1985:72). Technological advances in biomedicine now mean that, when people are 
rushed to hospital with suspected traumatic head injuries, or have otherwise 
collapsed, experiencing temporary cardiac and respiratory arrest, they are placed on 
`life support' as part of the effort to save their life. This includes a ventilator which 
takes over their breathing, augmented by drips which control the body's chemical 
balance, and catheters for urinary excretion. However, if damage to the brain is 
extreme, brain stem death occurs. The heart continues to beat for a while but it will 
cease spontaneously within days even under ventilation (Dept.. of Health 1998:8). 
Because of the availability of life support technology, and as long as the heart 
continues to beat, the body's tissues and organs remain living and available for 
transplantation. 
The earliest reports of the condition which came to be termed brain stem death 
appeared in the late 1950s. One described six patients on life support systems, where 
there was no evidence of blood flow within the cranium. The patients were declared 
dead after cessation of heartbeat, which occurred variably within a period spanning 
twenty -six days (Lofstedt and von Reis 1956). Three years later, French neurologists 
described the condition of such patients as coma dépasse' (Mollaret and Goulon 
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1959). The term `brain death' appeared in 1965, in a report about a kidney removed 
for transplantation from "a heart- beating, seemingly brain -dead donor" (Alexandre 
1991, cited in Powner et al. 1996:1220). 
An early step to develop formalised diagnostic criteria for brain stem death 
was taken by the Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School (1AMA 1968). 
Britain's medical establishment followed the USA somewhat more sedately, with 
statements on brain stem death from the Conference of the Medical Royal Colleges 
and Faculties of the UK in 1976. The then Department of Health and Social Security 
responded in 1979 (revised 1983 and 1998) with the production of guidelines for 
diagnosis, and the use of the deceased patient's organs for transplantation. Lock finds 
it "significant" that Harvard's Ad Hoc Committee produced its criteria "shortly after 
the world's first heart transplant" (Lock 1996a:215). She argues that "reaching a 
medical consensus ... was clearly linked from the outset to a demand for human 
organs" by noting that the Committee's second main reason for developing the criteria 
was because "obsolete criteria for the definition of death can lead to controversy in 
obtaining organs for transplantation," the first reason being to reduce the emotional 
and financial burdens on families and hospitals (Lock 1996a:215 -6). In a meticulous 
review of the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee's proceedings, Giacomini (1997) offers a 
strong argument for a direct causal link between the needs of the USA's transplant 
programme and the establishment of brain stem death criteria. The causal link is, by 
now, perhaps academic. If all transplant activity was to cease, this would not mean 
that the incidences of brain stem death would also cease. Yet the link is irrevocably 
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present and has led over the last few decades to substantial publicity encouraging 
people to think about becoming organ donors in the event of their deaths. 
Promoting Organ Donation 
In this section, I briefly outline how the promotion of organ donation has developed 
and how information is disseminated, before turning to examine the presence of gift 
metaphors within promotional, popular, and academic materials. 
Donor Cards 
Approximately 10 million organ donor cards are circulated every year (New et al. 
1994:48). Donor cards appeared as a private initiative in 1971, when they involved 
the kidneys only, but they were soon taken up by the then Department of Health and 
Social Security (DHSS). In 1981, the donor card became `multi -organ' with the 
inclusion of the heart, liver, pancreas and eyes; the lungs were added in 1985 and the 
eyes were changed to the corneas in 1988 (UKTSSA correspondence). 
The Donor Register 
Launched in 1994 by the then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Health, the 
Register is currently maintained by the United Kingdom Transplant Support Service 
Authority (UKTSSA). This centralised database allows health care professionals 
working in transplantation to check whether a suitable deceased patient had registered 
the wish to become a donor. Registration is facilitated in a number of ways. The 
8 The Authority also keeps a record of all potential recipients. and allocates organs through a series 
of waiting lists. 
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decision can be indicated on an application form for a driving licence, or when 
registering with a new general practitioner. In both of these cases, the information is 
directly transferred to UKTSSA. Registration forms are also sent out by the UK 
Passport Agency, but these have to be returned by individuals themselves, as do the 
registration forms which can be found in public places such as libraries. Registration 
forms are often part of an information leaflet, which also has a detachable donor card. 
Human Organs and the Metaphor of the Gift 
The term `gift of life' is widely understood to refer to organs for transplantation, so 
much so that the need for many other forms of tissue tends to be overshadowed, 
according to an educational leaflet about Britain's Tissue Banks (British Association 
of Tissue Banks 1997). Women whose ova are extracted and used in fertility 
treatments consider themselves to be giving `gifts of life' (Konrad 1999:645). During 
the present research, the terms `gift' and `gift of life' were frequently encountered. In 
popular media, the effect was often dramatic. On 5th May 1997, the Edinburgh 
Evening News carried a front page story about a young man who had committed 
suicide; his father spoke of how the young man had "left the gift of life for others," as 
his kidneys and liver had been removed for transplantation -- redeeming even the act 
of suicide. Similarly, the Big Issue in Scotland (1997:6) carried an article headed `the 
long wait for the gift of life'. An educational pack for health care professionals, 
prepared by the Scottish Transplant Co- ordinators, was titled Me (lift of Life' 
(personal communication), the title also given to three information booklets produced 
by the British Organ Donor Society (BODY). References to organs as `gifts' 
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appeared in research questionnaires returned to me by recipients and donor families, 
in academic writings (e.g. Sque and Payne 1994), and books by recipients (Hatton 
1996: Sylvia 1997). The Department of Health promotional leaflet from 1996 (Plates 
3 -4) carries the phrases 'gift of life' and 'a gift without price'; the word 'gift' appears 
twice in a recipient's quote, and a gift appears, literally, being carried by a man in one 
of the leaflet's several photographs. 
What is it, then, about allowing one's organs to be removed after death that 
renders them so obviously as `gifts'? Two publicly promoted aspects are significant -- 
organs are to be given first, voluntarily and second, altruistically, a view encountered 
in various research contexts where the status of the organ as a gift seemed in no 
doubt. A third quality, of anonymity, rather reinforces the other two. 
On their voluntarism, certainly in Britain, gifts are assumed to be given as a 
matter of choice (Carrier 1995; cf. Strathern 1997). In promotional leaflets designed 
to encourage people to carry donor cards terms such as 'option', `wish to donate', 
`request to be a donor', and `when you decide' are featured. Arbitrary removal of 
organs from the dead is not institutionalised in British law, though health care 
professionals have more authority to remove organs without consultation than is 
generally known (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, people spoke to me about how they, 
or their relatives or friends, had chosen to carry donor cards. Choice extends into 
which organs one prefers to donate. 
Altruism is broadly understood as giving with no expectation of return. In her 
Foreword to The Gift, Douglas (1990: vii) describes the "unrequited surrender of 
resources" as `charity', widely perceived in Britain as generosity, and represented in 
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one promotional leaflet through the use of a heart motif (Dept. of Health 1998, Plates 
5 -6), a symbol of loving and giving. Several hearts appear on the leaflet, increasing in 
size until the largest extends off the page. One might surmise that donor anonymity 
decreases the impact of the gift's altruism. Promotional leaflets emphasise that donor 
identities will not be revealed to recipients, though donor families may be told 11()\\ 
organs were used. If recipients do not know who gave this gift, no return can be 
made; potential donors are presumably happy with this arrangement. Yet the 
perception of organ donation as a generous act is rather amplified by the giver's 
concern for unknown people. In casual conversations with members of the public and 
academic colleagues, as well as more formal discussions with health care 
professionals, potential recipients, and donor families, organ donation was explicitly 
linked with the morally valued ideal of saving lives (cf. Lock I996b:164). Studies of 
donor families in the USA found organ donation regarded as "the highest form of 
charity" (Bartucci and Seller 1986:104), in a context we must remember where blood 
is bought and sold. Donor families in the present study similarly emphasised the 
generosity, the concern for others, the selflessness, of their loved one, who took the 
time to think about his or her own death, and decide to become an organ donor. Their 
moral worth was regarded as having been demonstrated by the act of donation, rather 
than achieved by it. In other words, the donor was already an exemplary person, in 
the eyes of his or her family. 
To re- iterate, then, organ donation is promoted and understood as the 
voluntary, anonymous and `unrequited surrender of resources'. Its quality as a gift is 
strongly reinforced in promotional materials, popular media and academic literature. 
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The model of voluntary, benevolent gestures towards others with no expectation of a 
direct return (`altruism') is implicitly assumed and explicitly defended in academia, not 
least in relation to policies for welfare provision generally (e.g. Pemberton 1990; cf 
Schrift 1997:18 -20), health care particularly (e.g. Page 1996) and tissue and organ 
donation specifically (e.g. Titmuss 1970), as shall be seen in the next chapter. It v, ill 
be useful, therefore, to examine here the tenacious nature of both the notion of 
altruism and its academic defence. 
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II Scholarly Discourses on Altruism 
The term `altruism' was originally offered by Auguste Comte to describe "a principle 
of moral conduct based on regard for others" (lngold 1986:277, citing Hawthorn 
1976:78) in contrast to egoism, that is selfishness, as the motivating force of human 
behaviour. Since then, a very substantial literature has accumulated, on altruism and 
its wider theoretical context of gift exchange, of which the present study can give but 
a glimpse. To paraphrase Parry's (1986) remark on Mauss's (1990) essay, it is not my 
intention to argue that there is no such thing as altruism; my interest lies in examining 
why people think there should be altruism, and the implications of this for organ 
donor families and organ recipients. The following summary is therefore a review of 
how the historical development of altruism is reported, and a critical appraisal of what 
has been and continues to be viewed as altruism within Britain's welfare system. 
Contemporary Discourses on Altruism 
The `theme of the gift' has been described as a focal point at the intersection of intra- 
and inter -disciplinary discussions of deconstruction, gender, ethics, philosophy, 
anthropology and economics (Schrift 1997:3). Within the literature, there is general 
understanding that the giving of gifts implicates of necessity some form of relationship 
between the giver and receiver. Forms of relating range from the intensely personal 
relations of love wherein "the gift finds perhaps its most perfect expression" (Schrift 
1997:7; cf. Emerson same volume), to a generalised sociality which permits of "state - 
sponsored gift giving" (Schrift 1997:16). 
36 
In his presentation of altruism as opposed to egoism, Comte made no 
distinction between selfishness and self -interest (Page 1996:34). Subsequent studies 
have considered whether altruism may include self-interest; arguing that altruistic 
behaviour should have no expectation of reward from the object of the altruistic 
behaviour" (Cohen 1972:41) or more broadly "from external sources" (Macaulay and 
Berkowitz 1970:3). Others have concluded that some benefit to oneself, even a sense 
of personal pleasure, is acceptable (Leeds 1963:230 -31), provided it is not the 
primary intent (Sorrentino and Rushton 1981:427). 
Attention has been given to agency, placing altruistic behaviour beyond the 
imperatives of duty or obligation (Leeds 1963:230 -31), in favour of spontaneous 
empathetic (Cohen 1972) or sympathetic (Collard 1978) responses to the needs of 
others. Attempts have been made to explain altruistic behaviour in humans through 
genetic determinants (e.g. Wilson 1975) derived from studies of non -human animals 
which provided behavioural theories (e.g. group selection [Wynn- Edwards 1962], kin 
selection [Hamilton 1964] and reciprocal altruism [Trivers 1971]). Philosophers have 
utilised such studies to account for human social life (e.g. Midgley 1994). In 
economics, mathematical theories have been applied to the same end (e.g. Stark 
1995). Collard argued for a `rational altruism' in opposition to the rational, self- 
interest propounded by contemporary economic textbooks (1978:3). Yet Western 
economists have also been criticised for their inability to comprehend systems of 
exchange beyond that of the Western economic market (Gregory 1983). A 
dichotomous model of `gift societies' opposed to `commodity societies' pervades this 
latter discourse, with frequent reference to Mauss's (1990) essay on gift exchange. 
37 
Historical Accounts of Altruism 
I develop this section with reference to `state- sponsored gift giving' (see above). In 
Britain the origins of `welfare altruism' have been traced to the teachings of the early 
Christian church, where an "active concern for others rather than self' was seen as a 
Christian duty (Page 1996:17; cf. Tierney 1959:46), though such acts also included 
an element of self -interest in as far as they were conducted in the hope of attaining 
salvation (Page 1996:17 -18). During the sixteenth century, the doctrine of salvation 
through the performance of charitable works was undermined by the teachings of 
Luther and Calvin, the latter believing that salvation would come to those who 
worked hard, and actively sought to bring the influence of religious faith into every 
aspect of life (Reardon 1981:111). Aspiring entrepreneurs and capitalists favoured 
Calvin's teachings, so that economic success came to be seen as a sign of salvation 
(Giddens 1976:5) -- this is the doctrine of predestination. Thus, Calvinism 
simultaneously "helped to secure the acceptance of an `unfettered' economic 
individualism within society" (Page 1996:20; cf. Weber 1958) and, during the 
seventeenth century, provoked an upsurge of charitable works particularly in the area 
of education and training, reflecting the doctrine that wealth should not be spent in a 
self -indulgent fashion (Page 1996:19). 
As a "demonstration of faith and a prospective state of grace" charitable 
works were stripped of self -interest; self -interest being understood as the less noble 
Catholic doctrine of achieving salvation through the execution of good works (Page 
1996:21 -22 emphasis added). By the mid -seventeenth century, "charitable activity had 
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become an established feature of English society" (1996:21 -22), activity represented 
as altruistic, that is nothing expected or received in return. While comparisons 
between historical and contemporary situations should be treated with caution, one 
can see here a strong resemblance to organ donation, where the moral worth of 
donors is shown by, rather than gained by, the act of donation. A broad difference 
resides in the secular character of contemporary Britain, where acts of altruism do not 
necessarily spring from religious convictions. 
Political developments in the eighteenth century restore the comparison, as 
`the state' begins to adopt a welfare role influenced by scientific, utilitarian principles 
(Page 1996:23 -25). Collective philanthropic organisations became widespread; their 
activities, considered to be a civic duty, were based on humanitarian principles and 
supported by the state (Page 1996:22). Into the nineteenth century, the state's 
scientific approach increased, with `poor relief' ased on the `factual' assessment of 
individual cases (Page 1996:24 -25). Private philanthropic organisations developed in a 
similar fashion, yet imbued their work with a "Christian concern for individual 
suffering" (Prochaska 1988:43). In the wake of threats to British economic and 
military supremacy, the latter half of the 19th century witnessed a strong state - 
sponsored drive for national efficiency in a society increasingly individualistic in 
orientation. Ethical liberal organisations such as the Fabian Society criticised an 
economic system which encouraged competitiveness and personal acquisition, yet 
excessive state intervention was not regarded favourably since it would tend to 
undermine self -reliance and independence (Page 1996:27 -8). "Ethical liberals idealised 
the market relations ... of early capitalism (where) responsible citizens ... freely 
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contracted with each other, for their mutual advantage" (Bellamy 1992:3, emphasis 
added). Stronger views on altruism were expressed. Peripheral to the Fabian Society, 
Clifford argued that only socialism could produce unselfishness (Page 1996:41). J.S. 
Mill, though a strong proponent of individualism, with its prioritisation of self before 
others, held that altruistic behaviour was indicative of `civilisation' (Page 1996:35). 
Paradoxically, autonomy and paternalism went hand in hand (Hockey and James 
1993). 
The foregoing suggests that the need for altruistic behaviour developed in 
tandem with economic individualism. Indeed, it was during the 19th century that the 
debate arose between selfishness and selflessness as the basis of human nature. Comte 
held that acts not directed towards the benefit of others were "inherently selfish" 
(Page 1996:34), while Spencer argued that an extension of familial altruism into 
society at large was acceptable to promote social intercourse, but benevolence should 
not be directed to "good- for -nothings" (Collard 1978:45). Segregating those who 
deserved help from those who took advantage of assistance has a long history. Page 
notes a tendency of the early Christian Church to distinguish between the `deserving' 
and the `undeserving' poor, though the small scale nature of feudal society afforded 
limited opportunities for abuse of the relief system (Page 1996:17 -18). Similarly, the 
nineteenth century saw perhaps the strongest response to possible abuse of state 
sponsored welfare in compulsory workhouses and financial assistance below the 
lowest possible wage level (Page 1996:25 -26). Reports of people who misuse the 
welfare system continue to feature prominently in contemporary media today. One 
might assume that organ transplantation would be free of any such moral evaluations. 
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As we shall see, while potential recipients demonstrably need organs -- the alternative 
being death -- the scarcity of organs does render the assessment of suitable recipients 
morally necessary, if problematic. 
In contrast with individualised analyses of poverty, by the early twentieth - 
century it was increasingly argued that poverty had structural, rather than personal, 
causes, and that the State was obligated to provide adequate assistance (Page 
1996:28 -29). Doubt has been expressed about the humanitarian motives of these 
reforms, not necessarily supported by the people -- especially those who came under 
their control -- since they were generally aimed at maintaining, rather than 
eradicating, existing social and economic relations (Page 1996:53 -4). However, the 
Second World War does appear to have impacted on rigid class divisiveness, 
generating a "willingness ... to offer help to strangers without expectation of either 
reciprocity or reward" (Page 1996:82), and giving rise to the view that "purposeful 
state welfare activity could ... provide the foundations for the creation of a fairer post- 
war society" (1996:60). The result was the development of the Welfare State. 
Assessments of Welfare Altruism Today 
The continuing success of Britain's welfare system has been attributed to "a more 
selfless spirit ... a greater public appetite for pooling risks rather than entering into 
highly individualistic arrangements" (Page 1996:83). Given the resurgence of 
"individualism, self -help and competition-- in the latter part of the twentieth -century 
however, Page suggests future measures should "appeal to self -interest as well as 
selflessness" (1996:146 -7) though he concludes his analysis of `welfare altruism' with 
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a rallying cry in its defence (Page 1996:150). Holman (1993:57) similarly evokes 
"mutual obligations towards others, stemming from the acceptance of common 
kinship" as a determining factor in maintenance of the welfare state. Hennessy is of 
the opinion that the National Health Service "is the nearest Britain has ever come to 
institutionalising altruism" (1992:132). Within the Health Service, R.M. Titmuss, an 
influential writer on liberal social policy, regarded the national blood transfusion 
system as exemplary of "sentiments of altruism, reciprocity and social duty ... explicit 
and identifiable in ... all social groups and classes" (1970:225). 
In this brief review, the term 'altruism' has been applied to behaviour which 
does and does not include self -interest, motivated by (variously or simultaneously) 
love, sympathy, empathy, Christian duty, civic responsibility and mutual obligations, 
conducted by individuals who esteem independence yet create dependence by refusing 
to permit reciprocity. Despite the assumption of autonomy and voluntarism in 
altruistic behaviour, all the developments discussed above feature an external agency 
responsible for provoking, or encouraging, or fostering that behaviour. For the early 
Christians it was God; by the Age of Reason, the State was beginning to assume the 
role; for some, that state had to be socialist; liberal utilitarians bowed to contractarian 
ethics; Titmuss accorded such influence to the nation's blood transfusion service; a 
century apart, Spencer and Holman evoked kinship connections. In other words, 
action does not arise spontaneously from autonomous free choice. It must be elicited. 
Finally, though kinship connections were evoked to foster a more general sociality, 
none of the behaviours described as altruistic envisaged the creation or maintenance 
of particular relationships. 
-V2 
Summary 
This chapter has introduced popular and academic perspectives on organ donation, 
paying particular attention to the presence of the gift metaphor, demonstrated in 
appraisals of organ donation as the generous consideration of others, a gift freely 
given with no expectation of personal benefit. Specifically, since the donor is deceased 
as a condition of the transaction, the possibility of a relationship between the giver 
and the receiver is excluded. 
It has become apparent through the historical review that the notion of 
altruism is idealised, applied to gestures displaying a wide range of motives which may 
or may not admit of self -interest; those arising from a sense of duty or obligation 
towards others may or may not be excluded. The majority of analyses prioritise the 
point of view of the giver, with limited attention directed to the effects of such 
activities upon receivers, beyond the assumption that altruism as `generalised 
generosity towards strangers' is good for everyone, at least in the context of the 
welfare state. Here, according to Titmuss (1970), altruism is exemplified by those 
who freely give blood. The altruism associated with welfare activities is predicated on 
the assumption that it is given by an autonomous, independent individual, yet external 
agencies have, simultaneously, been accorded the ability to `foster' altruism in the 
general public. 
Throughout this thesis, we shall be considering the location of agency with 
regard to giving the gift of life, while also paying close attention to the 
interconnections between human organs and the relationships animated by their cross- 
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bodily transaction. In the next chapter, I review theoretical analyses of gift exchange 
in general and involving the use of human tissue and organs in particular. A cautionary 
note is introduced since I shall argue that `the gift of life' is a homogenised term, 
inappropriately applied to a range of bodily substances given and received in diverse 
situations. Consequently, we are required to adjust the analytical framework to render 
it theoretically relevant to the `gift' in question. 
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Chapter Two 
Theorising Gifts Of Life: Applying Anthropological Theory To Human Tissue 
And Organ Transactions 
Within both the discipline of social anthropology and the context of everyday life in 
Britain, the terms `gift' and `gift exchange' have particular but not necessarily siniil;ir 
connotations. This situation has in turn implications for the manner in which 
anthropological analyses are applied to the transacting`' of human tissue and organs. 
To prepare the foundations for my own analysis of solid organ transactions, this 
chapter reviews a number of ethnographic and theoretical studies, both 
anthropological and non -anthropological. Some have treated exchange systems in 
general; others offer a more finely tuned focus on bio- technologies. 
Broadly speaking, the studies share a common ancestry founded on a now 
classic text by Marcel Mauss. A substantial part of The Gift, first published in French 
in 1923 -24 (Schrift 1997:323), drew on a small number of reports of exchange 
economies in Melanesia. Mauss (1990) concluded that the morality governing so- 
called `gift economies' could readily be adopted by people in Western `commodity 
economies'. Over half a century later, one of anthropology's most influential scholars 
of Melanesia, Marilyn Strathern, could draw on two generations of Melanesian 
ethnographies to produce her authoritative monograph, The Gender of the Gift 
(1988). In the view of Strathern, the kinds of persons implicated in Melanesian forms 
of gift exchange are irreconcilably different from persons in Western settings. 
Although the central arguments presented by Mauss (1990) and Strathern (1988) are 
9 From this point. I have tended to favour 'transacting' which emphasises the prominent 
participation of others in this cross -bodily transfer of tissue and organs. 'Donation' will be used 
when attention is focused on those from whom the tissue or organs are actually removed. 
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themselves apparently irreconcilable, this chapter seeks to demonstrate a considerable 
degree of compatibility in their application to the transacting of human tissue and 
organs. 
Viewed within the frame of the current research, Mauss's theory still holds 
relevance for contemporary studies of exchange economies, though it is his 
methodology to which I draw special attention in this chapter. Mauss argued that to 
understand exchange practices in any context one must also understand how people, 
objects, and the links between them are perceived. His methodological approach has 
important implications for comparative studies of human tissue and organ 
transactions. 
In relation to my own study of solid organ transactions, three points require 
emphasis. First, analyses of bio- technologies conducted within or outwith the 
discipline of anthropology cannot assume any homogeneity to human tissue and 
organs, either as `gifts' or as `biological material'. To do either privileges certain 
progressions of argument, leaving other important features unchallenged. Using 
ethnographically and theoretically based analyses of various forms of tissue and organ 
transaction, I suggest that each kind of 'bio -giff requires an analytical framework 
specific to the conditions of its production and transaction. 
The second point to be emphasised is that analyses of human tissue and organ 
transactions have tended to focus on one or at most two parties to the transaction 
whereas, I argue, an adequate understanding requires that we examine the effects of 
the wider transacting process on everyone involved. This broader methodological 
approach reveals that the transacting of human tissue and organs consists of what 
46 
might be viewed as a series of dyadic exchanges, each of which offers different 
interpretative possibilities, lay and academic, as regards the kind of object and the 
kind of person implicated in the exchange. 
This brings me to my third and last point -- the category of the person'. 
Particularly relevant here is the tendency in anthropology to juxtapose 'Western' 
systems of exchange with 'other' economies, carrying implications for anthropological 
notions of personhood. While it is understood within anthropology that analyses of 
exchange practices necessarily require a careful consideration of the form of person 
implicated in those practices, it is time to remember that the homogenised model of 
the `Western person' renders hegemonic discourses rather than ethnographic realities. 
The material in Chapter Two has been broadly divided to trace two different 
approaches to the study of bio- technologies. Section One addresses the work of 
Strathern (1988, 1997) whose principal concern has been `other' economies of bodies 
and persons. She thus foregrounds the kinds of persons implicated in different 
exchange forms, including human tissue and organ transactions. At this point, I take 
some time to review interpretations of `the person' apparent in academic literature, 
before outlining my own understandings of the terms `individual' and 'person' as they 
are manifested in the current research. In Section Two, I turn to Mauss's essay, The (ü/1 
(1990), which juxtaposed `other' economies of exchange with Western market 
economies. Mauss's theory has been applied to studies of bio- technologies within 
welfare scholarship refracted through socio- culturally specific interpretations of `gifts' 
and giving, as Carrier's (1995) research will illustrate. In Section Three, my own 
operationalisation of Mauss's theory frees it of certain restrictive assumptions; 
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interweaving my interpretation of 'individuals' and `persons', I show how Mauss's 
central argument can be applied to further our understanding of human tissue and 
organ transactions. 
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I Strathern and the (Re)production of Persons 
Strathern's work, shaped by her extensive knowledge of the literature on Melanesian 
exchange forms, illuminates the constitution of bodies and persons in the Melanesian 
context through `other' economies of exchange. The process is most extensively 
elucidated in The Gender of the Gift (Strathern 1988). Conveniently, a synopsis of 
sorts accompanies her stimulating contribution to The Logic of the Gift (Schrift 
ed.1997). Here Strathern applies her theory, shaped by Melanesian ethnographic 
materials, to the matter of 'bio- technologies' in Western settings. 
One of the core strategies on which Strathern's work relies is to "draw out a 
certain set of ideas about the nature of social life in Melanesia by pitting them against 
ideas presented as Western orthodoxy" (1988:12, emphasis added), namely the 
separation and juxtaposition of `individual' and `society'. Strathern does not claim her 
ideas to be held as orthodox by all Western thinkers. Still, the model of the Western 
person which she operationalises does hold a significant degree of currency within 
anthropological analyses (e.g. Becker 1995: Bloch 1988; Morton and Macintyre 
1995) and those relating to welfare altruism, discussed in the previous chapter. My 
work focuses on this orthodox form of Western person -- that of the individual as an 
autonomous, free -standing entity, detached from all other individuals, so that 
relationships with others are presumed to be secondary, "after the fact of the 
individual's personhood rather than integral to it" (Strathern 1997:298; cf. Strathern 
1988). 
Using this model of the person, Strathern argues that the value of Western 
gifts derives from either relationships with specific people which carry "special 
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connotations of intimacy" or a diffuse relationship to `society' which features 
"altruism as a source of benign feeling" (Strathern 1997:303). Furthermore, the 
generative power of exchanges is located, in this metaphysics, in the individual's own 
desires and agency. We give and receive because we want /choose to do so (Strathern 
1997:306). Twentieth -century Westerners live in a self -advertised consumer culture, 
dedicated to free choice, where gift- giving is highly personalised; in other words, 
consumption is about personalisation (Strathern 1997:295, my emphasis). Based on 
her understanding that goods may express personal identity without being gifts and 
that gifts can make statements about, but do not necessarily make, relationships, 
Strathern insists that in Western settings -- "the circulation of gifts does not create 
distinct kinds of persons" (Strathern 1997:302, her emphasis). Contrastively, 
Melanesian gifts are elicited by the potential recipient, where the identity of the giver 
is carried by the gift, and where that identity is significant to the identity of the 
recipient (Strathern 1997). 
Strathern On 'Bio-gifis' 
Applying this perspective to bio- technologies, Strathern (1997) argues that 
anonymity and voluntarism are ideologically paramount in organ and tissue donation. 
In her commentary on assisted conception, Strathern notes that semen or ova may be 
elicited by a specific person, i.e. a known recipient, but both can proceed 
anonymously; fertilisation occurs, and an embryo takes on its own identity, whether or 
not donors and recipients are known to each other. "Donation linking a person to a 
source of genetic endowment does not necessarily link the person to another person" 
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(Strathern 1997:300). Extending her argument to the donation of solid organs, organ 
donors "can give anonymously because human organs are regarded as anonymous: 
kidneys differ in physical condition rather than social identity" (Strathern 1997:301). 
At this point Strathern acknowledges that "ties are occasionally established" between 
donors and recipients (1997:310, note 38), based on Abrahams's discussions with 
transplant surgeons (Abrahams 1990). 
On voluntarism, Strathern holds that the Western individual, as consumer, may 
be `compelled' to act, but only "in the desire /drive /need for the individual to act as a 
free agent," not through the needs of others (1997:304). While "the Melanesian 
capacity to receive has to be nurtured in and elicited from a partner, sometimes to the 
point of coercion, the twentieth -century consumer is depicted as having infinite 
appetite" (Strathern 1997:306). We can think in terms of consumer choice because 
"anything consumed by that person comes from the outside, whether or not the 
source is other persons. For generative power lies in the individual person's own 
desire for experience" (Strathern 1997:306, her emphasis). 
Strathern's discussion concludes with the most salient contrast between 
Melanesians and Westerners. Melanesians have one kind of relationship -- 
interpersonal -- and gift exchange presupposes "two kinds of persons, partners 
divided by their transaction [and] a partnering of finite identities "; Westerners have 
one kind of person, and gift exchange presupposes "two kinds of relationships 
...interpersonal relations with others and ... relations with society" (Strathern 
1997:307). Under these circumstances, "the gift capable of extending a personalised 
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self into a potentially infinite universe turns the person into a potential recipient of 
everything" (1997:307). 
Re- thinking the Western person 
Intensive research with the families of deceased organ donors and the recipients of 
transplanted organs has led me to question anthropological understandings of 
`Western persons', and the extent to which we can be represented as bounded and 
autonomous units (Bloch 1988:16), 'distinctive wholes' (Geertz 1983:290). Such a 
representation is seriously curtailed by the fact that one or more parts can literally be 
removed from one body and placed into other bodies, a bio- technological 
development which has, by all means, extended our `capacity to consume' in 
extraordinary ways. 
Yet, as a direct consequence of this very development the current research 
confronted me with what seemed rather more than "one kind of person" (Strathern 
1997:307). The kind of Western person depicted by Strathern (1997) was evident in 
certain contexts. We glimpsed this person in Chapter One, an individual accorded 
political autonomy and the right to make choices about organ donation. However, as I 
listened to people describing the effects of their participation in the transacting of 
human organs, kinds of connections emerged entirely integral to their perceptions of 
personhood, reminiscent of `Melanesian' aesthetic. 
In Britain, personhood equates with `independence' which has a high moral 
value; those who fail to achieve `independence' are not seen as full members of our 
society. Children and old people can be excluded from full participation in social life -- 
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and therefore denied personhood -- because of their high degree of dependence on 
others for financial or material support (Hockey and James 1993). Other possible 
categories of exclusion are `the homeless', and 'the disabled' (Murphy 1987). 
Consequently, as I shall argue below, individuals are people but they are not always 
necessarily persons. Understandings of the individual and the person as I present them 
have no necessary universality. Rather, they can be interpreted and linked in diverse 
ways, in any one socio- historical context. Regarding `the Western person', the terms 
appear to have collapsed into each other. 
The category of the person 
The category of the person was first outlined anthropologically in Mauss's essay A 
category of the human mind: the notion of person; the notion of self , though he did 
not develop this work to the same extent as his thesis on gift exchange. 
Acknowledging the enormity of his subject matter'0, Mauss traces the social and 
historical development of the notion of 'self. We are conducted "with some daring 
and at inordinate speed, across the world and through time...from Australia to our 
European societies, from extremely ancient history to that of our own times" (Mauss 
1985:2), and thus we reach the terminus: 
From a simple masquerade to the mask, from a `role' (personnage) to a 
`person' (personne), to a name, to an individual; from the latter to a being 
possessing metaphysical and moral value; from a moral consciousness to a 
16 Given in French as the Huxley Memorial Lecture for 1938. 
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sacred being; from the latter to a fundamental form of thought and action 
-- the course is accomplished (Mauss 1985:22). 
The `finished product' in Mauss's essay bears a strong resemblance to the Western 
person described by Geertz (1986) and many other commentators on the person'. We 
can identify it as Strathern's (1997) Western consume5yet this analytical model is but 
one aspect of personhood revealed by the current ethnographic research. It is not my 
intention to reconstitute Western persons in the form of Melanesian, or any other 
ethnographically represented, personhood. I do propose giving careful thought to 
academic and non -academic usages of the terms `individual' and `person'. Whereas 
the terms are assumed to be synonymous, I argue that we need to separate them for 
both descriptive and analytical purposes. 
Ingold (1986) makes a similar point. Opposed to the notion that individuals 
are purely utilitarian, seeking only self -satisfaction, as one might say of Strathern's 
Western consumers, Ingold (1986:245 -6) rejects the idea that "individuals had an 
independent, subjective existence outside of and opposed to society." His own view is 
that "the source of both ... personal identity and ... current purpose lies in the social 
domain" (Ingold 1986:254), leading him to posit two ways in which the `person' has 
meaning in English language use. The first is the jurai person who has rights and the 
second is the category of the self who has control ( Ingold 1986:257). While Ingold 
does acknowledge the `social' source of `current purpose', the question of control is 
awkward. As I go on to argue, like Strathern's Melanesians, the agency for a Western 
person's actions can be generated by others far more often than we tend to 
acknowledge, particularly in the case of organ donation. 
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Two kinds of 'individual' 
My own research suggests a slightly different model of the individuaUperson, focusing 
rather on two possible meanings, in current English language usage, of the terni 
`individual'. Interestingly the first meaning tended to surface in my conversations with 
donor families and recipients, while the second generally turned up in academic 
literature or official documents of various sorts. 
Firstly, in the sense of being unique, individual can mean recognisably 
`different from' -- there are no others like this. In this sense, then, an individual is a 
unique embodied agent, a `one -off sample of homo sapiens. So far as human beings 
are concerned, we each have a visibly different body, even when a close family 
resemblance might be evident, though the case of identical twins does pose a problem. 
A second aspect of `no others like this' has to do with an individual's unique cluster 
of preferences, habits, dispositions, mannerisms and so on. Here too there can be 
perceived genealogical continuities with family members (`she has the Smith 
temperament', `his father used to sit just like that'), or habitual continuities with 
people who share our employment, interests or outlooks (`all ballet dancers walk with 
their feet turned out'). I am not aware of any ethnographic materials which suggest 
either understanding of `different from' is not broadly universal, and I do not think 
am proposing anything very controversial. What I am suggesting is that, wherever 
they are, people can usually `tell each other apart', though the emphasis given to 
displaying one's individuality /uniqueness is not necessarily prioritised everywhere to 
the extent it is in contemporary Britain. My use of the term individual draws on this 
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sense of difference, present in Ingold's (1986) and my own understanding of the 
person. 
In its second sense, as single, individual can mean `.separate from' -- individual 
sweets may be identical in composition and appearance, but they are all separate from 
each other. So far as human beings are concerned, it may appear obvious that we are 
all separate from each other; every body and therefore every person is bounded by, 
and stops at, its own skin. The notion lends credence to individualism as a paramount 
political doctrine, where the individual as separate from, and more important than, the 
wider social group, is the prominent understanding of the term (Cohen 1994:168). 
This kind of individual is contrasted "against its social and natural background" as the 
one in opposition to the many, where the latter is an abstract concept -- `society' or 
`culture' or `environment' (Geertz 1983:59). 
Apropos of this, it is not my intention to imply the presence of some form of 
higher order of entity, for example `Society', in opposition to the person, or even the 
individual, as they are discussed here. Where 1 do use the word `society', it describes 
not a thing, not a reified abstraction, but "a process going on" (Ingold 1986:121). We 
might, however, wish to ponder the possibility that the bestowal of rights to those 
who are citizens separates out a particular kind of (jurai) individual from the social 
person, and opposes the former to `the nation state'. At the same time, we cannot 
assume universality for this meaning of `individual'; its application in any social 
context would have to be carefully investigated. 
Similarly, political individualism has a long history in Britain (e.g. Macfarlane 
1978); understandably, we may well be at a loss to imagine how it is possible to be 
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different from, but not necessarily separate from, others. Nevertheless, any discussion 
of individuals in Britain would have to acknowledge the two indigenous meanings, 
and explicate their usages. In particular, it is to the second kind of 'one', the one as an 
indivisible individual, that we attach rights of all sorts, hence the term 'individual 
rights'. Where I wish to specify this second kind of .separate one, I shall use the term 
jurai individual (cf. Ingold 1986). 
To restate, then, I am suggesting that we can understand individual to mean 
different. As its ordinary descriptive plural form I will use the term `people'. 
Analytically, this kind of individual can also be a `person' in the manner I am about to 
discuss. But there is another kind of `individual' as separate. I am calling this the jural 
individual' and would argue that, as autonomous and bounded units, ` jural 
individuals' cannot be persons. 
The model of Western personhood presented in anthropological literature is, I 
maintain, this jural individual of British, and quite possibly north Atlantic, 
individualism, whose liberty "has become the cornerstone of Western political thought 
and practice" (Gittings 1984:9). Mauss (1985:21) himself indicates this, commenting 
on the significance of seventeenth- and eighteenth- century political thought 
concerning individual liberty whereby the personne acquired independence, 
autonomy, freedom, and the right to direct communion with God. Early in the 
nineteenth century, under the influence of the philosopher Fichte, individual 
consciousness was made "the category of the `self" and now, finally, each of us has 
"our `self (moi), an echo of the Declaration of the Rights of Man" (Mauss 1985:22 
and n37). 
57 
On this latter point, it will be recalled that Mary Wollstonecraft, "the first 
major feminist" (Brody 1992:1), was sufficiently moved by the gender inequalities of 
her day to produce `A Vindication of the Rights of Woman' ([ 1792] 1992), as the 
cries of `Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' wafted across the English Channel. Almost 200 
years later, Midgley was similarly moved to point out that the "whole idea of a free, 
independent, enquiring, choosing individual, an idea central to European thought, has 
always been essentially the idea of a male ... taking for granted the love and service of 
non -autonomous females (and indeed often the less enlightened males as well)" 
(Midgley 1984:51, cited in Lukes 1985:299; cf Hockey and James 1993). From a 
position of late twentieth- century Western feminism, we should not fail to keep in full 
view the partial rendering of the jurai individual discussed by Mauss, barely a decade 
after the extension of voting rights to women in Britain in 1927. 
A broader notion of personhood 
Mauss's essay on the person is not without its critics, several of whom contribute to a 
commemorative volume ( Carrithers, Collins and Lukes 1985). Pertinent to my own 
research, Carrithers (1985) contextualises Mauss's subject matter in relation to the 
intellectual development of French sociological thought, especially its emphasis on 
bounded, harmonious, organised wholes. Indeed, this sort of balance and harmony 
resonates in the concluding pages of `The Gift' (Mauss 1990) to which we turn in 
Section Two. However, only Taylor (1985:278 and passim) hints at the possibility 
that Mauss's `person' is not a `person' at all. So, what is a person? 
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An early definition from Radcliffe -Brown (1940:193 -4) distinguishes a kind of 
individual as "a biological organism" and a kind of person as "a complex of social 
relationships." This resonates with Taylor's more recent formulation: 
Being a person cannot be understood simply as exercising a set of 
capacities I have as an individual ... I only acquire this capacity in ... 
human linguistic interchange ... in a certain form ... that of my culture; and 
I only maintain it through continued interchange ... I become a person and 
remain one only as an interlocutor (Taylor 1985:276). 
Aspects of both arguments could be critiqued from a cross -cultural perspective, if 
one were aiming for a broad, analytical definition of personhood after the fashion of 
Leach's (1991) `marriage as a bundle of rights'. They appear to address corporeal 
personhood, taking no account of conceptual or metaphysical persons. Neither take 
account of "the brokenness of bodies" (Schenck 1986:51, cited in Diprose 
1995:210), which require medical or surgical intervention in order to exercise their 
capacities or participate in the process of composition. Conversely, a common 
significant feature is sociality -- personhood derives from belonging to and 
participating in social life. Ingold (1986:246 -7) proceeds further when he suggests 
that people are constituted through social relations; social life is "the very process of 
composition," a process which cumulates a biography. Thus: 
if we identify persons with the trajectories of their past experience, that is 
with their particular cumulative biographies, we must admit first that no 
person can be quite the same from one moment to the next, and second 
that there is no obvious point at which we should begin. No complete 
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biography would start with the birth of its subject [since the story follows 
on from other lives which have shaped it]. (Ingold 1986:107) 
Ingold (1986:263) emphasises the point, borne out by my own research, that "the 
constitution of persons is a process that is continuous and that cannot therefore be 
regarded as the working up of a raw material into a finished, 'moulded' product." Of 
course, in this `process of production' called social life we do not all constitute each 
other in similar ways or to equally significant degrees. One most unusual way is in the 
transacting of human tissue and organs. Section One of this chapter has introduced 
my argument that the anthropological model of `the Western person' cannot be 
applied unreflexively to analyses of bio- technologies. Section Two takes this a stage 
further, to my point that human tissue and organs cannot be analysed as if they formed 
a homogeneous category. Different kinds of `bio -gifts' offer different connective 
potentialities which can be discerned by examining people's perceptions of particular 
transactions. Consequently I argue that, while the transacting of actual body parts 
may not create a `distinct kind of person' in Strathern's (1997:302) sense, it does 
effect a profound change to the persons who are intimately involved. By way of 
illumination, I draw on studies of bio- technologies generated within both 
anthropology and welfare and health care scholarship. The latter have been strongly 
influenced by Mauss's theory and so we return to The Gifi and its application to 'gifts 
of life', reviewed in the light of Carrier's (1995) analysis of Western gift and 
commodity forms. 
60 
II Mauss's Theory of Gift Exchange and Social Solidarity 
The Gift (1990) is over three quarters of a century old, yet its central argument 
remains interwoven with ongoing academic discourse about the apparent opposition 
between so- called `gift societies' (non -Western) and 'commodity societies' 
(Western).11 Drawing on a culturally and historically diverse range of literature, 
including reports of gift exchange practices in Polynesia and Melanesia (e.g. 
Malinowski 1922), Mauss concluded that non -Western societies employed the 
exchange of gifts for the purpose of, for want of a better term, social cohesion. These 
practices were embedded in the system of total economic services" and gave 
expression to religious, juridical and moral institutions (Mauss 1990:3). Gift 
exchanges bound people together in obligatory giving, receiving and returning 
because the gifts were animated with the spirit of the giver, a force "both mystical and 
practical ... that ties clans together and at the same time divides them, ... constrains 
them to carry out exchange" (Mauss 1990:73). In Maussian terms, the raison d'&re of 
gift exchange was to create and maintain a network of social relationships which 
facilitated the economic distribution of goods and services. The two processes were 
embedded within each other (Mauss 1990:46). In effect, the system of exchange was 
about the ongoing maintenance of the whole group in both productive (economic) and 
reproductive (kinship) senses. 
Systems of these kinds differed greatly, Mauss argued, from what he saw 
around him in his own Western European social setting, and this reveals the political 
underpinnings of his work, outlined by Douglas (1990). Influenced by his celebrated 
I The labels 'gift' and `commodity' societies are as awkward as non -Western and Western. but I can 
think of nothing better. The reader may assume inverted commas round all such contested terms 
throughout this thesis. 
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teacher, and uncle, Emile Durkheim, Mauss sought to offer a critique of late 
nineteenth/early twentieth -century English political theory rooted in utilitarian and 
individualistic values. As a counter measure Mauss proposed, in effect, a welfare 
system based on the form of morality he saw operating in 'gift economies'. 'They' had 
moral persons whereas `we' had independent individuals yet, Mauss argued, 'we' 
could be like `them' if only we tried. 
While the conclusion to Mauss's essay resounds with undue idealism and 
romanticism in twenty -first century Britain, it remains a powerful statement about the 
nature of human relationships. Later twentieth -century scholarship has been drawn to 
what Mauss saw as the cohesive potential of gift exchange, upon which he himself 
was moved to remark, ensuring The Gift a prominent place in welfare policy 
discourses and studies of bio- technologies in Britain. R. M. Titmuss, an influential 
scholar of welfare policies, laid the foundations when he applied Mauss's thesis to his 
authoritative study of blood transactions in 1970. 
The Theme of the Gift' 
In The Gift Relationship (1970) Titmuss contrasts the USA's system of purchased 
blood with Britain's donation system, drawing on Mauss's (1966) theory. Seeking to 
discredit the commoditisation of blood, Titmuss brought into sharp contrast "the 
negative, impersonal nature of bilateral commercial exchange [and] the positive, 
integrative nature of gift giving in the sphere of social welfare" (Page 1996:95). 
Titmuss believed that any society's social institutions could "encourage or discourage 
the altruistic ... foster integration or alienation ... [and] allow the 'theme of the gift' 
62 
(to recall Mauss's words) -- of generosity towards strangers -- to spread among and 
between social groups and generations" (1970:225, italics added). For Titmuss, one 
such institution was the National Health Service's blood transfusion service. The non - 
monetary transacting of blood, Titmuss (1970:199) thought in rather Hobbesian style, 
assisted in maintaining community bonds; if they were broken, he argued, the resulting 
vacuum was "likely to be filled by hostility and social conflict." Titmuss 
acknowledged that few blood donors in Britain were motivated by "complete, 
disinterested, spontaneous altruism" (1970:89). Blood donors who participated in his 
survey entertained notions of reciprocity, to be fulfilled should they ever require a 
blood transfusion in the future (Titmuss 1970:239), yet the `gift' remained for him 
`altruistic'. 
The Tyranny of the Gift 
Sque and Payne (1994) have examined Mauss's ([1966] 1993) theory in combination 
with more recent writings from an anthropological perspective (Gregory 1982; Parry 
1991) on the dichotomous model of `gift' and `commodity' exchanges. Noting the 
influence of Christian moral principles in Western societies, Sque and Payne 
(1994:47) compare the very favourable public attitudes towards organ donation in 
Britain with cross -cultural moral evaluations of gift exchange, located firmly in 
opposition to the workings of market transactions (cf. Parry 1989; cf. Taussig 1980). 
Although Sque and Payne acknowledge Parry's (1989) comment that both systems of 
exchange "can be tainted with suspicion" they nevertheless conclude that "organ 
transplantation is sociologically and psychologically related to the dynamics of gift 
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exchange, as monetary re- imbursement for organs is outlawed in developed 
countries" (Sque and Payne 1994:47, italics added). 
Unlike Titmuss (1970) writing on blood donation, the question of obligation is 
prominently foregrounded by Sque and Payne (1994) in their study of solid organ 
transactions, and compared with Mauss's ([1966] 1993) discussion of the obligation 
to give, receive and return gifts. In the particular context of human organ transactions, 
the presence of obligation has been called `the tyranny of the gift' (Sque and Payne 
1994:48: cf. Fox 1988). When one considers the nature of the object which has been 
given, human organ transactions can be regarded as creating tyrannies, obligations, 
debts, which can never be repaid. Nevertheless, and following Titmuss (1970), Sque 
and Payne's (1994) theorisation of organ transactions exhibits a favourable moral 
evaluation of these `gifts', consonant with the promotional materials reviewed in 
Chapter One. Yet applications of Mauss's theory in contexts which privilege the 
contrast between Western forms of `gifts' and commodities, rather than that between 
different systems of exchange economy, have produced results not necessarily 
consistent with Mauss's intentions. 
According to Parry (1986:453 -6), Mauss's elliptical writing style and 
inaccurate first translation (Mauss [1966] 1993) have exacerbated the situation, 
rendering Mauss's arguments extraordinarily flexible; close comparative reading 
reveals significant differences between the translations. I have favoured the later 
translation (Mauss 1990) which appears more in keeping with Parry's (I 986) 
convincing critique. Wherever possible I endeavour to cite the copy scholars have 
used when discussing Mauss's theory. Similarly, Mauss's formulation of the theory, 
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its translations, and their applications are inevitably filtered through each scholar's 
academic or political pre- occupations (Parry 1986), the current work being no 
exception. 
The main interpretative difficulty relates to the difference between what I shall 
term, for convenience's sake, `Maussian gifts' and `Western gifts', illuminated by 
Carrier's (1995) attention to Western forms of exchange. Secondarily, there is the 
presumption that all tissue and organ transactions can be analysed in exactly the same 
way. I shall show that there are differences between kinds of tissue, and differences 
between kinds of transactions. When these differences are appreciated, considerable 
scope remains for applying Mauss's theory to analyses of bio- technologies. 
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III A Maussian Framework for the Analysis of Human Tissue and Organs 
Drawing on Mauss's juxtapositioning of `gift' as opposed to 'commodity' exchange 
systems, the examples from Titmuss (1970) and Sque and Payne (1994) demonstrate 
the classification of human tissue and organs as `gifts' because they should not be 
treated like commodities. The distinction operates only insofar as they should not be 
bought and sold, what I will call commoditised. According to Titmuss (1970) the 
system in the USA was morally inferior to that in Britain. Similarly, regarding organs, 
an OPCS (1992) survey showed 93% of respondents thought financial incentives 
inappropriate; on the other hand, the British Kidney Patients Association ( 1992) 
reported that 52% of respondents favoured grants for funeral expenses, to be made to 
the donor's family (cited in New et al. 1994:42 -3). But the absence of a monetary 
value does not render human tissue and organs `gifts' as Mauss intended the term. 
Possibilities remain to treat them in the same manner as commodities, as if they were, 
what I shall term commodified. It is no co- incidence that 1 found human organs being 
commodified most frequently in the very settings where they are literally detached and 
re- attached, that is hospitals, located in a health care context increasingly permeated 
by the politics and practices of the economic market. 
For purposes of analysis, the terms `gift exchange' and `commodity exchange' 
are a misleading shorthand. It will be helpful at this juncture to put aside the term 
`gift' and adopt instead `thing' -- comprising objects and /or services (cf. Strathern 
1988:136). Strictly speaking, the things one might call ` Maussian gifts' occupied the 
mid range of a continuum of exchange practices envisaged by Mauss.'2 At one end 
12 My thanks to Tim Ingold for this important reminder. 
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systems of `total services' involved inalienable things and at the other systems of 
market economics involved alienable things (Parry 1986:457), within which category 
we must, according to Mauss's understanding of them, include altruistic gifts. This 
becomes apparent in Carrier's (!995) exclusive focus on Western economies, mainly 
the USA and Britain, where the capitalist exchange form predominates, and where a 
different connotation of `gift' has emerged from that studied by Mauss in `other' 
economies of exchange. 
Carefully tracing socio- historical processes, Carrier argues that, in Western 
societies, need and obligation, and the transactions they motivate, have come to be 
perceived as separate; the same holds for people and objects (Carrier 1995:9 -10). 
Carrier illustrates that gift relations and commodity relations are identitied in 
opposition to each other (emphasis added), the former linked with the sphere of 
friends and family, the latter with the world of work. Finally, the obligations Mauss 
(1990) identified as being entailed in gift exchange have, in contemporary Western 
settings, become submerged because they are embedded within a network of familial 
and friendship relations (Carrier 1995:21) where the exchange of objects or services is 
regarded as voluntary, motivated by love rather than obligation. Within this schema, 
the only morally acceptable kind of gift is `the free gift', the altruistic gift. 
Altruism as Alienation 
Chapter One demonstrated the high moral value accorded to altruistic giving in 
Britain, and particularly to the state -sponsored altruism of our welfare services, 
strongly reflected in Titmuss's (1970) discussion of the Blood Transfusion Service. 
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Yet Mauss repeatedly stressed that 'gift exchange' was premised on a balance of self - 
interest and disinterestedness (Parry 1986:456). `Complete, disinterested, 
spontaneous altruism' did not foster integration in the societies Mauss studied, nor 
was the `theme of the gift' generosity towards strangers. An initial gift may have been 
given to a stranger, but the purpose of exchange was to turn strangers into allies and 
supporters. Mauss contrasted altruistic giving with inalienable forms of gift exchange, 
offering his essay as an indictment of charity, the altruistic gift, the "voluntary, 
unrequited surrender of resources" which leaves recipients indebted and "does 
nothing to enhance solidarity" (Douglas 1990:vii). 
The people implicated in such exchanges would be the autonomous, jurai 
individuals discussed in Section One. Carrier's discussion can be intertwined with 
historical analyses of the development of the autonomous individual (e.g. Macfarlane 
1978; Gittings 1984; Hockey and James 1993) which has assumed a dominant role in 
late twentieth- century political philosophy. Significantly, Carrier argues that the 
opposition of gift relations and commodity relations, and a denial of the former's 
obligatory nature, are not so much experiential as ideal (Carrier 1995:21, emphasis 
added). They are how we represent ourselves to ourselves, a point made by Ingold 
(1986) in relation to analyses of altruism "predicated on a certain notion of the subject 
... as a discrete individual," a model which has emerged because "we view our 
everyday life through an atomising ideological glass that presupposes the isolation of 
the subject" (Ingold 1986:277). As a result, Ingold argues, we represent our 
involvement with others as external to ourselves, coming between self and other, 
rather than as implicating part of ourselves, linking self and other. Viewed from this 
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perspective, altruism is not so much about 'selfless giving', the kind of generous 
giving exemplified in promotional materials for organ donation. Rather, we can 
identify it as giving detached from oneself, arising from the alienation of people and 
things, involving a rather impoverished kind of person abstracted from the obligations 
of social relations. 
The Problem of Reciprocity 
Conversely, Sque and Payne (1994:48) argue that human organ transactions do entail 
obligations, ranging from the "subtle pressures that enhance the obligation to give" to 
the `tyranny' of indebtedness felt by organ recipients who "can never totally repay the 
donor for their priceless gift." Such `tyranny' (cf. Fox 1988) may cause serious 
psychological harm to recipients and donor families (Sque and Payne 1994:48). 
Interpretations of this kind resonate with Parry's (1986:463) comments on Mauss's 
`spirit of the gift' (we may read this as what links the gift with the giver). Some 
anthropologists have found the notion most problematic in contrast with the idea of 
obligation, manageable under the rubric of reciprocity (e.g. Sahlins 1972). 
Parry argued that, when the gift is dana, its spirit precludes reciprocity 
(1986:463). An offering given to Brahmin priests, dana embodies the sins of the 
giver; "a kind of sacrifice," it must be totally alienated from giver and recipient 
because of the dangers it carries (Parry 1986:460 -61). A similar perspective can be 
attributed to health care professionals about organ donation. Human organs can be 
interpreted as `carrying the death' of the donor to the recipient, provoking feelings of 
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guilt, which motivates health care professionals to control or prevent contact between 
the donor family and the recipient lest the guilt is exacerbated. 
At the same time, organ recipients often feel they wish to make some form of 
return for their gift. However, recourse to the notion of reciprocity and hence to 
`repayment' of the debt (Sque and Payne 1994:47 -48) -- with its implicit assumption 
of an obligation discharged, cancelled -- cautions us to beware the pervasive influence 
of our Western economic model of exchange. 
Here the governing principle is "an exchange of alienable objects between 
people who are in a state of reciprocal independence that establishes a quantitative 
relationship between the objects exchanged" (Gregory 1983:100). Even if we allow 
that human organs can be treated as if they were commodities, Gregory's definition of 
reciprocity in commodity relationships does not transfer to human organ transactions. 
Attempting to incorporate reciprocity in a quantifiable mode is impossible when the 
thing given is "inestimably precious" (Verndale and Packard 1990). During the 
present study, a number of organ recipients remarked to me "how do you repay 
someone for saving your life ?" 
The question of recipient indebtedness was something Mauss (1990) 
particularly addressed when he turned to welfare provision in the concluding section 
of his essay, but the inability to repay or discharge an obligation was not, for him, the 
tyranny, since his primary focus was not the `quantitative relationship between the 
objects exchanged'. The gift exchanges of which Mauss wrote have been described by 
Gregory (1983:101) as "an exchange of inalienable objects between people who are in 
a state of reciprocal dependence that establishes a qualitative relationship between the 
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transactors." For Mauss, it was the inability of altruistic gifts to maintain relationships 
which was the tyranny. 
During the current study, 1 found that relationships were being established 
between the families of organ donors and the recipients of those organs. Other studies 
of organ transactions report similar findings (Sque and Payne 1994; Cunningham 
1999; Alnaes, personal communication); studies of tissue transactions report 
participants perceiving some kind of connection (Titmuss 1970; Konrad 1999). An 
analytical appreciation of these feelings of connection can be found in Strathern's 
(1988:xi) remark that "classification does not inhere in the objects themselves but in 
how they are transacted and to what ends." If we also concern ourselves with the 
ways in which human tissue and organs are transacted, and to what ends, we begin to 
see that dichotomous models -- inalienable /alienable, gift /commodity -- and the 
homogeneous classification of all tissue and organs are unhelpful strategies for 
analytical purposes. 
The Connective Potentialities of Human Tissue and Organs 
In Titmuss's (1970) study of blood transactions we noted that a form of balanced 
reciprocity was entertained by some donors; one day they themselves might need to 
receive a transfusion. Other donors offered broader and less concrete reasons for 
giving blood; "some sense of obligation, approval and interest; some feeling of 
`inclusion' in society" (Titmuss 1970:238). Titmuss was thus drawn to visualise blood 
donation enacting a sort of generalised anonymous sociality, motivated by a sense of 
obligation. In a more recent ethnographic analysis of ova donation (Konrad 1999:652) 
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many donors reported equally nebulous but rather stronger perceptions of `something' 
that linked them with the women who would receive their ova. Konrad (1999:943) 
concluded that ova donors "enact forms of relatedness as the sociality of anonymity." 
We need not associate these exchanges with 'jural individuals'; they may feature the 
transacting of human tissue as anonymous (Strathern 1997) but those who give do 
express, albeit vaguely, a perception of enhanced participation in social life. The 
women Konrad (1999) interviewed could even envisage a direct link with another 
woman as recipient. 
Sque and Payne's (1994) theoretical review evokes a much more specific form 
of connection, as does Cunningham's (1998) empirical study. Acknowledging that a 
relationship is established between donor families and recipients in the transacting of 
human organs (cf. Abrahams 1990), these writers give some emphasis to its emotional 
significance. Donor families may wish to know that the recipient recovered from the 
operation; recipients may wonder who their donor was; either party to this 
extraordinary transaction may wish to communicate with the other, or even meet. In 
this regard, Sque and Payne (1994:48) note Titmuss's (1970) comment about the 
transacting of human organs, when he suggested that something of the donor's self or 
personhood might be envisaged as accompanying the organ. He is describing, in 
effect, an inalienable thing in Mauss's terms, though the description does not 
necessarily apply to all 'No-gifts'. 
Instead, we need to rethink the inalienability and alienability of things in terms 
of degrees. Describing two different sorts of objects given during Samoan marriage 
celebrations, Mauss used the terms 'immeuble' and ` meuble', derived from medieval 
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French law pertaining to different forms of property (Weiner 1985:213, citing original 
publication Mauss 1923- 24:156; see Mauss 1990:8 -10). As a critique of misplaced 
analyses which interpreted exchanges of both kinds of object as balanced reciprocity, 
Weiner (1985:213) comments about the varying degrees of significance attached to 
the objects; not only was one kind, fine mats, held in higher esteem than the other 
kind of locally produced or Western manufactured goods, but the fine mats were 
ranked in relation to each other according to their social histories (cf. 
Appadurai:1986). Weiner (1985:213) argues "the full range of the statement that [a] 
fine mat makes about its own genealogy ... cannot be repeated with any other "; thus 
each mat is unique and not replaceable. 
Weiner's insight resonates with the examples given above, where different 
kinds of human tissue enact differing degrees of connection. From my own research, I 
will show that major solid organs, rather like the fine mats, carry a genealogy, a 
significant factor in understanding the connection between the families of organ 
donors and the recipients of those organs. Helman's (1991:100) comment is apposite: 
he suggests that human organs carry their own history into the bodies of their 
recipients, as "hidden narratives of another life and another death." I am terming this 
history `intangible substance', and I am arguing it cannot be detached from the 
physical substance of the organ. While it may be possible to hide these narratives -- 
they can be submerged in certain contexts -- they are never erased. Organ recipients 
know that someone had to die in order for their lives to be extended, that they live 
because they carry another's physical substance. I have found that they often wonder 
about their donor and the bereaved family, using chance snippets of information to 
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sharpen an otherwise nebulous image, writing their own narratives. And what of 
donor families? They are a part of that intangible substance, that narrative of another 
life and another death. From them it cannot even be hidden. They keep photographs, 
treasured objects, a lifetime of memories shared with someone whose physical 
substance now resides in another body (see Plates 9 -14). Though unknown to each 
other, I argue that organ recipients and donor families are inevitably implicated in a 
mutually constituting relationship engendered through the intangible substance of the 
organ in which they both participate. 
Summary 
The application of gift exchange theory to bio- technologies is embedded within wider 
socio- cultural understandings of the nature of gifts. Chapter One addressed how the 
notion of altruism has exerted a tenacious influence through history on attitudes to 
private and state -sponsored welfare in general. In this chapter, we have seen its effect 
on perceptions of human tissue and organs as gifts. Baldly stated, they are gifts 
because they cannot be commodities. Blood was the first widely utilised `gift of life', 
followed by other sorts of tissue, the major solid organs, and reproductive materials. 
It is my argument that all these materials were conveniently but erroneously labelled 
as `gifts of life' by way of a cluster of common features; they are all bodily substances, 
used in a biomedical capacity to create, enhance or extend life, and they are (imagined 
to be) freely given -- that is they are both given voluntarily and with no expectation of 
any return. The primary classificatory marker, however, is their opposition to 
commodities. 
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Focusing on human tissue and organs in terms of what they do in a connective 
capacity, the degrees of relationality they provoke, other classificatory labels are 
available. `A kind of property' has been proposed as offering fresh insight into our 
understanding of human tissue and organ transactions. `Property' and persons can be 
linked with widely differing degrees of connectivity. Human organs may be amenable 
to treatment as if they were commodities but they simultaneously resist the process of 
personalisation suggested by Strathern (1997:295). It is my argument that human 
organs personify their donors, through the `hidden narratives of life and death' which 
they carry from one body to another, implicating donor families and recipients in a 
sociality which challenges the orthodox model of the Western person. As I shall 
argue, the form of personhood to emerge from my own research is best represented as 
a shifting process, permeating and permeated by, a sociality which extends beyond the 
detached `betweenness' of relations `after the fact' of personhood. 
This shifting process is presented in Part Two of my thesis, which addresses 
the issues of anonymity, voluntarism and reciprocity, respectively. In its Introduction, 
I describe in more detail the donor families and organ recipients whose participation in 
the organ donation/transplantation process formed the substance of my research, 
along with elements of the transplant programme's organisation and administration 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































You might not know... 
Nearly 3,000 organs are transplanted in this 
country each year. 
As well as life- saving operations, there are over 
2000 sight- saving corneal transplants carried 
out each year. 
Heart, liver and kidney 
transplants which were 
once huge scientific 
breakthroughs are now 
commonplace. And as 
medicine advances, the 
types of organs that can be 
transplanted have increased. 
They now include organs such as 
lung, pancreas and small bowel. 
The option of donation after death can be 
extended beyond organ donation to a much 
larger group of donors who can give tissues. For 
example, corneas can restore sight and heart 
valves can save lives through their use in the 
treatment of heart disease. 
There is no maximum age for some donations 
so healthcare professionals would decide 
each case. 
Having an existing medical condition does not 
necessarily prevent a person 
from becoming a donor. 
Again, the decision is 
taken by healthcare 
professionals. 
The huge success of 
transplantation means 
that even more donors 
are needed. The most 
successful transplants come 
from organs donated from within 
the recipient's own ethnic group 
because of the importance of matching 
tissues in organ donation. 
People are still dying while waiting for a 
transplant. 
If Sou repare any more copes of Ma Wafter phase cal the rvn Oman 
Donator Utratawe tone on OMS 60 60 400 'cash are charged at local rarer, 
If you have any lurches encornes about agio donation. pease .sale 10 
Me LKTSSA. iUMed Meagdorn Transplrn Support Sernce Auttaorey1. Fos 
Dena Root Storm Crfloft 8nUc . 8534 BRR 
S9oa 1 SY) MO `os 1 e on 9e co, 
en6svara A UK rlrarJa QlPrtww,ts 
Organ Donation. 
Everything 
you need to know. 
Organ Donation. So life can go on. 
L 
Over 5,000 people in the UK are 
waiting for an organ transplant 
that will either save or dramatically 
improve their lives. Many people each 
year will die before they can receive a transplant. But 
as many people as possible need to be prepared to 
donate after their death to help reduce the waiting 
lists. 
Millions of people already carry donorcards or are on 
the NHS Organ Donor Register, expressing their wish 
that their organs should be used for transplants 
when they die. 
Many more have already taken the decision that 
they would like to help others in this way but they 
may not have told anyone how they feel about organ 
donation or expressed their wishes through carrying 
a donorcard or joining the Register. 
Facing up to the death of a loved one is hard. Having 
to make a decision about organ donation, unsure 
what that person would have wanted can cause extra 
pain 
The nest way to make sure your family and friends 
never find themselves in this situation is to talk to 
them now Tell them that you would like to be a 
donor. You can carry a card and join the Register. 
Even more important is making sure everyone knows 
that you want to be a donor. 
You are much more likely to need a transplant than 
to become a donor. If you are prepared to consider 
accepting a transplant for yourself or your family, it 
seems only fair to play your part by being willing 
to be a donor. 
How is donation handled? 
The idea that our death may help others is com- 
forting. Looking back, friends and families often feel 
better knowing that some good has come out of 
the tragedy. 
But, understandably, people want to know how the 
process is handled. For instance, if the time ever 
came is the welfare of the donor priority? The fact is. 
doctors' and nurses' entire training and commitment 
Is based on doing everything possible to save a 
patient's life. 
Organs are only removed when two doctors. working 
Independently have carried out a series of strict 
tests and monitoring to confirm brain stem death. 
These doctors are not part of the transplant team 
and they have no connection with organ donation 
The removal of organs is carried out with the <a^ r 
care and respect as any other operation. 
The funeral need not be delayed. 
What to do. 
Above all, make sure that those closest to you know 
what you want, should the need ever arise. That way, 
they'll have one less ordeal to cope with. 
Carrying a donorcard and /or putting your name on 
the Register confirms your decision to be a donor if 
the time ever comes 
The NHS Organ Donor Register is a nationwide, 
confidential list held centrally on a database of 
people, who are willing to become donors after their 
death. The Register helps to bring donors and 
transplant recipients together quickly. It is maintained 
by the NHS. 
If you wish to join the NHS Organ Donor Register 
please complete the attached form. 
You will also find a donorcard attached to this leaflet 
if you wish to carry one. 
NHS Organ Donor Register 
donorcard 
I0.1111 10 Mlp olhrtl (OJNt.N rt,r rvrt,: Ur rtr¡ arA(h 
DETACH BEFORE POSTING 
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PART TWO 
PARTIAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ORGAN DONATION AND 
TRANSPLANTATION PROCESS: Introduction 
I The Research Participants 
By way of introduction to the central part of my thesis, this section offers further 
biographical information about the donor families and organ recipients I interviewed. I 
then go on to discuss `discontinuities' in the organ donation and transplantation 
process which rendered variegated accounts of their own participation. However, I 
wish to draw attention here to one important issue regarding the processes of 
`becoming a donor family' and `becoming an organ recipient' which I present in 
Chapters Three to Five. 
The donor families and organ recipients I interviewed reported ambivalent, not 
to say deeply ambiguous, feelings about their participation in the performance of 
organ donation and transplantation. However, there were marked differences in their 
manner of relating that participation. My interviews and telephone conversations with 
donor families were highly emotional and very draining. As often as not, I found 
myself crying with whiver I was speaking to. Even when happy memories of the 
deceased donor were being recalled, there was a bitter -sweet poignancy in the 
remembering (cf. Battaglia 1990:197), and little or no opportunity to `look on the 
bright side'. In contrast, when organ recipients told their stories, there were 
occasional tears; some situations were more emotional than others; but overall, these 
conversations were scattered with humorous anecdotes or joyfully recounted 
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examples of `what I am able to do now'." Listening to recipients, I was reminded of 
the historical portrayal of transplantation's development as a `heroic struggle' (above, 
Ch.1). Consciously or not, these recipients related `becoming an organ recipient' as a 
struggle to be endured and ultimately overcome, particularly signposted by `The 
Assessment' and `Getting the Call' (below, Ch.5). 
Donor Families 
The first meetings I had with donor families took place in the library of a Cambridge 
college, where the British Organ Donor Society was holding its 1997 Convention. 
Steve and Claire had been sitting next to me during the afternoon's formal 
presentations, and I simply asked them if they would be comfortable about speaking 
to me. They agreed, and introduced me to another couple, Tom and Catherine, to 
whom they had "got talking" at lunchtime. What ensued was more of an open 
discussion than formal interviews, not least because we all retired together to the 
library, but also because I wished to reassure these families that I would not impose 
either my own research agenda or my own assumptions about what bereaved people 
need or want. At that same Convention, Rita and Conrad approached me about my 
research, and offered to help. Though Steve and Claire declined further participation 
in my research, the other two couples gave me their addresses." 
Late in 1997, Rita and Conrad visited me at home during a trip to Scotland, 
while early in 1998 I visited Tom and Catherine's home. Our conversations here 
lasted two to three hours. Tom and Catherine's only child, John, was 24 when he died 
i3 For an example in written form. see Plate 8. 
14 Steve and Claire are fictitious names, at this couple's request. 
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and became a multi -organ donor in 1995. Rita and Conrad's son, Philip, was 41 when 
he died in 1996. He too became a multi -organ donor. Both couples evinced a need, 
well documented in bereavement literature, to talk about their sons. Added to this 
need, both couples had apparently gone through such traumatic events during and 
after the donation event, I left them to relate their stories to me in their own ways. 
This involved showing me their store of memorabilia and photos, carefully placed in 
albums, which I was invited to look through. 
Over and above our meetings, we communicated by letter and frequent 
telephone conversations. Such research methods hardly exhibit anthropology's 
standard `total immersion' in the daily lives of participants, yet I established a strong 
rapport with both couples, whom I now regard as friends, still exchanging phone calls, 
letters and Christmas cards. Rita has often sent cuttings from magazines or 
newspapers; usually they have upset her a great deal not only because, as promotional 
instruments for organ donation, they focus entirely on saving the lives of potential 
recipients through stressing the need for more donors --as Rita put it, "for more 
people to die" -- but also because they present a picture of donor family comfort and 
support which jars painfully with her own circumstances. 
Ongoing communication with both these couples gave significant insights into 
the possibility that donor families' views can change as they move through 
bereavement and reflect back on their participation in the donation process. Sadly, 
neither of these couples have come to feel that their participation brought any 
measure of comfort, not least because of a lack of communication with their donor 
co- ordinator, and with recipients who benefited from their acts of donation. 
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Organ Recipients 
I was granted access to organ recipients at one transplant unit, where staff selected a 
small number of out -patients who lived within reasonable travelling distance for me to 
visit. Letters of introduction, Information Sheets about my research, and Consent 
Forms for participants, were posted by the staff" All these recipients agreed to take 
part. Interviews ranged from one to three hours and I conducted three with each 
recipient. One recipient met me on the occasions when I visited the Out -patient Clinic 
to interview staff, another chose to meet in a convenient and quiet bar in Edinburgh 
city centre; I visited the others at their homes. As a condition of REC approval to 
conduct my research with patients from this hospital, I signed a declaration to 
maintain their, and the hospital's, anonimity. Meeting other organ recipients at BODY 
Conventions is the main way this has been achieved, though I regret the fact that this 
second group of recipients has receded, unrequested, into anonymity. 
Broadly speaking, all the male and female recipients I interviewed or met 
informally ranged in age from early 40s to late 60s. At the time of our meeting, they 
were between one year and ten years `out from their transplant', indicating how long 
ago the operation had taken place. Among them, every major solid organ had been 
transplanted. Family backgrounds were diverse; recipients were single, married, 
divorced, with and without children. In the accounts related below, all names of organ 
recipients are fictitious. Further, I have occasionally attributed comments from one 
actual recipient to a fictitious other. Lastly, though I do name organs received by 
l' These are requirements of RECs. For detailed discussion of the application process. see journal 
articles in Appendices 7 and 8. 
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recipients, where I have felt it necessary to clarify particular stories, it should not be 
assumed that the recipient relating that story necessarily received the organ named. 
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II Organisation Aspects of the Transplant Programme 
As the Introduction to this thesis noted, the transplant programme engages a 
heterogeneous and numerous range of health care professionals employed in 
administratively autonomous hospital units throughout the UK. Efficient 
implementation of the programme is dependent upon a high degree of inter -unit co- 
operation, facilitated at the present time by the United Kingdom Transplant Support 
Service Authority (UKTSSA) and a somewhat patchy network of co- ordinators. 
Though the cross -bodily transfer of human organs can be made to appear as a unified 
process, organisational aspects of the transplantation programme sustain 
discontinuities which impact upon families of potential or actual organ donors, organ 
recipients, and health care professionals, not necessarily in comparable ways. I discuss 
these discontinuities next, moving on to give a brief description of the articulating 
role of co- ordinators. 
Discontinuities in the Transplantation Process 
Beginning with perceptual discontinuity, which I found to be most significant, 
analytically and ethnographically, the donation and transplantation process can be 
divided in different ways with regard to the participation of those involved. My 
research foregrounds the accounts of donor families. These could be discussed in 
relation to their relative's death, or the act of donation, or their interactions with 
health care professionals. One of these divisions was emphasised to me by a transplant 
surgeon. We had been discussing my research finding, that what 1 am calling the 
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realms of the donor and the recipient were bounded in such a way as to separate the 
organ donation and transplantation process into two distinct parts. The surgeon 
expressed concern over this finding, insisting that the two parts are inseparable. 
However, when I introduced explicit examples to support my finding, he wished to 
separate the issues surrounding the death of a relative and the family's interactions 
with ICU staff, from those of the act of donation and interactions with donor co- 
ordinators. We were each perceiving a separation between parts of the process, but 
perceiving them in different places, probably a result of our own different 
positionality. I willingly acknowledge that any part of the whole process can be 
separated from any other part, for example for the purpose of examining or improving 
practices in a specific area, and that any actual changes may or may not impact on the 
process as a whole (e.g. Cunningham 1998). Nevertheless, I would argue that the 
intensity of bereavement lends significant weight to processes 
interpretation, and that bereaved people cannot neatly cordon off `this bit' of the 
process from `that bit'. 
The increasing significance of perceptual discontinuity can be traced in the 
Code of Practice which has set professional guidelines in the UK over the last two 
decades. The first version (Health Depts. 1979) was titled `The Removal of Cadaveric 
Organs for Transplantation: A Code of Practice', wherein discussion of donor care, 
diagnosis of brain death, and organ removal were interspersed. The most recent 
version (Dept. of Health 1998) separates the process. It is titled `A Code of Practice 
for the Diagnosis of Brain Stem Death: Including Guidelines for the Identification 
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and Management of Potential Organ and Tissue Donors '.'6 Comparing these titles, a 
de- emphasising of organ removal is apparent; the latter version explicitly bifurcates 
the process. In the annotated `step by step' plan (pp. 18 -19), also split between two 
separate pages, clinical diagnosis of brain stem death is listed before consideration of 
any patient's eligibility as a donor. 
Underpinning this conceptual discontinuity, spatial discontinuity stems from 
the highly fragmented nature of health care today, whereby different conditions or 
diseases are treated by different health care professionals in specialised hospital units. 
The circumstances under which `the gift of life' is given dictates that the giver and 
receiver are located in different places. Potential organ donors are located in accident 
and emergency or intensive care settings, clinically and administratively disconnected 
from the transplant units where recipients are to be found." These units can be in the 
same hospital, though they will more frequently be in different hospitals which can be 
very distant from each other. For discussion purposes, I am calling these the donor 
and recipient realms. One of the most notable factors underlined by a consideration of 
spatial separation is that, in the recipient realm, the attention of transplant unit staff 
and the family of a potential organ recipient is called towards that recipient's `fight for 
life'. The deaths of potential recipients drive the campaign for organ donation. 
Concurrently in the donor realm, the attention of ICU staff and a potential donor's 
family is called towards a similar `fight for life' and, where efforts fail, towards that 
person's death. In these circumstances, the attitudes of health care professionals 
16 Brain stem death has become the accepted term, to differentiate this from clinical diagnoses of 
whole brain death, or higher brain death. which is not legally recognised as `death'. The latter 
condition would include people in persistent vegetative states. 
" For this thesis. I address intensive care units only, since most of the donors whose families 
participated in the research died in these units. 
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towards their patient's relatives, and the attitudes of the bereaved family towards their 
deceased loved one, may overwhelm any concern about giving the gift of life' to 
others. 
A third form of discontinuity is temporal, and relates to engagement in the 
donation /transplantation process. While organ donors and recipients are both 
`patients' of hospital units, recipients are visibly engaged with the process for a longer 
period. Potential recipients are referred to transplant units from other specialist areas 
of care. Once referred, they are carefully assessed regarding their suitability for a 
transplant operation. Once accepted, they are placed on a waiting list and may have to 
wait many months, even years. Where a suitable organ becomes available and the 
transplant operation is successful, recipients nevertheless require substantial clinical 
support for the rest of their lives. At the least, they will return to the transplant unit as 
out -patients every year and can contact the unit or their own general practitioner in 
the event of ill health. 
In contrast, while someone may have carried a donor card for many years, he 
or she will become actively engaged with the process suddenly, as a result of external 
or internal physical trauma, and technically leave the process as a deceased donor 
within a very few days, perhaps weeks. Family members are engaged with the process 
in parallel with their relative's involvement but they are not `patients', nor are they 
primarily (or even) regarded as the ones who make the donation; these acts of 
exclusion have major ramifications for their own, and other people's, perceptions of 
their participation in the donation process. So far as donor families are concerned, 
their participation is lifelong, because their memories of their loved one and his or her 
9(1 
act of donation endure for life. It may also be the case, though longitudinal qualitative 
studies are conspicuous by their absence, that curiosity about, and a sense of 
connectivity with, recipients is also lifelong. 
Practices which sustain the gap between the realms of the organ donor and the 
recipient are not necessarily the result of any deliberate, unified strategies adopted by 
health care professionals. In an article critiquing the ideology of hospice care which 
has come to impose an idealised way of dying on patient5Hart et al. (1997:73) argue 
that carers are not "individually responsible for this new form of social control," yet 
control emerges, sustained by practice. The senior surgeon to whom I spoke was 
concerned to emphasise that donation and transplantation are parts of one process, 
and strongly disagreed with my argument that they are separated. Nevertheless, a 
form of discontinuity was expressed explicitly by a co- ordinator when I was preparing 
to obtain ethical approval for my research. While links between the realms were 
apparent to me, and one of the issues I particularly wished to investigate, the co- 
ordinator advised me to separate them for my presentation to the local research ethics 
committee (REC) and in discussions with ICU staff at other hospitals. Her reasons 
related to the fragility of relations between intensive care and transplant units, a 
fragility which resides in the need for public reassurance that every effort is made to 
save the life of the potential donor. 
Herein lies a fundamental tension in the donation /transplantation process. 
While ICU staff and TU staff both aim to save lives, achieving this aim in a transplant 
unit requires the failure of that aim in an intensive care unit. Consequently there can 
be a degree of ambivalence among ICU staff towards organ donation. 
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Despite their discontinuities, the two realms must be linked to facilitate the 
transacting of human organs. Metaphorically speaking, the donor and recipient co- 
ordinators provide a bridge. 
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The Role of Co- ordinators 
Co- ordinators are generally located and financially sustained from budgets in the 
recipient realm. Many were formerly nurses. Involvement of co- ordinators in the 
donation and transplantation process has developed in something of a piecemeal 
fashion since the early 1980s, when one co- ordinator would function in both realms. 
Gradually the responsibilities came to be split into two separate roles, and donor co- 
ordinators have increasingly assumed a centrality to the whole process. This is 
apparent from the Code of Practice (Dept. of Health 1998) which governs the 
diagnosis of brain stem death and removal of organs for transplantation. The first two 
versions (Health Depts. 1979, Dept. of Health 1983) refer to `the transplant team' but 
there is no specific mention of co- ordinators. In the latest version (Dept. of Health 
1998) a page is devoted to outlining the role of co- ordinators, and their liaison 
functions with UKTSSA. Thereafter, several references are made to the role of co- 
ordinators in the process. 
However, the latest version uses the term transplant co- ordinators, reflecting 
a shift away from two separate designations -- donor co- ordinator and transplant co- 
ordinator; the division of roles remains though in smaller transplant units one co- 
ordinator may still undertake both functions (RSCE 1999:38). Donor families I met 
expressed disapproval of the term transplant co- ordinator, because it appears to erase 
the donation aspect of the process, a central theme running through this thesis. 
Further, I found the term dramatised a clinical practice and submerged the presence of 
people who receive organs. Hereafter, the terms donor co- ordinator and recipient co- 
ordinator are employed. Recipient co- ordinators tend to work within the recipient 
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realm; their role is presented in Chapter Five. Donor co- ordinators more often travel 
between the realms; their role is discussed next. 
The Donor Co- ordinator 
Within the donor realm, donor co- ordinators assess the provisional suitability of 
potential donors and arrange for clinical screening tests. The ('ode of Practice 
recommends that co- ordinators are informed about a potential donor at an early 
opportunity, not least because he or she may not be suitable, for clinical reasons, in 
which case relatives do not have to be approached (Dept. of Health 1998:12). Where 
a potential donor is suitable, co- ordinators perform a variety of administrative tasks. 
These include liaison with UKTSSA which allocates organs to transplant units; 
obtaining formal authorisation for organ removal from a patient's relatives; and 
arranging all practical aspects of the removal operation, including transportation of 
the organs to their allocated transplant units. Early notification to co- ordinators is 
therefore important, logistically. Allocating organs on a national rota basis, and 
arranging removal and transplant operations, are complicated and time consuming 
procedures, particularly in the case of multi -organ donation, where more than one 
transplant unit is involved. Any significant time delay could mean that the donor's 
heart spontaneously ceases to beat before the removal operation can be conducted. 
Furthermore, the heart, lungs and liver have to be transplanted quickly. The 
designated transplant unit has therefore to locate the potential recipient, who must 
travel to the unit and be prepared for the transplant operation while the removal 
operation is being conducted on the donor. 
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Given their central role in organ donation, one might wonder why donor co- 
ordinators are not located in intensive care units. ̀ 8 I was given two reasons for this. 
The first was logistical. Unlike transplant units which are highly specialised centres, 
few in number and widely dispersed, there are many more ICUs, where donors would 
be located, but each unit would in all likelihood deal with a very small number of 
donors, if any, on an annual basis. From this point of view, administrative 
centralisation makes sense. The second reason gets into the problematic area of ethics 
and morals. At a weekend Convention of the British Organ Donor Society (BODY) in 
1997, the Friday afternoon was devoted to presentations by and for health care 
professionals. One presenter outlined the `retrieval system' in Spain, where health 
care professionals (most often a doctor) are employed, on an additional and part-time 
basis, as donor co- ordinators. They are expected to identify potential donors, not only 
of solid organs but also of tissue, through regular visits to units where donors might 
be found, and through scrutiny of the daily death reports, since some tissue can be 
removed from patients who died of cardiac arrest. They are termed non -heart- beating 
donors. 
On the Friday evening of the Convention, I joined a group of ICU nurses 
whose assessment of the Spanish system was not favourable. One said that to have a 
member of hospital staff deliberately looking for people who could become organ 
donors would be like "death stalking the wards." Another told me, "my unit's staff 
have enough problems coping with a patient's death, without someone earmarking 
potential donors in advance." She also said that contacting the donor co- ordinator 
18 The exception is the London region. 
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was "admitting defeat." Many health care professionals regard death, particularly of 
younger people, as a defeat and seek to focus on doing everything possible to save a 
patient's life. ICU staff also wish to be seen to be doing everything possible to save a 
patient's life. The staff I spoke to about the procedure in Spain all wondered how 
families would feel about the presence of a donor co- ordinator in the hospital. Would 
it to them also conjure up images of "death stalking the wards," and cause concern 
that not enough was being done to save the patient? As one nurse told me, the 
transplant programme is based on trust, a significant part of which involves full 
confidence that everything will be done to save a patient's life. There should be no 
suggestion that a person is admitted to hospital for the sole purpose of obtaining 
organs. Ideally, people would recover and return home to their friends and family. 
Where it becomes apparent they will not recover, the decision about when to 
involve donor co- ordinators lies with senior ICU staff One co- ordinator told me that 
in her experience being summoned to a unit meant the family had already been asked 
and had reached a decision in favour of donation. Another said she was "not always 
successful," indicating an earlier role in approaching a potential organ donor's family. 
The need to approach relatives sensitively is emphasised in the Code of 
Practice (Dept. of Health 1998:14) which also notes that relevant training may be 
valued by ICU staff. Training in communication skills was raised in several 
presentations at BODY Conventions which I attended, some made by donor co- 
ordinators. Particular attention was devoted to appropriate management of relatives in 
intensive care units, and guidelines on sensitive approaches for organ donation. Donor 
co- ordinators told me of serious distress caused to relatives because of the inadequate 
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communication skills of ICU staff. The general picture to emerge is that the 
experience can be traumatic for bereaved families, particularly if it is not well 
managed by health care professionals. 
Among the bereaved families I have interviewed, one of the strongest views to 
emerge was that health care professionals, including donor co- ordinators, had been 
unable to communicate sensitively and with empathy. None of the families had been 
offered information about bereavement counselling, though one young widow told me 
about an intensive care unit which set up counselling by a member of the nursing 
staff. The last thing she wanted to do at that time, she said, was to return to the unit 
where her husband had died. I also learned that co- ordinators might refer people to 
BODY, which was established to offer emotional support to the families of organ 
donors. Conversely, a number of health care professionals, including donor co- 
ordinators, expressed reservations about BODY. Reasons for this resided mainly in 
the founders, John and Margaret Evans, having `a very particular perspective', or `a 
selective viewpoint', with the implicit assumption that health care professionals hold 
an objective and totalising knowledge, an assumption I challenge in the next chapter. 
Communication between the realms 
Apart from the issue of approaching families sensitively about organ removal, 
communication between the donor and recipient realms is possible on three different 
but interconnected levels. Firstly, staff in both realms can be in direct communication 
with each other. Second, donor families and transplant recipients can be given 
information about each other. Third, donor families and the recipients of their 
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relatives' organs can sometimes communicate with each other. On each level the co- 
ordinators occupy a pivotal role though, on the latter two levels, that role can feature 
practices which effect and sustain communicative discontinuities. 
Communication occurs with staff in the donor realm because co- ordinators 
recognise the emotional stress involved in caring for organ donors. The co- ordinators 
I interviewed emphasised that they would write or telephone with basic details about 
recipients, along with thanks for their work. Particular concern was expressed for 
operating theatre staff in the donor's hospital, who can often be left "in limbo." They 
did not know the donor or his or her family, and they may have no contact with the 
donor's intensive care unit after the operation. Staff who assist with the donor's 
operation can find the experience unpleasant. One co- ordinator said that, unless she 
telephoned or wrote to them, theatre staff would have no idea of the "successful end 
result" of what can be a very distressing situation -- operating on "a dead body." A 
theatre nurse I met at a BODY Convention reiterated this view. She came to the 
Convention specifically to get a happier view of organ donation, since she only dealt 
with deceased donors and never learned about recipients. 
ICU staff were not forgotten by the co- ordinators I interviewed. They too 
would be contacted, to hear about a recipient's recovery One co- ordinator asked 
ICU staff to pass on this news to the donor's family, if they telephoned or visited the 
unit. The co- ordinators I spoke to said they contacted the ICU staff for their own 
sake, because their work was emotionally distressing. However, the importance of 
advising them about the success of recipient operations was emphasised at BODY 
Conventions for another reason. Awareness of the successful outcome of transplant 
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operations affords the possibility of more favourable support from ICU staff. Co- 
ordinators I met were, no doubt, genuinely concerned for the emotional well -being of 
health care colleagues. At the same time, the more general need to promote organ 
donation among ICU staff cannot be ignored, though it was not an issue I was aware 
of before I began research on this phenomenon. 
The donor and recipient co- ordinators may also communicate basic 
information to donor families and recipients about each other. In most cases which 
came to my attention, donor families would most often be given the age and/or sex of 
recipients. In their turn, recipients would be given the age and sex of the donor, and 
sometimes the relationship of surviving next of kin, for example a wife. 
Donor families and recipients might also communicate indirectly, via the co- 
ordinators, or directly with each other. I found the latter form much less frequent, and 
neither form was widely supported among transplant professionals. They argued that 
either recipients or donor family members can feel themselves to be strongly attached 
to the other, emotionally involved with the other, and this was regarded as potentially 
harmful. Since control of communication emanates largely from the recipient realm, 
the matter is treated fully in Chapter 5. 
Education 
Beyond the physical confines of the donor realm, donor co- ordinators contribute to 
public education about, and the active promotion of, organ donation. Promotional 
leaflets and media articles illuminate a number of themes raised by co- ordinators and 
other health care colleagues in interviews, casual conversations, and presentations at 
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BODY Conventions. These themes have a forceful impact on what I am calling the 
public performance of organ donation. Three promotional leaflets are reproduced as 
Plates 1 -6 (Pp. 75 -80) and employed to illustrate various points in this work. Here, I 
briefly present two media articles which give some prominence to the role of co- 
ordinators, but reflect very different styles of presentation. 
On public attitudes, an article in the Big Issue in Scotland (No. 136, 1997) 
features co- ordinators in Glasgow who inform us that countering the myths which 
lead families to decline organ removal is "a tough job." The first myth is about 
`vulture -like' doctors, who will mutilate or badly treat bodies, only interested in 
getting organs; seeing the donor's body after the removal operation alleviates this 
concern, we are told, an option always offered by these co- ordinators. Further 
problems arise in the "confusion about brain -stem death," which many people do not 
understand, and the anger relatives can feel about a sudden, unexpected death, 
particularly of a child. Where it is a child who has died, the number of refusals to 
donate organs "is very high," but after a death "the time for education is over." To 
compound a bereaved family's distress, a co- ordinator points out that "grieving 
relatives can live to regret refusing organ donation." 
An article in Sainsbury's The Magazine (Sept. 1995) also featuring co- 
ordinators stresses the availability of "counselling and support as long as a bereaved 
[donor] family needs it." A co- ordinator explains that donor families receive "every 
detail about a recipient except their name and address" and that "recipients are 
encouraged to write anonymously to the donor family to express their own thanks ... 
for most people [donor families] that is enough." 
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A new facet of the exchange process is introduced here. In the foregoing 
section we saw how that process is perceived as fragmented and discontinuous. Now 
we see the process reach its conclusion; an organ is given and accepted, thanks are 
returned and accepted. From one perspective, and resembling the dyadic exchanges of 
the marketplace, the transaction is meant to have been completed. 
Summary 
To re- iterate the main points of this Introduction, we have seen that many 
professional people are involved in the donation and transplantation process, itself 
bifurcated into two distinct realms. Giving the gift of life is not a simple matter of 
exchange; the transacting of human organs is mediated by a diverse range of health 
care professionals. Participation was rendered even more bewildering for donor 
families I interviewed because they encountered a traumatic lack of fit between their 
expectations, informed by public representations of organ donation, and the attitudes 
of health care professionals which informed daily practices in the donor and recipient 
realms. 
Reflecting on the organisation of the transplant programme, Sque and Payne 
(1994) make a particularly apposite point in relation to my study: the role of health 
care professionals as gate- keepers is not well understood (cf. Fox and Swazey 1974). 
My own approach to health care professionals treats them as both gatekeepers and 
participants in the donation/transplantation process. 
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In this regard, Sahlins's critique of The Gift raises two relevant issues.'9 First, 
Sahlins argued that Mauss understood exchange "in the way it is presented to 
experience -- fragmented ... into the separate acts of giving, receiving, and repaying" 
where the han (the spirit of the gift) becomes "mystic cement" used to glue back the 
fragmented elements (Sahlins 1972:154). Second, Sahlins emphasises the 
complicating presence of a third party in the exchange process (Sahlins 1972:160 -1; 
cf. Mauss 1990:10 -13). The donor families and organ recipients I interviewed 
certainly encountered the process of organ donation and transplantation as 
fragmented, as indeed did I; further, health care professionals were regarded as a 
complicating presence, as the controllers and distributors of information (cf. Sque and 
Payne 1994:49; Cunningham 1998 passim). 
As gatekeepers and participants health care professionals are located within 
distinct and discontinuous clinical realms. Their location and role as carers can affect 
how they interpret and respond to their participation in the transplant programme, 
which is discussed in Chapter Three. In turn, the perspectives of health care 
professionals could have profound effects on how donor families and organ recipients 
regarded their participation in the process, as I shall show in Chapters Four and Five 
respectively. 
19 I am not in agreement with Sahlins's first comment. 
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Chapter Three 
Managing the Transplant Programme: human organs as a health care resource 
Introduction 
Rothfield (1995:174) has argued that "knowledge always arises from a complex of 
circumstances, practices, related forms of knowledge, and institutional loci. It is not a 
panoramic view of the world but is always partial, provisional, and located." This Part 
of my thesis has two interwoven themes. One presents and accounts for different 
knowledges of the body within the broad context of the organ transplantation 
programme. The other theme illustrates what happens when one form of knowledge -- 
in this case biomedical knowledge -- is privileged over other forms. Thus, I endeavour 
to untangle the `complex of circumstances, practices, related forms of knowledge, and 
institutional loci' which give rise to these partial knowledges. 
That diverse and even conflicting knowledges of the body can be held by 
health care professionals, as well as donor families and organ recipients, is illustrated 
in Section One of this chapter. Priority is given to ethnographic data which both 
challenges and reflects representations of human organs as either altruistic gifts or 
commodities. In Section Two, a theoretical explication of different bodily knowledges 
accounts for the prevalence of the medical model of bodies, among both health care 
professionals and lay people. In Section Three, I reflect on the significance of the 
medical model of bodies and organs in the context of investigations into means of 
resolving a perceived gap between the supply of organs and the demand for them. 
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I From personhood to anonymity: perceptions of donor bodies 
On the medical model of death 
Morton & Macintyre have argued that "in the absence of signs of life ... the body 
becomes just a body -- a corpse" (1995:13 emphasis in original), while Gatens writes 
of the "neutral, dead body" (1983 :150, cited in Rothfield 1995:183, emphasis 
removed). Similar comments were often encountered over the course of the current 
research, reflecting attitudes held by living people towards their own bodies after 
death. As nothing more than bodies, no longer of significance, one can safely 
contemplate the removal of organs for transplantation (cf. Richardson & Hurwitz 
1995, Papagaroufali 1999 for comments on waste /recycling of bodies and their parts). 
In their turn, these attitudes reflect the dominance of a medical and legal 
model of death, which occurs in an instant; a time of death is pronounced, after which 
we are left with nothing more than a dead body. Decisions as to when someone is 
`really dead' vary cross -culturally (Bloch and Parry 1982:12 -13). In Britain, 
historically, death has generally been recognised to require the cessation of heartbeat 
(but see Powner et al. 1996). Complications have arisen as a result of life -saving and 
life -sustaining technologies which destabilise long- standing interpretations of life and 
death, and the boundary between them, as Chapter One explained. 
The phenomenon of brain stem death permits a critique of the notion that 
death is simple to determine, since it amplifies the processual nature of physiological 
death to an unprecedented degree. The death of a part does not equate with the death 
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of the whole, something well known to mortuary staff and funeral directors.20 These 
`deathworkers', as Howarth (1996) calls them, know that hair and nails continue to 
grow on the bodies of the dead, and that bodies do not instantly putrefy. Death 
unfolds over time. Certainly, brain stem death has been accepted for biomedical and 
legal purposes as an indication that integrated bodily functioning has irretrievably 
ceased, and its introduction to Britain met no widespread public opposition, such as 
Lock (1996a; 1996b) has documented in Japan. Nevertheless, its validity remains the 
subject of debate among biomedical ethicists and philosophers.21 From a philosophical 
perspective, Evans insists that "the spontaneously persistent heartbeat is a sign that 
the individual is not dead" (1994:6). Similarly, Chadwick argues that "it would seem 
odd ... to call a corpse an object which still manifests one of the traditional signs of 
life" (1994:55 -56). Youngner (1996:44 -47) writes of a `cognitive dissonance' 
provoked by medical technology forcing us to choose which signs of life count and 
which do not, and which is discernible in language use: it suggests that the person dies 
twice (cf. Lock 1996:220, citing Younger et al 1989). 
Never, just a body 
Official literature and reports about organ transplantation seek to emphasise the 
ordinary nature of brain stem death, "no different from death as commonly 
understood" (New et al. 1994:10), the intention being to place public discontent and 
unease about this kind of death beyond the bounds of `rational thought' and into 
superstition or ignorance (e.g. Big Issue in Scotland No. 136, 1997). During the 
20 My use of the word whole should not be taken to imply the boundedness relating to autonomous, 
jurai individuals. 
21 See Lamb 1985, Chapter 6 for a lucid discussion. 
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current research, though donor families found acceptance of their loved one's death 
very difficult, neither they nor the health care professionals 1 interviewed expressed 
doubts about the donor being `really dead' (but see Keep [1998] and Gill [1999]). 
But death is not only a physiological process. When we die, our disconnection 
from the social world is not instant and total; it is also processual, depending on the 
perspectives of the living (e.g. Battaglia 1990; Bloch 1971; Bloch & Parry 1982; 
Connor 1995; Hockey 1990; Metcalf and Huntington 1991; Mulkay 1993; Prior 
1989). Even in the face of broad agreement that a body is dead, a matter less easy to 
ascertain than one might imagine, it is seldom, if ever, `just' a body to other (living) 
people. On the contrary, the bodies of the dead provoke the endowment or negation 
of meaning, manipulable through the positionality of the observer. To declare dead 
someone whose body manifests all the commonly understood signs of life -- a 
heartbeat, blood circulation, body warmth, skin colour, breathing -- is profoundly 
unsettling to the social process of death, not only for lay persons but also for health 
care professionals. 
In Britain, as Machado (1998:4) argues, the descriptive terminology applied to 
bodies reflects their perceived connection to, or disconnection from, their social 
context, and indicates the correct social behaviour towards them. During the present 
study, when it came to caring for and talking about the living bodies of people 
declared dead, ambiguities and uncertainties were apparent among donor families and 
health care professionals. My own uncertainties also manifest in my use of shifting 
terms to describe these bodies /people, because I could not decide on one which 
seemed universally appropriate though `deceased' seemed reasonable, in most 
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situations, as a general term, prompting me to emphasise that while specific rules of 
behaviour may well be fixed to specific terms, the application of those terms is by no 
means uniform. 
Not Dead but Deceased 
Discussing the materiality of the body, Morton and Macintyre (1995:13) argue that "a 
body is more than its materiality, which is why, in order to be a person, it must 
possess life," a statement which could be challenged in the case of people in persistent 
vegetative state, where family members argue that there may be a living body but `the 
person they knew' is no longer there (Scotsman 12.4.96). As the discussion in 
Chapter Two argued, there is more to being a person than having a living body. 
Without wishing to appear flippant, my own research clearly illustrates that 
being dead need not imply `having a dead body'. The bodies of potential organ donors 
are not dead; if they were, organ transplantation would be pointless. While the patient 
has been declared brain stem dead, the body's tissues and organs remain living for 
hours or even days. Knowingly or not, the health care professionals to whom I spoke 
tended to mask this ambiguous status with the word `viable' -- organs are kept 
`viable' by the life -saving technology to which the patient had been connected in an 
effort to save his or her life. That machinery circulates oxygenated blood, and 
maintains the balance of other bodily fluids and chemicals, until a decision about the 
use of the patient's organs is reached. 
Even in situations where it was generally understood that the body was `dead', 
I learned that great care would often be taken by health care professionals to choose 
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words which did not upset the family of a deceased patient. (Significantly, they did 
use the word `patient' frequently, to prevent identities being revealed to me, but I 
have also observed its use as a handy generic label, as I use `donors' and `recipients') 
Recalling Youngner's comment about the inappropriateness of terms which 
indicate dead bodies, any application of the terms `corpse' or `cadaver' to the bodies 
of those declared brain stem dead met with strong disapproval. `A corpse' has lost 
much of its social subjectivity as a former person (Machado 1998:4). Cadaver seems 
to me to have been regarded as more of a medical term, denoting "an object with 
medical or biological connotations rather than social aspects" (Machado 1998:4). I 
encountered its frequent application, in texts devoted to transplantation, and as a 
descriptive term employed by academics and health care professionals who spoke of 
`cadaver donation'. Indeed, having occasion to refer back to fieldnotes from 1995, I 
realised I had employed the term myself, and its use was not totally absent in 
conversations with donor families. 
When speaking directly of their relative, donor family members tended to 
prefer `body', and they usually added the name of the donor, speaking of "Philip's 
body" or "John's body." When they were recounting their experiences before that 
body was released by the hospital, they tended simply to say "Philip" or "John." The 
bodies of organ donors, far from being `neutral', were regarded as embodying loved 
ones still connected with their family members. The circumstances of their deaths 
tended rather to retrospectively reinforce their identities as generous young people 
whose deaths were sudden and totally unexpected, but whose foresight and 
consideration meant that other deaths would be prevented. 
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In their dealings with the relatives of their patients, health care professionals 
even tended to eschew the word `body'. Describing their communications with 
bereaved relatives, nurses told me they would use either the patient's personal name, 
for example `Susan', or a relationship term, for example `your son', when talking to 
parents. Intensive care unit staff may have known a potential donor for a very short 
time, and if someone was brought into a unit already unconscious, there would have 
been no interaction with `a person'. Nevertheless, the ICU staff I met were aware that 
their patient was a member of a family, someone's daughter, someone's dad, and 
nurses in particular had to spend time with the family, offering what comfort they 
could. This care with words applied even when they seemed to contradict what the 
health care professional `really knew'. One co- ordinator explained how, when she 
speaks to the family of a potential donor she knows she is discussing `a dead body' 
but, as a mark of respect, never uses that term in front of the relatives. 
`Backstage' hospital humour can be much less respectful, rendering the caring 
image of health professionals questionable (Sudnow 1967, cf. Hockey 1990, Howarth 
1996). I was not permitted access to contexts which might have revealed similar 
behaviour, but the point I wished to make concerned the interactions of health care 
professionals and the families of potential organ donors. In the next section, I turn to 
the management of organ donors by health care professionals, as it was recounted to 
me by their families, and by health care professionals themselves. 
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From Person to Body 
At what point, under what circumstances, does a `person' become detached from his 
or her body, or the body from the `person'? Machado (1998:4) draws attention to the 
processual nature of this detachment; I would emphasise its oscillating qualities, 
thrown into particularly sharp relief in the context of organ donation. Until a decision 
has been reached about the use of organs, the status of the potential donor is 
somewhat liminal -- "betwixt and between" (Turner 1967: Chapter 4) -- or even in a 
Derridean sense, both and neither (e.g. Culler 1979:esp.165 -66 on differance). From 
the perspective of transplant professionals, he or she literally embodies scarce and 
valuable resources which could save the lives of their patients. Careful medical 
management is essential, otherwise organs could be damaged and useless for 
transplantation. At the same time, ICU staff are not dealing with a living person as a 
patient. This can create tensions, because the deceased patient is still someone's 
relative and should be (but is not always) treated with the sort of care the family 
would wish. Tom and Catherine told me how their son was left alone on two 
occasions. Nurses had come into the cubicle to carry out routine care, and had asked 
visitors to leave until they were finished. But they had not let the visitors know that 
they could return to John's bedside. His parents felt this was wrong. Someone should 
have been with him all the time. It is not that they thought John was alive. They 
simply felt he should not have been alone. At this point in time, `John' and `his body' 
were still intimately connected so far as his parents were concerned. 
However, family members are not the only people who think deceased patients 
should not be left unattended. The following examples concern treatment of what I 
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shall now call `the donor's body', after the removal operation. This matter, I 
discovered, is the subject of controversy. In one case, a nurse from a transplant unit 
was given the opportunity to observe a `retrieval operation'. Once the organs had 
been removed by the transplant teams, the donor's body was left alone in the 
operating theatre. The nurse said she was appalled that "the body" had been left lying 
alone. She could not understand how theatre staff could do that; paradoxically she 
apparently saw no problem in her use of `the body' as a descriptive term. Another 
nurse, recalling a similar situation, was moved to go into the theatre and hold the 
donor's hand for a while. When she looked into "his empty body," she realised "he 
was really dead," though it was still awful to look down into "an empty, open body." 
Her feelings were exacerbated by the knowledge that "the patient's parents" were 
waiting to see "him" before they left the hospital. These donors may have been really 
dead, but they still called forth strong emotional responses, and provoked 
uncertainties regarding their exact classification -- the transition from a `person' to a 
`body' is fraught with ambiguity. 
The apparent abandonment of these donors' bodies was given some 
perspective by an operating theatre nurse. He told me that when a patient dies during 
an operation, the staff take a half hour break as a mark of respect, before closing the 
incisions and performing last offices; the gap between organ removal and closure of 
the donor's body reflects a similar mark of respect, from the perspective of the health 
care professionals involved. However, this view was rejected by the donor families I 
know, who were deeply distressed at the idea that donors' bodies were being left 
alone. A donor's father went so far as to say that management of the body after the 
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operation was being treated as a minor consideration, left to junior staff, or "the next 
shift." The practice of leaving care of deceased patients to `the next shift' has been 
noted by Sudnow (1967: Ch. 3) in his study of two hospitals in the United States. 
Among the British participants in my study, the only nurse prepared to assist with 
removal operations in her hospital told me she stays to perform last offices for her 
deceased patients, though her unit's senior staff "hassle me to get back to caring for 
the living." 
An emphasis on care of the living, this time of potential organ recipients, was 
also apparent in a conversation with a transplant surgeon, for whom the ambiguous 
status of the donor body permits a conceptual resolution to the problematic of 
operating on `a dead body'. I asked the surgeon if he had to employ any particular 
strategies for coping with the removal operation. A potential organ donor is brought 
into the operating theatre with a beating heart, which has to be stopped as part of the 
removal operation, and actually removed if it has been donated. It struck me that this 
might be a difficult thing for a surgeon to do, knowing that the heart will not be re- 
animated in this patient's body. The surgeon said he had not found it easy, but he had 
learned what worked for him. Conceptually, he began the operation on `a patient' and 
finished with `a dead body'. At the same time, he felt he was going to `retrieve' an 
organ which was `already' his patient's. By the time a surgeon reaches the potential 
donor's hospital to remove the organ(s), there is a strong degree of certainty that it 
will be suitable for his or her patient -- who is currently being prepared for the 
transplant operation back at the surgeon's own hospital. Far from being an 
"anonymously produced object [which] becomes part of a store on which others 
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draw" (Strathern 1997:302), human organs for transplantation are 'produced', 
brought forth, in highly exceptional circumstances. They are cut out of the bodies of 
specific people, by specific people, for specific people. 
Talking to the same surgeon, I was struck by what was no doubt his genuine 
commitment to his patients and, simultaneously, his concern to show respect for the 
organ donors who permitted that commitment to go on. Unfortunately, not all 
surgeons demonstrate such thoughtfulness, as one instance related to me by an ICU 
nurse illustrates. It was very late in the evening and the nurse was sitting with the 
parents of a young male organ donor; they had chosen to stay in the intensive care 
unit while the removal operation was conducted. At one point the door was pushed 
open, a young man put his head round the door, and introduced himself as "one of the 
retrieval team." He asked if Mr X, the senior surgeon, had arrived yet. When the 
nurse replied that he had not, the young man said this was his first retrieval, and he 
was really pleased it was going to be supervised by such an eminent surgeon. The 
nurse told me she just looked at him, and said, "these are the donor's parents," at 
which the young man "went a bit red, said `oh', and left the room, without so much as 
an apology." Before encountering the donor's parents, the surgeon appears to have 
effected a conceptual disconnection of the person and the body, viewing the latter, in 
this instance, as a learning opportunity, to enhance his surgical skills under expert 
guidance. 
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II Agency, Inscription and the Transplant Programme 
Endeavouring to elucidate the unstable nature of bodies, in so far as they will not 
`stand still' long enough to bear permanent inscription (Lock 1993), I am indebted to 
Crossley's (1996) synthesis of Merleau -Ponty's `body- subject' and Foucault's `body - 
power'. The kinds of bodies /persons emerging from the current research exhibit 
elements of both these extreme positions but also encompass the continuum which 
flows between them, so that particular `subjectivities' manifest, shift, and change, 
according to their particular inter- relationship with other bodies /persons. 
Rothfield's (1995) comments on the substantive body are also illuminating 
since she challenges, at some length, the biomedical assumption that bodies exist as 
essential objects. While bodies `exist' in the form of substance, Rothfield argues there 
is no neutral, a priori body to which we have access since nothing can be objectified, 
named, inscribed, outside of language. Our very perception of bodies as matter, and 
their definition through inscription, are inextricably linked in the process which 
produces meaning. Yet there is no single meaning since, in order to define, we 
inevitably take up positions in relation to the body in question. Different positions 
produce different kinds of knowledges about the body and, I would emphasise, no- 
one need be committed to a single position. At the same time, certain positions and 
the knowledge they produce assume an authority derived from their articulation with 
other dominant discourses. One such is biomedical knowledge. To better understand 
how this form of knowledge produces particular kinds of bodies, I return to the 
concepts of ̀ body- subject' and `body -power'. 
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Merleau -Ponty (1962, 1965) developed the notion of the 'body- subject' in 
response to a dominant Western philosophical assumption that bodily action arises 
from prior and separate acts located in a mind (the subject) which somehow stands 
outside and in superior opposition to the body that is its object; similarly, the `body - 
subject' does not relate to its world as a subject to an object. Instead, body- subjects 
belong to and are part of the world; our very way of being -in- the -world (Heidegger 
1962) is through embodied actions (Crossley 1996:100 -101). Though this 
embodiment can be regarded as living through the body, one's substantial body is 
absent from explicit awareness since it is not so much an object of attention than an 
orientation centre in relation to our environment (Diprose 1995:209). 
Pain, however, affects this habitual mode of being -in- the -world; the mind and 
body are separated to the extent that one is conscious of bodily pain (Leder 1990 
cited in Diprose 1995:209). Schenck (1986) takes this further by suggesting that pain 
or illness, the 'brokenness' of bodies, invites the care of others. From this we may 
conclude that pain or illness alters how we interpret and respond to our own or other 
bodies; they alter our habitual modes of being -in- the -world. To put it another way, 
one's subjective position in relation to that body has shifted. Significantly, health care 
professionals already occupy a professional position which responds to the brokenness 
of bodies, to whom, Schenck (1986) argues, we give over responsibility for their 
repair. This brings me to consider the location of agency. 
Superficially, Merleau -Ponty's `body- subject' bears scant resemblance to the 
jurai individual discussed in Chapter Two, but on closer inspection we find that both 
are accorded autonomous agency; `body- subjects' act. Indeed Merleau -Ponty could 
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be accused of overemphasising agency while ignoring the effects of power; for a 
socio- political understanding of the latter we can turn to the work of Foucault, though 
here the body is apparently bereft of agency and is entirely acted upon (Crossley 
1996:104 -5). The theoretical conceptions of `body- subject' and `body -power' 
apparently oppose each other (Levin 1989; Grosz 1993), yet in Crossley's (1996:99) 
view, they are not only compatible but "mutually informing and complementary." This 
is illustrated through Foucault's own later conceptions of agency and power, where 
power consists "in an attempt, by one agent, to conduct the conduct - Foucault likes 
the word play - of the other" (Crossley 1996:105 citing Foucault 1982:220). In other 
words, the successful application of power requires not a person who acts and a 
person who is acted upon, but rather "a person who acts and a person who acts upon 
those actions" (Crossley 1996:105). This suggests balanced, reciprocal agency, what 
we might term the mutual constitution of persons in daily life (Ingold 1986:263), or 
"communicative intersubjectivity" (Crossley 1996:110), sharply contrasting with the 
forms of subjection Foucault attended to (e.g. 1977). 
Foucault's notion of the body has been described as "a passive receptacle of 
historical and political forces ... functioning to the requirements of the social system" 
(Crossley 1996:104 citing Levin 1989). But rather than passive bodies which permit 
themselves to be acted upon, Foucault is more accurately describing docile bodies 
which permit themselves to be managed (O'Neill 1985:132 -3). Management is 
achieved through "the materiality of power operating on the very bodies of 
individuals" (Foucault 1980:55), in other words by "direct and active attempts to 
control, direct, delimit and co -opt the actions of the body" (Crossley 1996:105). 
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However, the direct application of power to bodies is normally disguised since it is 
routed through the organisation and control of space; in particular Foucault discusses 
practices which enclose, divide, and differentiate spaces within which bodies can be 
rendered controllable and functional (Crossley 1996:106 -7; cf. Foucault 1976, 1979), 
to the extent, I would add, that compliance is regarded as beneficial; otherwise, 
resistance may be offered (Foucault 1981, 1982; cf. Crossley 1996:107). How then is 
compliance perceived to be beneficial? 
Crossley's (1996:111) example of how power operates upon bodies is 
apposite since he suggests we have a largely medical awareness of bodies and their 
parts, influenced by a historically contingent web of discourses to which we all 
subscribe, knowingly or not; these discourses articulate with other health related 
practices which regulate our daily lives and to which we submit because we primarily 
identify ourselves through a medical model of our bodies. By and large, when we 
become ill, we expect and accept health care; we submit ourselves to the treatments 
offered by an existing biomedical regime because we wish to get better. Even those 
who turn to `alternative' forms of treatment nevertheless seem to hold an ideal model 
of `the healthy body' and experience `deviations' from that as requiring intervention 
of some kind. Biomedicine apparently offers us a radical degree of control over our 
bodies, in its extreme form over death itself. Yet as prolonged life has become a 
supreme value, and our dependence on clinical treatments has increased, it could be 
argued that control over bodies has actually passed into the hands of biomedicine's 
practitioners (White 1995:22), which brings us back to the medical model of the body. 
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That model assumes an abstracted, objective `everybody' in which 
biomedicine merely intervenes (Rothfield 1995), disregarding the significance of a 
particular body's location within a relational matrix of other bodies which imbue each 
other with meaning (Diprose 1995:205 -6). What we have is the `everybody' of the 
anatomy textbook; more appropriately to the present study, it is the anonymous body 
which yields equally anonymous organs for the transplant programme. 
Summary 
The `disconnectedness' of bodies from each other is presumed in Western 
metaphysics and embedded within biomedicine's everyday ways of thinking, speaking 
and acting. Part of the 'habitus' of the clinic, such everyday practices may well be 
effected with no strategic intention (Bourdieu 1977:72 -73). It has also been argued 
that such disconnection prevails between bodies and their parts, in so far as organs are 
regarded as "free- standing entities" (Strathern 1997) functioning in the manner of 
commodities outlined in Chapter Two. Yet unlike commodities, where transactions 
can be based as much on desire as on need, and unlike Maussian exchange, where the 
transactors desire "the personal relationships that the exchange of gifts creates, and 
not the things themselves" (Gregory 1983:19), potential organ recipients very much 
need `the thing itself"; the alternative is death. In another sense, there is a need for 
organs; they are in `short supply'. Section Three reviews means by which organs are 
currently, or in the future might be, obtained for transplantation, contextualising the 
perceived shortage of organs and the current emphasis given to what health care 
professionals widely term 'cadaver donation'. Here, the commodity metaphor is 
evident yet, like the gift metaphor, it is also unstable. 
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III Increasing Demand, Declining Supply: the nemesis of the transplant 
programme 
Organ transplantation has rapidly become a standard form of treatment for diseases of 
the major solid organs. Having proved beneficial in an increasing number of medical 
conditions (Richardson 1996:88), we can reasonably assume this trend will continue. 
In a recently produced promotional leaflet for organ donation (see Plates 5 -6), we 
learn that nearly 3,000 organ transplants are conducted in Britain each year. However, 
the leaflet also states that "over 5,000 people in the UK are waiting for an organ 
transplant.i22 Transplantation's "huge success," its inclusion of ever more kinds of 
organ and tissue, and its now commonplace position as a form of treatment all amplify 
the need for more organs. The demand for organs is, if not infinite, then certainly 
amenable to growth, as evidenced by comparing figures from the Annual Reports of 
the United Kingdom Transplant Support Service Authority (UKTSSA), currently 
responsible for maintaining an administrative database for the transplant programme. 
The number of potential recipients waiting at 31 December 1995 was 6083; at 31 
December 1996 it had risen to 6355 (UKTSSA 1996:6).23 The 1998 Report recorded 
a total of 6539 people waiting at 31 December 1998 (see Box 1). 
It has been remarked that waiting lists do not necessarily reflect the "real 
need" for transplants and therefore the number of operations which would be done, 
given an unlimited supply of organs (RCSE 1999:19); transplant professionals 
apparently impose quantitative control. Certainly, those interviewed in the present 
study emphasised their transplant unit's rigorous selection of potential recipients (see 
Chapter 5). The RCSE (1999:7) report noted that "the number of cadaveric donors 
22 The figure appears not to include suspensions from the waiting list; see Box 1. 
23 Excludes kidney patients in the Republic of Ireland. 
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has remained at a plateau of 900, reached in 1990" but does not propose a 
concomitant ceiling on waiting list numbers, a suggestion made by one transplant co- 
ordinator I interviewed. Instead, "(i)ncreasing the potential number of donors remains 
... fundamental to policy formulation" (RCSE 1999:7). 
BOX 1 
Transplant Activity 1998, UKTSSA * ** 
Number of organ donors during 1998 
Number of organs 
847* 
2965 ** 
Recorded waiting list for transplants at year end- active 5383 
suspended 1156 
* including 26 from overseas 
** including 30 from overseas 
* ** Statistics prepared by the UK Transplant Support Service Authority from the 
National Transplant Database maintained on behalf of the UK transplant community. 
(ISSN 1464 -4444) 
The paradox of applying a commodity metaphor to human organs 
Richardson has noted "the constant refrain of shortage" in public and academic 
discourses about organs for transplantation (Richardson 1996:88), remarking that 
"too much emphasis is often placed upon public resistance to donation, and rather too 
little upon the public's generosity" (Richardson 1996:91). In media stories, emphasis 
will certainly be given to the number of people waiting for transplant operations, or 
the number who have died without one, rather than the number of lives which have 
been saved. A report in the Daily Express (21.2.98), for example, disclosed that while 
"5,175 people in Britain need transplants, last year only 822 donors provided 2,800 
organs." Similarly, cases where relatives withhold consent for organ removal, "by far 
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the most significant cause of the non -use of otherwise suitable organs" (New et al. 
1994:48), are foregrounded as "over 30 per cent of relatives" refusing (Big Issue 
1997), instead of two out of three cases of agreement. 
Quantitative surveys certainly suggest room for improvement in this area of 
organ availability. They regularly demonstrate a disparity between the number of 
people who report being in favour of organ donation and the number who actually 
carry donor cards (see Box 2). Health care professionals involved in transplantation, 
and indeed many people who promote organ donation as individuals or members of 
organisations, do believe that the number of organs available for transplantation 
would increase if only people could be made aware of the shortage of organs, if only 
everyone who was apparently willing to become a donor carried a donor, card and if 
only people made that wish known to their family. 
At this point, we realise that the potential donor's family (legally, his or her 
next of kin) have a role to play, since they will be consulted about organ donation in 
the event of a relative being declared brain stem dead. A recent survey 
(MORI/UKTCA/BACCN 1995) supports the argument that telling one's family about 
the wish to be a donor generally prompts their consent (see Box 3). In fact, the survey 
was conducted to ascertain the reasons relatives gave when "refusing a request for 
organ donation" (MORI/UKTCA/BACCN 1995:3). On this terminology, a telling 
point was put to me by the father of a donor. "Why," he asked, "do reports say 
people `refuse to give consent'? Why can't they say some families `decline donation', 
or `prefer to keep the body intact' ?" 
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BOX 2 
Public Attitudes to Organ Donation 
Attitudes to being a donor Donor card holder 
OPCS DoH BKPA OPCS DoH BKPA 
In favour 70% 70% 72% Yes, usually carry 19% 23% 25% 
Against 13% 12% 18% Yes, don't carry 8% 7% 7% 
Don't know 17% 18% 10% Not card holder 73% 67% 67% 
OPCS Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, involved 2035 adults 
DoH Dept.. of Health (commissioned Research Surveys of Great Britain), involved 2000 adults 
BKPA British Kidney Patient Association (commissioned Gallup), involved 1000 adults 
(BKPA survey annual since 1988) 
Tables are taken from `A Question of Give and Take' -- reproduced by kind permission of 
King's Fund Publishing (New et al. 1994) 
BOX 3 
Reasons for Withholding Consent for Removal of Organs 
(From a Total of 515 Requests to Relatives) 
24% did not want surgery to the body 
21% knew the deceased had not wished to have organs removed 
21% felt deceased had suffered enough 
19% relatives divided over decision 
18% expressed uncertainty about the deceased's wishes 
(Relatives may have offered more than one reason for refusal) 
Survey conducted by MORI's Health Research Unit, among 328 participating ICUs in the 
UK. 
Reproduced from `Report of a two year study into the reasons for RELATIVES' REFUSAL of 
ORGAN DONATION' (1995:17) commissioned by the United Kingdom Transplant Co- 
ordinators Association (UKTCA) and the British Association of Critical Care Nurses (BACCN) 
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In the above report, in 18% of cases, relatives did not know the views of the 
deceased about organ donation while 19% of cases revealed that relatives were 
divided about what to do, which may also suggest the wishes of the deceased were 
unknown. One could argue that, if all those who died had carried donor cards, and 
made their wishes known, their families would have consented to organ removal. 
Promotional materials for organ donation repeatedly emphasise that no relative 
withholds consent where the deceased had explicitly stated the wish to become a 
donor in the event of his or her death. Of course, any argument about increased donor 
rates predicated upon such surveys assume that all those who were declared brain 
stem dead were in favour of being donors. 
This belief is surely compounded by the ideal of altruism and the moral worth 
of saving lives, which we examined in Chapter Two. As Kahan (1996:137) has 
argued, "[b]ecause patient plight drives the entire transplant process, it seems 
inhumane to prohibit a person from any treatment that may restore life or health" 
especially when `all' that restoration requires is something no longer needed by 
someone already dead. Underpinning this attitude towards organ transplantation is a 
biomedical model of the body as a machine; either it works, or it does not (Baudrillard 
1973:159). Further, as a model of `everybody', the advent of transplant technology 
means that, if one body cannot be repaired, its parts can be salvaged and used to 
repair other bodies. The resonance with `second hand' car parts is striking (cf. 
Elkinton 1964, cited in Fox 1996:260; see also note 17, p. 269). 
Paradoxically, the circumstances under which most solid organs currently 
become available for transplantation are extremely limited; the number of brain stem 
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deaths occurring in any one year is very low. A national audit of deaths in Intensive 
Care Units (ICUs) in England during 1989 and 1990, for example, estimated 13,000 
deaths, of which 1,054 patients were confirmed brain stern dead with no general 
medical indications that their organs were not suitable for transplantation (Gore et al. 
1992). Professionals working within the transplant programme, or conducting allied 
research, implicitly commodify organs when they apply commercial terminology to 
this disparity, frequently discussed as `the gap between supply and demand'. Writing 
of the US transplant programme, Kahan (1996:139) proposed a strategy for restoring 
parity between "the extreme demand and limited supply " which should utilise the 
skills of individuals "familiar with supply and demand issues from the standpoints of 
economic and business theory." When such terminology is directly juxtaposed with 
discussions of the financial provisioning of the transplant programme (e.g. RCSE 
1999), organs can be made to look even more like commodities; one might be 
forgiven for assuming that the expenditure of sufficient effort will ultimately `produce 
the goods'. 
As this section illustrates; though, the problem cannot be reduced to simple 
arithmetic, to be addressed through increasing production after the manner of 
commodities. At a basic level, though a total of seven major solid organs can be 
removed from those declared brain stem dead -- heart, 2 lungs, liver, 2 kidneys, 
pancreas -- not every potential donor will have suitably healthy organs, and 
preferences may have been stated about which organs could be removed (see Box 3). 
Similarly, the number of healthy organs removed need not directly reflect the number 
of recipients to benefit. The heart/lungs, for example, may be transplanted as a unit, 
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and repeat transplants to the same recipient do occur -- a kind of `wastage' through 
the rejection of organs by their host bodies.24 Improved clinical techniques are 
increasing the number of recipients who can benefit from the organs of a single donor; 
the liver and individual lungs can now be divided, with lobes going to different 
recipients. Nevertheless, while the waiting lists increase, the number of available 
organs does not. 
Ironically, the disparity in Britain has much to do with efforts to prevent 
deaths among those who would have been potential donors. The RCSE (1999:19) 
report notes a drop in deaths due to intracerebral haemorrhage, from 5,609 in 1976 to 
2,405 in 1996.25 We can surmise that improvements in clinical care have contributed 
here. Figures produced by UKTSSA (1996:9) record a drop, from 31% in 1987 to 
18% in 1996, in the number of donors who had been involved in road traffic accidents 
where traumatic head injuries are common (cf. New et al. 1994:14 -15). Richardson 
(1996:89) witnessed the bald statement, made at a conference, that "the simplest way 
to produce more organs for transplant would be to repeal legislation requiring the use 
of seat belts in cars, crash helmets for motorcyclists, and speed limits on roads." The 
suggestion would not be taken seriously, but it does highlight in a graphic manner the 
current conflict at the crux of solid organ transplantation. To extend the lives of 
potential recipients the programme relies heavily on the deaths of other people, in 
circumstances which are themselves the subject of clinical or legal preventive 
measures. 
24 The need for repeat transplant operations would not be termed wastage. since the organs were 
being used in an effort to save or enhance lives. 
25 Among those aged 15 to 64. 
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Reviewing Alternative Sources for the Supply of Organs 
A range of possibilities currently exists which could help redress the balance between 
the availability of organs and the number of people awaiting transplants. I outline 
these next. Contrary to implicit and explicit messages in promotional materials for 
organ donation, the disparity between the number of available organs and the number 
of potential recipients does not rest entirely upon individual preferences to decline the 
removal of organs. The content and impact of promotional campaigns, along with the 
legal framework of organ donation, are discussed more fully elsewhere. 
Here I focus on what I shall broadly term `clinical' possibilities which involve 
increasing the kinds of bodies from which organs could be removed. The picture is 
drawn with a rather broad brush, inadequate to the finer clinical and organisational 
details of `optimal use' in, for example, the RCSE (1999) report, but sufficient to my 
purposes. These are to demonstrate a prevalent commercialised approach to `meeting 
the demand' for organs, illustrated by the forced anonymity and presumed autonomy 
of bodies under examination as potential sites for the production of more organs, yet 
also to illustrate notions of connectivity reflected in ethical concerns about such body 
use. Finally, an appreciation of the other possibilities under consideration will assist in 
contextualising the pressures brought to bear upon living people to actively mark 
themselves as (future potential deceased) organ donors. 
Clinical Measures to Increase the Availability of Organs 
Clinical approaches to improving the supply of organs are not entirely separable from 
non - clinical issues. Increasing the number of brain stem death tests carried out in 
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hospitals, for example, would be a clinical practice carrying administrative and 
financial implications to do with available beds and staffing levels since potential 
donors require very careful and expensive clinical management, estimated at £2,000- 
£2,500 per 24 hours (RCSE 1999:20). Indeed, improving the management of 
potential donors to minimise organ damage has been recommended (RCSE 1999). 
These two measures appear least problematic ethically but, by comparison with 
others, seem to hold relatively little potential for a significant increase in organ 
numbers. 
Wider development of non -heart- beating donation (RCSE 1999:2), and live 
donation (New et al. 1994:83; RCSE 1999:2) have greater numerical potential (RCSE 
1999:20 -21) and ethical questionability. Non -heart- beating donors would require 
minor but invasive surgery immediately after death, to insert a catheter for the 
purpose of cooling the kidneys whether or not they are subsequently removed.26 Next 
of kin might not be present to give consent to organ removal; should the preparatory 
procedure be conducted in the hope of retrospective consent? (New et al. 1994:66). 
Living donation, primarily of kidneys, could have a significant impact upon 
waiting lists since the vast majority of people are waiting for a kidney but, while living 
donors could give consent to organ removal, conducting major surgery on a healthy 
person for the benefit of someone else raises difficult issues for medical ethics ((New 
et al. 1994:66).27 In these cases, biomedical ethics assumes it regulates the rights of 
autonomous, disembodied individuals in relation to biomedicine (Diprose 1995:202). 
26 Only the kidneys could be used from non -heart- beating donors. However the vast majority of those 
on the waiting lists require a kidney. 
27 Living donors could currently provide a single kidney. a lobe from the lung or liver. and a small 
bowel section. Healthy hearts removed from recipients of a heart/lung unit can also be transplanted. 
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"Taken to its logical conclusion, the notion of the autonomous self discourages the 
ideal of community and interdependence" (Diprose 1995:206); we can thus argue that 
the notion of autonomy is counterproductive with respect to tissue and organ 
donation. 
Conversely, in the case of living donation, demonstrable autonomy appears to 
be required. Other arguments against live donors illustrate the tension provoked here, 
in the assumptions health care professionals hold about organ donation and the nature 
of relationships. One argument questions the voluntary nature of living related 
donation (Rudge 1997a:11 -12, Rudge 1997b:46 -48); according to the principle of 
autonomy, consent to donation should be `informed and freely given', but people 
could feel obliged to offer an organ to a sick relative. Conversely, another argument 
proposes that, while living unrelated kidney donors could be used, they should have 
an established long term relationship with the potential recipient, to ensure the 
absence of financial incentives (RCSE 1999:26, 29). Presumably, the absence of 
`relatedness' despite long term `relationship' precludes the possibility of morally 
obligated giving. 
Further evidence of implicit and interrelated assumptions are present in these 
objections; that organ donation must be free of obligation, that deceased donation 
lacks any form of coercion, that the absence of financial incentives can be ensured in 
any way, for example that a long term relationship between unrelated donors and 
recipients (often spouses) precludes any financially based recompense. The difficulties 
health care professionals envisage in keeping organ transactions free of these 
apparently undesirable elements are reflected in statistics. Though the RCSE 
129 
(1999:21) report noted "an increase of 32% in kidney transplants from live donors" in 
1998, at 11% of all kidney transplants this figure has been compared unfavourably 
with 40% in Norway and 28% in the USA (National Transplant News, vol.15, p.1, 
1998). Clearly, using the bodies of the anonymous dead is held to be far less 
problematic when informed by this ethical and moral framework, albeit precariously 
balanced upon the assumption of autonomy. 
Two highly controversial options for increasing the supply of organs are 
elective ventilation and xenotransplantation. Elective (or interventional) ventilation 
would involve placing someone expected to die within 24 hours on mechanical 
ventilation (life support') so that they suffered brain stem death, rather than cardiac 
death. This would be done solely to obtain organs, with no medical benefit to the 
patient concerned, rendering the bodies of the (nearly) dead even more like 
receptacles of spare parts for the living. New and his colleagues favoured pursuing 
this option (1994:83), reflected in the comment that "[i]t may not be long before 
actively managing death to save other lives is as `good' and dignified a form of dying 
as any other" (1994:65). 
Preliminary findings of the pilot study, presented at the BODY Convention in 
1996, reported that no next of kin objected to the possibility of the procedure being 
carried out on patients who had met the clinical criteria. What the long term effects of 
such decisions might be on the families concerned could not, of course, be predicted. 
The hospital based study of this procedure was postponed when its legality was 
questioned; ethical concerns seem to be minimal (New et al. 1994:55 -56, 63 -66). 
Both the British Medical Association and the Conference of the Royal Colleges of 
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Surgeons approved the procedure though possible resistance to its actual 
introduction, by practising clinicians who would have to care for these potential organ 
donors, has been noted (Rudge 1997b:45 -46). Thus we are reminded that ambiguities 
are apparent within the health care professions, particularly between those who care 
for potential donors, and those whose concern is for potential recipients. 
Arguably the most radical development of all, xenotransplantation involves the 
genetic modification of animals to render their organs compatible with transplantation 
into the human body. Clinical trials using human recipients have been postponed until 
concerns about the cross -species transfer of diseases have been adequately 
researched. Numerically, xenotransplantation could potentially erase the waiting lists, 
assuming our health care system had the financial and human resources to respond to 
a limitless supply of organs. Yet, transplant professionals hold widely divergent views 
on the long -term efficacy of non -human organs (RCSE 1999:30). 
Summary: The C ommodification of Organs 
Writing of the US transplant programme, Kahan (1996:139 ) remarked that it is 
constrained only by the availability of organs and the costs of transplantation. The 
RCSE (1999) report on Britain's transplant programme addresses shortcomings 
within the programme itself, which deter full utilisation of all available organs, not 
least the shortage of renal and liver transplant surgeons, as challenging as the shortage 
of donors according to its authors (RCSE 1999:8). In Britain, with its state funded 
health service, the extent to which financial costs are regarded as a legitimate 
constraint is a moot question. Few people interviewed in the present study seemed to 
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have given explicit thought to the financial implications of running a transplant 
programme with access to a substantially increased or even limitless supply of organs. 
On the other hand, the need for careful selection of potential recipients would be 
framed in terms of `making the best use of a scarce resource'. One newspaper quoted 
the cost of a transplant operation at £60,000, reminding us that this `free gift' must be 
accompanied by expensive biomedical expertise to cross over from the giver to the 
receiver (Scotsman 29.4.97b). With regard to kidney transplants, it will be emphasised 
that dialysis is the more expensive treatment; thus it could be argued that an unlimited 
supply of organs would actually reduce the transplant budget (Daily Express 6.4.00). 
Several proposals for increasing the supply of organs have been examined. 
Different professional or academic groupings may favour and promote different 
approaches to increasing organ availability. Attitudes towards these approaches rest 
on subjective, taken -for -granted assumptions about the nature of giving, within 
established relationships, and as an anonymous act, rather than the "objective 
application of universal principles" of biomedical ethics (Diprose 1995:204), both of 
which are in any event predicted upon socially constructed images of bodies and 
individuals (Diprose 1995 passim). 
In Chapter Two, I argued that organs are defined as gifts primarily because the 
notion of any monetary dimension to the transacting of human organs is abhorred. Yet 
a dominant metaphor in the discourse of shortage is that of the organ as commodity, 
framed within a commercial problem of supply and demand. Other language habits 
encountered during the present study -- in professional reports, academic literature, 
numerous interviews and informal conversations, revealed similar perceptions of 
132 
human organs, if not as objects to be bought and sold then certainly as "free- standing 
entities" (Strathern 1997:301). 
Transplant professionals and recipients spoke in terms of the `new' organ the 
recipient had received though, at best, organs are `second hand'. They are certainly 
not `spare', another term I encountered, suggesting the surplus manufacture of, for 
example, machine parts (e.g. Longmore 1968; cf. Fox & Swazey 1974). I would 
argue that the use of such language reflects a wider tendency, certainly in Britain, to 
regard the body as a machine; this tendency has a long ideological and philosophical 
history in the West, well documented in academic literature. Mechanistic models of 
the body are intimately bound up with the development of Western biomedicine 
(Sawday 1995:28 -32 esp.). In some instances the tendency is applauded (e.g. Miller 
1978:9 -11 esp.), in others it is criticised (e.g. Helman 1991: Ch. 6). Whatever the 
view, from this metaphor it is but a short step to regarding organs, consciously or 
unconsciously, as "replaceable parts," a notion intimately bound up with modern 
capitalism and the commodity markets (Helman 1991:26). Yet replaceability suggests 
discardability, and here the commodity metaphor meshes with conservation rhetorics. 
As a potential donor in one promotional leaflet (1996) says, donation simply prevents 
organs from `going to waste'. The view clearly echoes the utilitarian connotations of 
organ transplantation, which recycles body parts, yet it also reinforces the gift's 
altruism. `Why should I want anything back? It's not as if I am giving away anything I 
need'. At the same time, human organs are gifts `beyond price'. No mere 
commodities, human organs can also be thought of as precious natural resources to be 
carefully husbanded. 
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Terms employed to describe how organs are obtained suggest similar 
perceptual shifting. The term `harvesting' featured in academic literature (e.g. 
Chisholm 1988), though no health care professional used it in conversation with me. 
The term has an organic ring to it, suggesting the idea of a crop produced for use, 
but also provoking images of the `Grim Reaper' and his scythe, mowing down those 
whose time has come to die (Richardson 1996:86 -87). One co- ordinator told me the 
term harvesting had been taken up as a result of influence from the USA; television 
viewers of their imported hospital dramas will certainly be familiar with the term when 
organ donation has been featured as a storyline. `Procurement' is the term widely 
used by health care professionals in the UK, resonating more closely with the 
commodity metaphor and its discourse of supply and demand. I found the term 
`procurement co- ordinator' unpopular with donor families for the same reason they 
tended to dislike use of the uniform description `transplant co- ordinator'. Both terms 
erase the presence of the organ donor. As if to further assist in the erasure of the 
donor's role, the procedure for removing the donor's organs is commonly described 
as `retrieval', offering the image of something being brought back to its rightful 
owner, foregrounding the surgeon as the one who `gives' the organ, and the one to 
whom gratitude is very strongly expressed by recipients. I have deliberately used the 
term `removal' which reminds us that the organ is taken from someone else. 
Paradoxically, the term retrieval was used not only by health care professionals but 
also by recipients and donor families, which illustrates the extent to which we can 
unwittingly adopt the dominant linguistic habits employed in a particular context, my 
tendency to lapse into using `transplant recipient' rather than `organ recipient' being a 
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case in point. Again, the former term tends to erase the donor's role by laying 
emphasis on a technical procedure which has been made to stand for that which was 
transplanted, namely a human organ. 
i;; 
Chapter Four 
In The Donor Realm: The Erosion of Voluntarism and the Erasure of Persons 
This chapter treats the notion of voluntarism in organ donation, framed by an 
examination of the tension between its public profile and reports of actual 
participation. In their movement from the ordinariness of everyday life, into the 
trauma of a sudden bereavement, the donor families I interviewed felt they and their 
deceased children were being erased from the donation and transplantation process. 
Section One focuses closely upon donor families, endeavouring to offer some 
sense of their disorienting, troubled and unlooked -for confrontation with the donation 
process. Among the families I interviewed personally, and the respondents to my 
questionnaire survey, commentaries on their negotiation through the donation process 
varied considerably. But in every case which came to my attention, the possibility of 
organ donation had been discussed within the family; at that time, no -one foresaw any 
difficulties. Retrospectively, relatives recalled being proud of their loved one's 
decision. Though they remain proud of that decision, actual involvement in the 
donation process has over time provoked deeply ambivalent feelings. 
Section Two amplifies the erosion of voluntarism in the donation process. In 
Chapter One, some attention was given to elucidating the notion of choice as it 
manifests in promotional materials; this is now challenged. Many families feel they too 
have choice in the matter. They will have been approached by health care 
professionals for permission to remove organs according to their relative's wish: the 
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idea of coercion need not have occurred to them. Yet I am arguini2, t hat giving 
consent to organ removal is less voluntary than is generally supposed. 
Section Three traces the gradual erasure of persons, donors and their family 
members, from the donation process, yet erasure necessarily entails `something' left 
behind. To explain this feeling of erasure as it was reported to me, I draw on a simile 
from Battaglia's (1990:199) ethnography of mortuary practices on Sabarl Island, 
though it is not employed in the precise manner of Battaglia's informant. Erasing an 
organ donor resembles scrubbing a mark from floorboards; it leaves `a bright spot'. 
There is the presence of an absence significant to the donor's family, but which others 
may not remark upon at all. Donor family members can feel a similar sense of being 
erased from the donation process, insofar as their participation is presumed to have 
stopped when they leave the donor realm or, perhaps, when they have received 
confirmation that their loved one's organs had been successfully transplanted. 
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I The Organ Donation Process 
Insights into the actual donation process, presented here in a sequential format, 
mirror the process of becoming an organ recipient as it was recounted to me, and 
described in the next chapter. In both cases, the `process of becoming' is inscribed 
quite literally through the practices of health care professionals upon the bodies of 
their patients. Donor families did not relate their participation in an ordered and 
sequential form; rather, this device allows me to foreground the presence and role of 
family members in the donation process, encountered by them as a sudden, 
bewildering, and emotionally devastating series of procedures enacted upon the docile 
bodies of their relatives, and over which they themselves had limited or no control. 
The day it happened: The trauma of a sudden death 
The majority of people who currently become deceased organ donors in the UK have 
usually experienced severe brain damage through either a direct injury to the head or 
spontaneous intracranial haemorrhaging. It is a traumatic situation for their families 
(Wright 1996); a serious accident or sudden, unexpected collapse, the rush to 
hospital, a barrage of technology -- `life support', a tube through the mouth and down 
the throat, connecting the patient to a respirator which controls breathing. 
Philip had told the hospital not to worry his parents. Rita and Conrad told me 
"we only found out when he was transferred to ICU." Steve and Claire were away on 
holiday when Anne died; they travelled a whole day to get back home and to the 
hospital. "They'd told us Anne was in hospital and she had trouble breathing. Later, 
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we were told she went into respiratory arrest in the unit at 2 a.m. on the Tuesday." In 
other words, she was already dead when the hospital traced them that morning. 
Tom recalled finding his son, John, unconscious in his room one afternoon, the 
journey in the ambulance, Catherine, his wife, following in the car. John stopped 
breathing in the ambulance but was `stable' by the time they reached the emergency 
department. A nursing sister introduced herself as the grief support nurse; "John is 
critically ill and may not live." "She was rather clinical and detached," Catherine said 
"but she recognised me as a former colleague, I was a nurse, and she seemed to 
become more friendly." Confusion about the cause of John's collapse meant a brain 
scan had to be done. John was subsequently moved to ICU. 
Along with shock, bewilderment sets in. "What's happening ?" "Who can tell 
us ?" "When will you know ?" Steve and Claire had been overwhelmed by the 
confusion and lack of information. "When we got there, someone gave us brandy, sat 
us down, and said Anne had possibly had a brain haemorrhage." "They couldn't agree 
on a diagnosis." "There was no post -mortem." 
The technology can be overwhelming, yet hypnotic; "something to focus on, 
something to do." The physical condition of someone brain stem dead can exacerbate 
feelings of bewilderment for the bereaved family, since the deceased person is, to all 
appearances, `breathing', still warm, with skin colour, and a heartbeat. Tom and 
Catherine found it "very difficult to take it in" that John was dead, though they 
understood that he was brain stem dead. He looked asleep, his body moved from time 
to time -- caused by spinal reflexes which continue after brain stem death. 
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Doing the Tests: Confirming Brain Stem Death andi the Suitability of Donor Organs 
Brain stem death is confirmed by a series of tests, carried out on two separate 
occasions and by doctors not involved in transplantation (Dept. of Health 1998:7). 
Sometimes relatives are asked if they wish to be there; none of the families I met were 
asked. A nurse described the tests to me as "brutal but necessary." Health care 
professionals may, understandably, wish to avoid subjecting relatives to observation 
of the procedure. Other tests check potential donors are free of infections or diseases 
which could be transmitted to recipients of their organs (Dept. of Health 1998:16-17), 
and to assist in matching donor organs to recipients. 
When donor family members spoke to me about "the tests," it was related in 
the context of being asked about organ donation. 
Then They Asked Us ... 
The Code of Practice which guides health care professionals in the area of organ 
donation (Dept. of Health 1998) offers flexibility as to who approaches the potential 
donor's family, and when. Time is a factor; the potential donor's heart will stop 
beating within a few days, despite the respirator, and organs will cease to be `viable'. 
Perceptions of how much time relatives need varies considerably among health care 
professionals. For the families I met, the time given was `not enough'; they had all felt 
rushed, and ICU staff appeared uncomfortable in their presence. 
Steve and Claire were approached "after the first tests" and asked to reach a 
decision "in the next few hours," though two days lapsed before the second set was 
carried out. Anne had a donor card, but Claire needed to find it, "to be sure." An 
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apparently little thing assumed a major significance. They went home to look and gave 
their decision next morning. 
A senior consultant approached Tom before the tests were done on his son. "I 
knew they'd ask, as soon as they said John might die. I told him it was up to 
Catherine." She took up the story. "We knew John had a donor card; he'd talked 
about it but I needed to find it. I went home to look and they [staff from the ICU] 
phoned twice asking `had I found it ?'." Meantime, the consultant asked Tom, 
"Couldn't you just persuade your wife to agree ?" Tom had been furious. The man 
had cried, re -living the events of John's death, but now he shook with anger at this 
recollection. Catherine said she had felt "as if there was already a recipient lined up." 
(Technically, of course, many potential recipients are `lined up', on the waiting lists.) 
The Donor Operation 
If relatives consent to organ donation, the logistics of the removal operation are 
worked out and set in motion. It can take up to four hours, conducted by transplant 
surgeons, but performed in a theatre in the donor's hospital, so staff from that hospital 
can also be involved. One ICU nurse told me, "no -one likes that operation; I'm the 
only one who'll assist." Another nurse explained, "it's bad enough when a patient dies 
on the operating table but when one is brought in already dead, it's awful." 
TU nurses also expressed a deep dislike of the operation. I met two who had 
gone to observe it as a matter of professional interest. One nurse particularly 
remembered the donor arriving in theatre with life support machinery maintaining 
oxygenation, and the body being placed in the "the crucifix position." The arms are 
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outstretched to allow full access to the torso, but the religious symbolism of the 
position was not lost on the nurse. The other nurse "thought the worst part was 
watching the heart being removed because it had to be deliberately stopped." After 
removal, organs are packed in ice for transportation. Speed is essential. Heart/lung 
transplant operations must be performed within four hours, the liver within about 
sixteen hours; kidneys will `remain viable' for forty -eight hours. 
Afterwards: Post Operative Care 
After the removal operation, the donor's body is `restored'. This is particularly 
important, I was told, if relatives ask to view the body; they can be worried about 
what it will look like. Staff tended to believe `viewing' left a more peaceful memory 
for the family. The donor families I got to know however had mixed views on this. 
Tom and Catherine had stayed with John until he was taken to the operating theatre, 
but "we weren't asked about seeing him afterwards." They wonder if it may have 
helped them. Steve and Claire were asked, but felt they had said their goodbyes to 
Anne in ICU, reasoning that "what was left [after the operation] wouldn't be our 
girl," which does not mean families are unconcerned about how their relative's body is 
treated. As we saw in Chapter Three that is a source of much controversy. 
Donor Family Support 
One of the fundamental problems for donor families is that they are not hospital 
patients, not even out -patients. The donor was the patient; he or she is now dead. 
When the donor's body is officially released to the family, they leave the donor realm 
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and any further communication is at the discretion of health care professionals. There 
is no formal, structured aftercare regime or regular out -patient visit for donor families 
to mirror that of organ recipients. ICU staff told me they tended not to maintain 
contact with the bereaved families of deceased patients, whether or not they became 
organ donors, mainly through a dislike of invading the family's grief One nurse said 
she would like to attend the funerals of all the patients who died in her unit, but felt it 
would be an intrusion. I also encountered the view that contact with donor families is 
the responsibility of co- ordinators, the picture presented in promotional materials and 
acknowledged in the Code of Practice (Dept. of Health 1998). 
Most of the co- ordinators I interviewed personally, or contacted by telephone 
or letter, did aim to send a donor's next of kin basic details of how their relative's 
organs were used; usually this included the age and/or sex of recipients. In a few 
cases, a structured follow up system was in place, and two areas I know of had 
established donor family support groups. But my research found marked disparities, 
between donor co- ordinators, and among the staff in any one transplant unit, in the 
extent of ongoing contact with donor families or supplying information about the 
progress of recipients who benefited from their act of donation. Sadly, I found that 
this lack of communication both arose from, and lead to, misunderstandings which left 
donor families feeling "used and discarded" as Catherine put it during one of our 
telephone conversations. 
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II The Erasure of Persons in the Performance of Organ Donation 
Very few studies have been conducted, to date, with the families of potential or actual 
organ donors about their participation in this process; those which have tend towards 
finding ways to increase the number of families who agree to the removal of a 
relative's organs (e.g. Bartucci and Seller 1986). Implicitly or explicitly, potential 
organ recipients are the centre of interest in such research, not the bereaved families. 
A further tendency of such studies is to rely on reports from health care professionals 
about comments made to them by donor and non -donor families at the time of their 
relative's death or very soon after (e.g. MORI/UKTCAIBACCN 1995). Both 
tendencies erase donor families, limiting opportunities for understanding how they 
interpret their participation in the donation process, and what they regard as their 
needs, over a time period which takes adequate account of the long term effects of 
bereavement, and in a manner which acknowledges that, for the families themselves, 
participation in the donation process begins before their relative is admitted to 
hospital and continues for the remainder of their lives. 
During the present study, I encountered a plethora of conflicting views about 
organ donation which, broadly speaking, can be divided into three levels. First, there 
is a public profile to organ donation, carrying certain messages which interconnect 
with highly valued moral ideals reported to be held by large numbers of the population 
in Britain. Next, the organisation and administration of the transplant programme 
involves rules or practices which belie the public profile of organ donation. I am 
arguing that this tension arises, certainly in part, from the third level -- behaviour in 
the actual performance of organ donation. We have seen that health care professionals 
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occupy a certain positionality in relation to the 'broken bodies' which call forth their 
attention (above, p. 114). Daily participation in the lives and deaths of their patients 
influences their perceptions in a myriad of ways, perceptions which then influence the 
public performance of organ donation. What I emphasise here is that assumptions 
about bereaved people in general and donor families in particular, embedded within 
the performance of donation, do not always accord with the perceptions of donor 
families themselves, increasing their sense of abandonment, and the perception that 
they and their deceased relatives are being erased from the donation process. 
Erasing persons through inappropriate responses to bereavement 
"A single person is missing for you, and the whole world is empty. But 
one no longer has the right to say so out loud" (Aries 1974:92). 
There is a widespread view among academics who study death and bereavement that 
people at the turn of the twentieth- to twentyfirst- century Britain can no longer cope 
with death; an analytical conclusion generalised to the point of banality. The literature 
on the subject is vast (e.g. Simpson 1987) and a critical analysis would provide in 
itself sufficient material for a thesis. From my own research I wish to emphasise that 
all the bereaved people I met, or communicated with by telephone and letter, were 
`coping' with a death in so far as they managed to continue their daily lives, in 
employment and in caring for their families and homes. What they could not 
necessarily cope with was other people's responses to their bereavement. 
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Avoidance 
Avoidance was a common response among health care professionals. In one case, the 
serious grief of donor families was constantly emphasised by a co- ordinator, to justify 
refusing me any access to them through her office. Similar concern was demonstrated 
by the members of one REC against whose rejection of my research application I had 
lodged an appeal. At the appeal interview, some of the members were visibly horrified 
at the thought of my contacting bereaved people "when we have no idea what has 
been happening to them since their relative died." Paradoxically, that was the very 
reason why I wished to talk to the families of organ donors -- to get their views on 
how they were managing their somewhat unique situations. 
Those who do make the effort to speak to bereaved people may avoid 
mentioning the person who died. Donor relatives have told me it is as if the deceased 
person never existed at all. It can be worse when judgements are offered -- `shouldn't 
you be getting over this by now ?' Michelle's son said as much when he told her not to 
come back to visit her grandchildren until she had "cheered up." Her grief has been 
intensified as a result.28 A more subtle form of judgement is displayed, albeit 
unintentionally, when people try to disconnect the donation event from its wider 
context, and argue that any anger or pain felt by donor families is `just part of 
bereavement', rather than having anything to do with the organ donation itself. The 
unspoken assumption is that one cannot feel anything but comfort from donation. 
Finally, platitudes are offered, though this is easier in some cases than in others, as 
Hockey noted (1990:37). When old people die, they've `had a good innings'. The 
28 I do not overlook the possibility that Michelle's son's attitude reflects his own unresolved 
bereavement issues. 
146 
deaths of young people are `tragic', `untimely', `needless', sentiments reflected in 
public discourses about those who die waiting for a transplant, which may help to 
explain why efforts to comfort donor families can focus on organ recipients. 
Displacing grief 
Catherine told me how she had visited her son's dentist, with whom John had had an 
appointment on the day he died. It was some weeks after John's death and she just 
needed to know he had been all right then. The senior dentist, instead of talking about 
John, focused on the fact that he had become an organ donor, and remarked on the 
comfort this must be, to think of the people whose lives he had saved. Catherine just 
said, "no it isn't." Retelling the story to me, Tom said he did not care how many lives 
had been saved; he just wanted John back. We should not forget that donor families 
would have preferred not to be in the position of giving life to others. They would 
have preferred that their relative go on living, just as the families of potential 
recipients want their loved one to go on living. In the course of my research, I have 
learned that this is not an easy gift to give, and does not confer unequivocal comfort 
upon donor families. 
While organ donation brings life to recipients (who are not without their own 
problems), the gift is solicited at a time of bereavement, often following a sudden and 
unexpected death. I have learned that a family's involvement in the donation process 
centres on the broken body of a `significant other', which has called forth their care 
and attention, in a manner diverging dramatically from the public performance of 
organ donation, predicated on disembodied, autonomous individuals. A sense of being 
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erased from the donation process can be therefore be compounded by interactions 
with health care professionals, both at the time of a relative's death, and in any 
subsequent contact. 
Conducting the conduct of donor families 
Catherine and Tom were very distressed by the behaviour of staff in the unit where 
John died. The casualty department where John was first taken had a grief support 
nurse but the ICU had nothing of that sort. I suggested that health care professionals 
were in the business of saving lives, and found it difficult to cope with a patient's 
death. Tom picked up on the word `business'. "Yes, it is a business," he said, "with no 
time to care. Business is my territory [that is his line of work] and in that environment, 
people are not trained to deal with failure. Only success counts!" He used to admire 
health care professionals and wonder how they did such difficult jobs. Now, "I'm very 
cynical about it all." 
Steve and Claire also felt they were not being well treated, or given clear 
information; for example, the time of the removal operation was changed twice. The 
grief of this couple has been exacerbated in a number of ways. They were not with 
their daughter when she died; Claire was especially worried that Anne might have 
been in pain. When we met, nine years after Anne's death, they still did not know the 
cause, and they felt health care professionals were `closing ranks' to prevent them 
from obtaining information they regarded as vital for their peace of mind. Lastly, as 
Steve said, "You expect to bury your parents, never your child." 
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The families I met were unhappy with the lack of support they received after 
the donation event, beyond the basic `information letter' from donor co- ordinators. 
Co- ordinators have told me they always impress on donor families to get in touch if 
they need anything. As one put it, "I'm not psychic. Relatives have to tell me if there 
is a problem." Not all co- ordinators appear to encourage such contact and, if they do, 
donor relatives may not want to be a bother. Irene said as much, when she was 
explaining how she had initially declined to receive any information about recipients 
when her late husband became a donor. Six months later, she had changed her mind, 
and was very curious about them. I asked her what she had done to investigate. 
"Nothing" she replied. "I felt it was too late and I would just be a nuisance to the co- 
ordinator." 
Steve and Claire had had experience of three different co- ordinators when we 
met. Four weeks after Anne's death they received a letter from the first, to say how 
many people had received transplants, but no other contact until a new co- ordinator 
took over a few years later. She was much better, they told me, keeping in regular 
contact with updates on the progress of recipients, and initiating an annual memorial 
service for all the donors in her area. The third one had been "no good at all." 
Tom and Catherine derived little comfort from becoming a donor family, 
because it is woven into what they perceive as unsupportive treatment of their grief, 
extending into a lack of contact with the co- ordinator. They also received the 
information letter after John's death, with brief details of recipients; enclosed was an 
anonymous letter from someone who did not receive an organ from John -- a sort of 
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generalised reciprocity, sometimes employed by co- ordinators. "That" said Catherine 
was it. "29 
29 
However, a few days after John's death. John Evans of BODY telephoned out of the blue', at the 
request of the co- ordinator, to offer support, which he and his wife give unstintingly. 
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III From Voluntarism to Coercion in the Donation Process 
During my study, I frequently encountered the view that bodies, after death, are 
resources which should be used to save other lives. Non -utilisation of this precious 
bio- material, which would otherwise `go to waste', leads to unacceptable social costs 
- that is the needless deaths of those who could be given transplanted organs. 
Juxtaposing these perceptions of the bodies of potential organ donors and potential 
recipients, with Lock's (1996b) eloquent remarks about `the heroics of saving lives' 
and `the moral worth of giving', the voluntary nature of organ donation presents as 
self -evident. 
The presumption of free choice in deceased donation, as opposed to coerced 
giving in living donation, has already been noted (above pp. 128 -! ); living donation is 
not favoured because obligation is present when the potential donor and recipient are 
known to each other (cf. Rudge 1997a:11 -12). Contrastively, the women Konrad 
(1999) studied, who donate their ova, seemed to be exercising choice, as did the 
respondents in Titmuss's (1970) study of blood donation. In both cases, anonymity is 
a key feature yet this should not lead us to assume that deceased organ donation is 
devoid of coercion because it is anonymous. Within the donation process, anonymity 
has its degrees, which render the transacting of human organs less voluntary than the 
rhetoric of donation leads us to believe. 
Compounding the situation, a study of general media and official promotional 
materials further undermines organ donation's presumed voluntarism, the public call 
for organs taking a highly emotive and publicly visible form in contrast with that for 
reproductive tissue and blood. When we also take into account the fact that an actual 
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donor's body is that of a loved one, the notion of choice is further undermined. Lastly, 
the pressures upon transplant professionals to save the lives of their patients enables 
us to trace a flow, if not of coercion, then certainly of strong elicitation, from the 
realm of the recipient to the realm of the donor and beyond, into the public domain. In 
this section, that flow is traced `upstream', so to speak, beginning with the public 
performance of organ donation and moving towards the individual persons who 
receive the substance of others. 
The rhetoric of choice 
Organ transplantation is conducted on a global basis, but the processes by which 
organs can be obtained and used are constrained by legal and cultural practices, as 
Lock (1996b) has demonstrated in her comparison of the US and Japan. Alnaes 
(personal communication) makes a similar point in relation to Norway. While it could 
be argued that legal regulations are an expression of cultural conventions, it may be 
more appropriate to say that different cultural conventions influence legal and clinical 
codes, as evidenced by disparities, in Britain, between the law which governs 
obtaining and using organs, and the procedures adopted by health care professionals. 
Chapter One gave a brief outline of legal procedures for recording one's wish to be an 
organ donor. This chapter has introduced administrative practices informed by 
medical ethics. Maintaining that separation hereafter has limited value; I largely 
address them together. 
Current British law governing the mode of obtaining human organs for 
transplantation offers the jurai individual more freedom of choice than other countries; 
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in the USA, for example. doctors can be legally obligated to approach families in all 
cases of potential donation, while in Austria organs can be arbitrarily removed from 
the bodies of the dead. Britain operates an `opt -in' system of required consent. 
`Choice' is presumed to be a fundamental aspect; one chooses to be a donor, chooses 
the method of formal record, chooses which organs may be removed. Donor families 
often emphasise the generosity of their loved one who chose to think about organ 
donation and make the effort to act on their decision. 
Promotional pressures 
In order to `make a choice' about organ donation, one needs to be aware of its 
possibility. Over the course of my study, a range of official promotional materials and 
other publicity came to my attention; I conducted no systematic survey, but rather 
sought to observe the form and manner by which information about organ donation 
might be encountered by members of the public. Television documentaries, for 
example, were prominent during annual National Transplant Weeks. While writing 
this chapter of my thesis, the media featured a prominent coverage of one set of 
parents appealing publicly and successfully for a heart for their dying child. 
At such times, it would be difficult for people who watch a reasonable amount 
of television or buy a daily newspaper not to be convinced of a perceived shortage of 
organs. Listening to comments from colleagues, friends and family members, one 
could also surmise that the stories of people, especially children, waiting for 
transplants are emotionally provocative. Yet, as interpretations of statistical surveys 
report (see Chapter 3), `not enough' people take steps to register as potential organ 
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donors and `not enough' families agree to the removal of a deceased relative's organs. 
Recalling Richardson's (1996:88) comments on "the constant refrain of 
shortage" in public and academic discourses about organs for transplantation, she 
further remarked that "too much emphasis is often placed upon public resistance to 
donation, and rather too little upon the public's generosity" (1996:91). In the media, 
emphasis will be given to the number of people awaiting transplants, or the number 
who have died without one, rather than the number of lives which have been saved. 
The Daily Express (21.2.98) disclosed that while "5,175 people in Britain need 
transplants, last year only 822 donors provided 2,800 organs." Similarly, cases where 
relatives withhold consent for organ removal are foregrounded as "over 30 per cent of 
relatives" refusing (Big Issue in Scotland No. 136, 1997), instead of two out of three 
cases of agreement. 
Consequently, this gift has to be elicited and in official promotional materials 
an increasingly strident message can be identified. In two promotional leaflets, 
produced in 1994 and 1996, found at my GP's surgery and a third, produced in 1998, 
acquired at a BODY Convention (Plates 1 -6), textual content and emphasis changed 
from general details about the donation process, to prominent slogans of `the gift', to 
forceful facts about transplant waiting lists. The third leaflet tells us that many people 
will die without a transplant, and -- `it could be you': 
You are much more likely to need a transplant than to become a donor. 1f 
you are prepared to consider accepting a transplant for yourself or your 
family, it seems only fair to play your part by being willing to be a donor. 
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The point is powerful and, on the face of it, seems perfectly just. If we are prepared to 
take, we should be prepared to give, as a matter of social responsibility. When the 
point is linked with the other facts and figures of transplantation, and the direct 
personal equation between giving and receiving, the voluntary nature of donation is 
overlaid with a strong persuasive quality. 
Taking a step further, the promotional poster for National Transplant Week 
(20 -26 July 1998) featured a photograph of nine year old multi -organ donor Lucy 
Maxfield, with the caption 
"In September 1997 Lucy saved the lives of five people ... by accident." 
National Transplant News (1998:2) noted that "[n]ever before had such a powerful 
image been used to convey a simple message, and Lucy's touching story reached the 
hearts of millions ... [to help] create an awareness of the terrible shortage of organs." 
That `terrible shortage' can lead to an explicitly coercive approach being aired 
in the public media; in one case, people who do not carry donor cards are accused of 
selfishness (Daily Express 3.9.96); in another, those who refuse permission for the 
removal of organs from their relatives are accused of ignorance or superstition (Big 
Issue in Scotland No. 136, 1997); in a third, the girlfriend of a young man who died 
before an organ became available said doctors should just remove organs from any 
suitable donor, without reference to his or her family.3° 
An equally controversial view of acceding to a family's request featured when 
I took part in a radio discussion about an incidence of `conditional donation', where 
parents had specified that their son's organs should only be given to white people 
30 This was sent to me by Rita. I have been unable to trace the reference. 
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(BBC Radio 4, `P.M'. programme, 7.7.99; cf. Dept. of Health 2000). Rather than 
using the incident to justify excluding families from the decision about organ removal, 
I suggested that the offer should be politely declined. Also on the programme was 
Mrs Elizabeth Ward, President of the British Kidney Patients Association, who held 
that my suggestion was condemning potential recipients to death. She preferred that 
the organs were taken and used for white people, since any life saved was an end 
which justified the means. The Department of Health's (2000:1 -2) inquiry Panel 
disagreed, indicating that neither donors nor their families should be permitted to 
choose categories of potential recipients. 
The obligation to invite 
From my discussion of law versus medical ethics in the matter of organ donation, it 
might be assumed that health care professionals have considerable choice about 
approaching families on the question of organ removal. Health care professionals may 
themselves be reluctant to regard their deceased patients as potential donors and 
prefer not to approach the relatives about organ and tissue removal, an issue given 
some prominence within the transplant programme. Speakers at the BODY 
Conventions I attended addressed this professional reluctance. In one magazine 
article, it was linked with the idea that families derive comfort from choosing to allow 
organ removal. "By not asking, we make that choice for them" (Sainsbury's The 
Magazine, Sept. 1995, p.64). In another article (Big Issue in Scotland, No. 136, 
1997, p.8), co- ordinators proposed that "this is where [we] step in" to ease the 
burden for ICU staff Directly addressing nurses, and placing the reluctance to ask 
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within the frame of Mauss's (1990) theory of gift exchange, Sque and Payne (1994) 
have argued that health care professionals, particularly nurses, had an `obligation to 
invite' families to permit organ removal from their deceased relatives. 
A leaflet produced by the Heart Valve Bank, targeting health care 
professionals, illustrates the obligation to invite.' The force of the message suggests 
it is the duty of health care professionals to save lives by obtaining this gift. 
Highlighting a serious shortage of heart valves for transplantation into babies and 
children, a quote on the inside page in large bold type states, .'..Unless they have this 
transplant they WILL die..." (original emphasis). The leaflet also illustrates the 
advantages gained from donation, using photographs of `Ryan', as a very sick baby, a 
healthy 2 year old heart valve recipient and a lively little brother with his sister, 
`Laura', who produced the leaflet's graphics. 
Concurrently the coercive nature of the leaflet's dominant message, and any 
worries health care professionals may have about approaching bereaved relatives, are 
offset by an emphasis on the voluntary and strong wishes of donors themselves, 
expressed directly by their bereaved spouses, as well as by the comfort those spouses 
have derived from the generosity of the gift. Significantly, the leaflet also carries 
photos of donors and their partners; thus donors, recipients and the relatives of both 
are clearly identifiable as such -- something I had not found in any of the publicly 
available promotional materials which came to light during my research. In the public 
domain, the anonymity of donors in particular had been emphasised as a desirable 
31 No identifying reference. Although heart valve is tissue, the approach adopted when addressing 
health care professionals is illuminating. 
157 
feature of donation and strictly maintained -- until recently, as we saw above in the 
case of Lucy Maxfield. 
Choice and familial obligation 
Under British law, bodies are not regarded as property. They cannot be owned, and 
therefore they cannot be disposed of in the same manner as property in a formal will. 
Rather, the bodies of the dead have `persons in lawful possession', depending on 
circumstances. According to the Human Tissue Act 1961, operating on the basis of 
required request, where someone has died under the appropriate circumstances and is 
found to be carrying a donor card or listed on the donor register, the designated 
representative of a Health Authority is empowered to authorise removal of organs. 
Where the potential donor had not registered in any formal way, the designated 
representative must be confident that neither the deceased nor any surviving next of 
kin expressed objections to organ removal (Dept. of Health 1998:13). At the same 
time -- and this is where a set of cultural conventions generated within `the clinic' can 
be seen to conflict with those which influence the enactment of laws -- the Code of 
Conduct guiding health care professionals in clinical and administrative aspects of 
obtaining organs advises health care professionals to make every effort to contact and 
consult the deceased's family, irrespective of the deceased's identifiable status as an 
organ donor (Dept. of Health 1998:10, 13). 
In all the conversations I had with health care professionals and donor 
families, it was clear that the Code of Conduct, rather than the law, was followed. No 
health care professional I met was happy with the idea of removing someone's organs 
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without consulting family members, because of the sensitive emotional state of those 
relatives and the need to avoid actions which might exacerbate their distress.32 One 
co- ordinator told me that the wishes of relatives must be respected so as to assist their 
bereavement process. The point is emphasised in promotional materials which state 
that, legally, the approval of relatives is not required, but it is nonetheless always 
requested ... nowadays at least. 
Presenting a paper at a BODY Convention I attended, a well known surgeon 
remarked that in the early days of transplantation organs were removed from deceased 
patients without consulting relatives, some of whom complained, so the procedures 
were altered. This surgeon's remark was a casual anecdote and no more information 
was given; at the time, his comment seemed to fit with other views I had heard 
expressed about consultation with a potential donor's family. Organs must be seen to 
be freely given, under the control of the donor, before death, or the relatives after the 
donor dies. 
We must remember, of course, that `freely given' is also taken to mean the 
absence of conditional giving (Dept. of Health 2000:1, Point 1.3). The Department of 
Health's investigation into an incidence of conditional organ donation illustrates 
official recognition that control should not be entirely in the hands of the donor or 
donor's family. Recalling the stories told to me, we can question whether families in 
this predicament have any sense of control at all. Traumatised by the sudden deaths of 
their children, bewildered by a lack of information, feeling pressured to agree to organ 
32 However, see my comments about the BMA and presumed consent in Chapter 6. 
removal, and rushed into a decision, suggests a marked absence of control which has 
left the families I interviewed angry and in despair. 
Similarly, if "there are no recorded cases of relatives refusing donation in the 
face of a donor card" (New et al. 1994:48), there is room to question the extent to 
which a donor's family actually has any `free choice' in the matter. The point is by no 
means insignificant; doing what their loved one would have wanted is a paramount 
concern for many bereaved families.33 Arguably, they have no choice; acceding to 
their loved one's wishes about organ donation is a matter of obligation. Tom 
expressed this poignantly when he remarked that John had made the decision about 
becoming an organ donor while he and Catherine were left with the consequences. 
For a number of donor families who participated in my research, those consequences 
were not as comforting as they had imagined, and there were limited opportunities for 
expressing dissatisfaction. 
Another factor destabilising the rhetoric of choice in organ donation was 
mentioned by a few nurses and co- ordinators, who said that the availability of organs 
was susceptible to media influence; one "bad story," for example, about removing 
organs from a deceased person whose family had not been asked, could directly affect 
subsequent donor numbers. In my early conversations with donor families, they 
acknowledged this delicate issue and expressed reluctance to speak publicly about 
their poor treatment `in case it put people off organ donation'. In effect, these families 
were coerced into supporting the public performance of organ donation by 
suppressing their own less comfortable stories, thus contributing to their own erasure 
33 Certainly among all the bereaved people I have had conversations with, not only donor families 
(cf. Howarth 1996:123) 
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from the process. Gaining a measure of strength as they have moved through 
bereavement, and feeling that organ donors and their families should not be so readily 
cast aside "after the event," Catherine and Rita have attempted their own resistance to 
the public performance of organ donation. 
Resisting Coercion and Erasure 
In February 1999, at my invitation, Catherine agreed to speak of her situation on a 
radio programme (BBC Radio 4, Woman's Hour, 5.2.99), which was to have focused 
on the participation of families in decisions about the removal of a relative's organs, 
and their need for support after the donation event. The inclusion of a senior 
transplant professional in the discussion shifted the spotlight to `the refrain of 
shortage' (Richardson 1996), particularly of kidneys, to "the failure of [donor card] 
campaigns," "a general degree of apathy" towards carrying donor cards, and to 
"families who block [one's] stated wish" to donate organs, concluding with waiting 
list numbers. This had really angered Catherine, who later said she did not think she 
could do anything like that again. 
Rita and Conrad were originally very dubious about drawing attention to their 
situation. Conrad remarked, "it wouldn't go down very well with the medical 
profession." When they presented £1,200 to the ICU where Philip had died, the 
hospital press office brought in a local reporter whose paper "did a lovely piece" 
about the humidifier for a life support machine, bought with the money collected, as a 
memorial to Philip and mark of gratitude to the ICU staff who had tried to save his 
life. Unfortunately, delays in purchasing the equipment, then administrative pressures 
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in the hospital press office, meant it had taken two years for this to happen, with no 
explanations to Rita and Conrad about the delay. They were less happy with the 
article in the hospital's own paper which, the couple said, "hijacked" the story and 
used it to promote organ donor cards. "So it wasn't really about Philip at all." 
Three years later, Rita was sufficiently upset by a newspaper item about an 
organ recipient, in which there was no mention of the donor or family, that she wrote 
a letter to the newspaper, "never expecting it to be published." But it did appear 
(Plate 7). 
Although these seem small steps to take, I have a vicarious sense of their 
magnitude for Rita and Catherine. Rita has since been contacted by her area's co- 
ordinator to say that, as a result of her experiences of the donation process, much 
hard work is being done to improve the quality of support for donor families. So, as 
Rita remarked, "we have tried, and accomplished something between us." 
Summary 
This chapter has addressed the attitude of donor families that they and the donor are 
erased from the donation and transplantation process, and we have examined some of 
the mechanisms by which this occurs, anonymity being a key feature. 
It has been demonstrated that the anonymity of organ donors and their families 
is variable and manipulable. Most importantly, organ donors were, and in significant 
ways will always be, implicated in the lives of friends and family members who survive 
them (see Plates 12 -14). Promotional material might guarantee anonymity in a 
generalised form as a valuable feature of the organ donation and transplantation 
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process, but as Lucy Maxfield's poster demonstrates, the apparently desperate lack of 
organs for transplantation prompted the transplant community to abandon donor 
anonymity in favour of a `powerful image' designed to provoke intense emotional 
responses towards those who need transplants. Reversing what people in Britain have 
come to understand as the `natural order' -- adults protecting children, and death 
taking us in old age -- we are confronted by a young child with the generosity and 
forethought to carry a donor card, and who thus saved the lives of two children and 
three adults when she herself was killed in a road accident. 
Such imagery undermines the supposed voluntarism of organ donation. We 
may `have a choice' when Britain's legislative position is contrasted with, for 
example, Austria, and there are elements of free choice in the matter of recording 
one's willingness to become an organ donor. Nevertheless, we have seen that a 
plethora of promotional materials seek to encourage registration; the act of giving has 
to be nurtured. In form and content, these materials can display strongly persuasive 
tactics, openly acknowledged in a study designed to increase the number of donor 
card carriers, albeit in the USA (Skumanich & Kintsfather 1996). Persuasion merges 
with coercion when those who do not carry donor cards, or do not consent to the 
removal of a deceased relative's organs, are subjected to moral condemnation in the 
media. 
Despite an obvious concern among health care professionals to show 
sensitivity, the families I met felt strongly pressured by hospital staff to agree to organ 
removal. Where families appear to be willingly following their loved one's wishes 
about organ removal, any notion of `freedom of choice' can be eroded by the 
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emotional aftermath of that decision. Contrary to the perspective that human organs 
are (always) anonymous, detached, commodified objects, not implicated in the 
identity of the donor, for the families in this research the now transplanted organs of 
their children were far from anonymous and detached. How and where they had been 
used was enormously important information. 
This leads me to introduce the next chapter where it will be seen that the 
identity of organ donors travels with their organs, into the realm of the recipient. 
There is a further way in which organs have to be elicited, relating directly to their 
corporeal form. Human organs cannot simply be `given', handed over in the manner 
of `presents' passed directly between two known people. They must be physically cut 
out of the giver's body by a surgeon. While the `retrieval team' is at the donor's 
hospital, conducting the removal operation, a particular recipient is already being 
prepared to receive an organ from a particular donor. In their turn, then, surgeons are 
`coerced' into acquiring organs for their patients, who would otherwise die. Thus, the 
needs of potential recipients drive the process of alienation to the extremes depicted in 
this chapter, where anonymous organs are to be arbitrarily removed from anonymous 
bodies with no thought for the bereaved families. But as Chapter Five will show, 
actual recipients can have very different attitudes towards their transplanted organs, 
the persons from whose bodies they were removed, and the families left bereaved. 
Giving thanks where It's due 
I HOPE the girl who received an 
organ transplant recently recovers. 
Her father was very thankful and 
thoughtful regarding the donor. 
Often they are never mentioned. 
Our son was a multi -organ donor 
four years ago and was able to help 
seven people. We received one letter 
of thanks. To carry a card is a very 
unselfish act. The family, left 
behind, have all the trauma of 
carrying out the donor's wishes, 
along with the grieving. 
Kidney recipient Janet Bennett 
said that it was "better than 
winning the lottery" (Express, 
April 12) - there was no mention in 
the report that someone had to 
carry out the wishes of a donor in 
their family, or be asked if they 
would agree to donate organs. I 
hope more people will remember 
that someone had to die before 
there could be -a transplant. 
Rita Jackson, 
Morecambe, Lancashire 
,72F :.:7fr g74T, n'TATTo 
Rita's letter in "The Daily Express "; 15.04.00. 
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The (Dis)Placement Of Connectivity: Organ Recipients And The Management 
Of Guilt And Gratitude 
This chapter focuses on people who have received the `gift of life'. The social and 
emotional ramifications of receiving an organ extend far beyond the act of donation 
itself, materially influencing the lives of organ recipients. As shall become apparent, 
feelings of guilt and gratitude reported by organ recipients undermine the voluntarism 
and anonymity of organ donation in the recipient realm. 
The process of becoming an organ recipient is described in Section 
One. Awaited with eagerness, it may take considerably longer than becoming a donor, 
and is recognised to extend beyond the immediate transplantation event; in actual 
practice, organ recipients are acknowledged to remain recipients for the rest of their 
life and a support service is available for them. 
Section Two returns to the theme of anonymity. Here we see a reversal of the 
anonymising process described in Chapter Three. Human organs personify their 
donors, and recipients may feel compelled to imagine an identity in the absence of 
concrete information. At the same time, recipients do report bodily and psychological 
changes to themselves, as persons, often expressed as feeling like `a different person' 
or `a new person'. These changes, I am arguing, derive from recipients' participation 
in the tangible and intangible substance of their donor. 
Section Three addresses the most controversial issue to arise during my 
research -- that of direct communication between recipients and their donor family. 
The decision about writing may not be in the hands of recipients, though most 
167 
expressed the wish to do so. The issue of communication returns us to the donor 
realm, and to donor families, leading into my final chapter on the tension between 
autonomy and connectivity in the transplant programme. 
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I Becoming an Organ Recipient 
Starkly contrasting with the sudden, unexpected and unwanted entrance of donors 
and their families to ICUs, for all the recipients I met referral to the transplant unit 
was the culmination of months, even years, of illness which they took considerable 
time to recount to me in a sequential narrative.34 They had to be prompted to tell me 
what happened after their operation. My initial approach may have provoked this 
narrative sequencing. When we first met, they all asked "what do you want to know ?" 
or "where will I start?" But given that they had been ill for a very long time, it was 
understandable that `how they got referred' should illustrate the duration and 
seriousness of their illnesses, and that their stories ended with the operation which, so 
far as they were all concerned, "saved my life." 
Each recipient acknowledged the operation was, if not a culminating event, 
then certainly a watershed. Anthropologically speaking, it resembles the liminal zone 
in a rite of passage (Turner 1967; cf. van Gennep 1909). Recipients undergo a major 
change of status; in contrast to their life of ill health, the ones I met all seemed to feel 
they were awaking from the operation to `begin afresh'. Many recipients think of the 
day of their operation as a second birthday. With further prompting, they talked about 
the after -effects of their operation, and how they were managing to cope with the 
difficulties of a demanding aftercare regime. 
34 It is also possible that potential recipients become ill very quickly. 
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`I knew something was wrong': getting referred to the transplant imit 
Potential recipients are referred to the transplant unit from other areas of health care. 
Keith's referring= consultant "thought I was too old but my daughter insisted." All the 
recipients I met said they "just knew" something was very wrong. Helen's story is 
fairly illustrative. She knew she was dying. No -one had actually used the word 
`dying', but eventually one houseman had taken her aside and said "there is no more 
we can do for you" -- then he mentioned the possibility of a transplant. Helen said 
she'd try anything. This was a lifeline and she "would have done anything to get onto 
the list." 
The recipients I met all said they `had no choice'; it was 'either a transplant ... 
or death'. Robert made the point eloquently, saying "I was never very keen on human 
organ transplants, never mind animal ones,35 but all that changed when the consultant 
said `you need a transplant'. When you are standing at the edge of the precipice, 
things look very different." Some recipients had expressed doubts, particularly about 
getting the chance `at their age'. One man in his late 60s wondered if it was right that 
he should get a chance when younger people also needed transplants. Similarly, Mary 
said she got very upset when she heard about young people dying. "It doesn't seem 
fair when I got the chance," she said. However, neither of them seriously considered 
refusing a transplanted organ. In fact, a friend once asked Mary, when she was having 
a very bad day, depressed about the death of a neighbour's young husband, if she 
wished she had not had the operation. Her negative reply was emphatic. 
35 We had been discussing xenotransplantation, genetic engineering of pigs, to produce organs 
compatible with human bodies. 
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The Assessment 
One endeavour on the part of transplant unit staff to control the disparity between the 
availability of organs and the number of people waiting for operations is through an 
assessment of patients. 
For potential organ recipients, The Assessment (I always felt recipients were 
saying that with capital letters) has huge implications, since it can mean they are not 
accepted on to the waiting list.; TU staff told me many recipients have a "hard time 
of it," after their operations, citing cases of "serious depressions" and "marriages 
breaking up." "Living with a transplant" is demanding, I was told; physical and 
emotional progress difficult to predict. Senior staff want to assess `family support' as 
well as a patient's physical and psychological status. Spouses, especially, are expected 
to participate in The Assessment. Here, connectivity is unambiguously recognised and 
co- opted. 
Several recipients I spoke to regarded the assessment as "an exam," their only 
concern being how to pass it. Tony thought it was all to do with his behaviour, "like 
having the right table manners "; he was desperate to "do it right." Robert regarded it 
like an interview. "You have to be on form." Keith remembers the very first thing the 
surgeon said was "there's no age limit, but I won't put a good liver into a bad body." 
When the surgeon said Keith would eventually become "like a vegetable" as a result 
of his illness, his wife said she would cope -- she was worried about the risks of a 
transplant, but Keith wanted to take the chance. Otherwise, he said, it would be "too 
much of a burden on her." 
36 Unfortunately I was not able to ascertain how many people are rejected on an annual basis. 
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The Recipient Co- ordinator 
Recipient co- ordinators, responsible for administrative aspects of transplantation, 
occupy a pivotal liaison role within this realm; usually meeting the recipients prior to 
assessment and taking an active role during assessment. Recipients told me the co- 
ordinators had especially asked for their thoughts about `getting a transplant', 
discussed the operation's recovery period and described the aftercare regime. Co- 
ordinators are part of the unit team which reviews the suitability of people referred for 
assessment, though the transplant surgeon will make the final decision. Although the 
British Medical Association's position is that the judgement should be entirely clinical 
(Scotsman 29.4.97b), one senior nursing officer acknowledged to me that decisions 
usually involve subjective judgements about a potential recipient's background. 
Consequently, decisions can be rendered ambiguous (see New et al. 1994:79 -80; cf 
Scotsman 29.4.97a, 30.4.97). If people are accepted on to the waiting list, their 
`official' entry into the recipient realm is formalised by presentation of a personal 
pager. 
Waiting for The Call 
Potential recipients constantly carry this pager, through which their unit will contact 
them when an organ has been located. The recipients I interviewed had waited from a 
few weeks to over a year. Maintaining some semblance of ̀ normal life' was important 
but difficult. Helen spent time making plans for her family, "in case I died." Other 
recipients talked about not telling their family everything, of wanting to protect them; 
conversely, they realised their family members wanted to protect -- perhaps 
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overprotect -- them, determined to keep them alive until an organ became available. 
Katy said people were worried about taking her out anywhere "probably in case I 
collapsed." Keith said his wife did everything for him. "She'd have drunk my tea if I'd 
let her!" he joked. 
Exacerbating the situation, potential recipients do realise they are waiting for 
someone to die. Tony acknowledged using some "very black humour." Looking back, 
he is not happy about some of the things he said, but "I did it; it's how I coped." 
Marjory also knew she was waiting, hoping, for someone to die "so I could get my 
transplant ... and that's an awful thing to be doing." 
Getting The call 
All the recipients I spoke to, with one exception, "got the call" at home, though one 
told me his pager had a habit of going off on its own accord, causing two false alarms 
on car journeys. Robert, a wonderful raconteur, related his rather fraught ambulance 
journey with gusto; first it arrived late, then it broke down on the motorway. 
However, "we got there!" 
On arrival at the transplant unit, recipients are `prepped' for their operation, 
before the exact suitability of the allocated organ is determined. While bodies can be 
viewed as containers of `spare parts', the parts are by no means uniform. Internal 
organs vary in size and each is chemically unique. Relatively close matches do occur, 
but the complete suitability of any organ can only be determined once it is removed 
from the donor's body, and subjected to a final sequence of tests. Potential recipients 
must be sent home if the match is not suitable. Keith was sent home again the first 
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time he got the call; "It was the worst night of my life." He closed the door and the 
curtains, and "ate worms" -- a humorous reference to a Scottish children's rhyme. It 
was at this point he fully acknowledged, "I could die." 
The Transplant Operation 
The recipients I met all said their operations had `gone smoothly'. Most of their 
narratives concentrated on the immediate post- operation period. Everyone spoke of 
how they felt an intense sense of euphoria and well -being when they regained 
consciousness. Helen said she felt "all glowing," as if it wasn't really her, she felt so 
different. Thomas was amazed at how free of pain he felt. Keith said he remembers 
waking up and asking "when's my operation ?," while Tony woke up to discover a 
nurse cleaning his teeth.37 
Afterwards: the post -operative recovery period 
Contrary to public perceptions, and indeed the notions of some of the recipients I met, 
a transplant does not restore full and immediate health. Though they all woke up from 
the operation with intense feelings of well -being, none of the recipients suggested that 
the recovery period was `plain sailing'. There is physiotherapy, special diets, and 
learning to monitor intake of all the drugs which help recipients' bodies accept the 
organ. Some recipients were very ill for weeks, even months; others spoke of being 
`up and about' in a matter of days. Some then stayed in a small flat on hospital 
3' Since the mouth is a primary entrance point for infections, oral hygiene is very important - see 
infections (p. 175). 
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premises for a few weeks. All organ recipients return as unit out -patients for regular 
check -ups. 
Recipients spoke frankly about the discrepancy between their hopes and the 
reality of their recoveries. Michael showed me the booklet his unit had given him, and 
said staff really made sure he read it all, so there were "no surprises." So, nothing had 
surprised him? "Well, I really didn't believe it would take me so long to recover." 
Gary said he was determined to "beat the book," which suggested recipients could be 
back to work in three months. He would do it in less time than that -- he would be a 
model patient. Unfortunately, he never has recovered enough to return to paid 
employment, though he does voluntary work to keep himself occupied. 
Most of the recipients I interviewed, and many questionnaire respondents, 
reported successful operations and good post- operative recovery periods. In the 
term, the actualities of living with a transplanted 
variegated complexion. Recipients' lives had certainly been extended beyond 
expectation. Elation and relief from the burden of imminent death showed in the 
humour with which they recounted their stories to me, in contrast with the stories told 
by donor families. Yet recipients also spoke of dramatic and not entirely welcome 
changes to their bodies and perceptions of `themselves'. As I argue in the next 
section, these changes relate both to the presence of tangible, alien substance within 
their bodies, and also to the `intangible substance' of personhood irretrievably entailed 
in the cross -bodily transfer of human organs. In other words, the ongoing process of a 
recipient's self -making implicates the `present absence' of the organ donor and his or 
her family. 
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II Consuming Parts: From Anonymity to Personification 
While organ donation is presented as anonymous, and organs can be made to 
resemble detached objects with no social identity, their alienability from their donors 
is curtailed for recipients. As I shall shortly demonstrate, the donor's death tends to 
focus a recipient's attention on a particular, if still anonymous, person. First, I wish to 
illustrate an organs's physical inalienability, the effects of which I locate in certain of 
the recipient's responses to the organ itself or, less directly, to the operation or drug 
regime which accompanies it. 
Detachable yet inalienable 
Human organs are literally detachable; they can be cut out of the body and stand as 
separate objects. But transplanted organs are `alien' to recipients' bodies. To prevent 
a immune system the organ, large quantities of 
immunosuppressant drugs must be ingested every day, yet this exposes recipients to 
infections which the immune system cannot deal with precisely because it is being 
suppressed by drugs. The possibility of certain infections are combated with other 
drugs. Although the drug regime is strictly monitored and controlled, infections and 
rejection remain permanent threats to organ recipients. Consequently, they continue 
to take the drugs for the rest of their life. Three of the recipients I met had recovered 
from major episodes of rejection; others had had minor rejection difficulties, but 
suffered from infections which had forced their return to hospital or, at the least, to 
complete rest at home. Episodes of rejection or infection tend to serve as reminders 
that recipients do not have their own organ; it came from someone else's body. 
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Recipients can also be affected by other unpleasant physical and emotional 
changes, unsure whether they relate to the transplanted organ or not. One recipient 
joked that some patients felt compelled to tell TU staff about every little physical 
problem, for example "I've got an ingrown toenail, doctor. Is it because of the 
drugs ?" Although most recipients will stress, at what one might term the level of 
everyday conversation, how well they are as a result of their operation, their ongoing 
physical problems can be challenging. 
Emotional or psychological problems can be as severe as the physical ones, 
though not necessarily life -threatening. After the initial euphoria of recovery, one or 
two of the recipients I interviewed had been extremely dispirited about their slow rate 
of progress. Very few had found their long term recovery easy. Another change 
recipients noticed was a heightened emotional sensitivity, usually appearing in the 
proclivity to cry "at the drop of a hat," as Helen put it. The men found this more 
troublesome, commenting that crying was not something men were supposed to do. 
Transplant recipients can be ambivalent about expressing any difficulties they 
are experiencing, either emotional or physical. As Tony remarked, "when people ask 
how you are, they don't necessarily want to hear the truth. It's just habit -- `how are 
you ?' `Fine'." When Jo Hatton, one of the first people in Britain to receive a 
transplanted heart/lung, voiced some of these issues in a letter to Transplant Times (a 
newspaper produced from Papworth Hospital) subsequent issues carried some letters 
of praise, but more of criticism, from other recipients. The general view was `you are 
alive, be grateful for it, and stop complaining'. In the early 1980s, Jo learned there 
was little supportive space for recipients to express anything but gratitude towards 
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the gift, but she fought to create it and established the Transplant Support Network. 
(TSN) in 1995. Having established a network of regional group organisers composed 
of recipients trained in communication skills and who can offer information and 
support to anyone involved in transplantation, TSN has now begun to formalise links 
with transplant units throughout Britain by distributing an education pack. 
Along with their own physical and psychological problems, recipients may 
have to deal with the deaths of other patients while they are recovering from their 
own operations, or in the longer term. The ones I met said deaths in the unit might 
have been easier to cope with if staff had not tried to hide what was happening. Doors 
would quietly close; curtains would be discreetly drawn; nothing was said "but we 
knew who had died -- word gets round." Hiding death in this way was similarly 
reported by Hockey (1990) in a nursing home for the elderly. Mirroring the comments 
I encountered from other health care professionals, about not talking to bereaved 
people, the TU staff I spoke to said it was for the benefit of patients, so they did not 
get upset. On the other hand, one long term recipient told me he felt very awkward 
asking staff about other recipients, in case anyone had died, and the staff were upset. 
Witnessing the deaths of other patients during a hospital stay is not unique to 
transplant recipients. However, the possibility of a life- saving operation for those 
facing imminent death can mean potential recipients are not given the kind of 
emotional support increasingly available to other dying people to help them come to 
terms with death, a predicament noted by the senior nursing officer in a transplant 
unit. The death of a fellow patient, before or after a transplant operation, tends to 
emphasise the uncertainty of survival for others; no transplant operation carries a 
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guarantee of success. At the same time, surviving recipients can also feel guilty that 
fellow patients have died, and ask "why them and not me ?" in a manner which 
resonates with the attitude of many recipients towards their donor's death. This brings 
me to consider the conceptual inalienability of organs, for their recipients. 
From generalised anonymity to 'specific someone' 
In the context of organ and tissue donation, Strathern argues, an "anonymously 
produced object becomes part of a store on which others draw" (1997:302), because 
of its alienability. Semen and ova are alienable, detachable from the donor, because 
they can be "produced [for use] without being elicited by another person" (1997:300). 
Women who donate ova have actually described them as being like fingernails 
(Konrad 1999:651), produced to be discarded.'$ Bracketing for the moment the finite 
nature of ova, as opposed to the regenerative nature of semen, reproductive tissue and 
indeed blood are also comparable with fingernails because they readily regenerate.39 
Here we have two contrasts with organs. In the first place, human organs are finite. In 
the second place, organs are neither `natural' bodily emissions nor autoproductive; 
they cannot be produced without being `elicited' by another -- a surgeon must remove 
them from the body. Strictly speaking, ova must also be `elicited', i.e. surgically 
removed for the purpose of donation though they do form part of a regular bodily 
emission. The fact that organs have to be removed from someone, in the majority of 
38 Nevertheless, these donors expressed a sense of communion with recipients, which Konrad terms 
the sociality of anonymity (1999:643). 
39 The biomedical perspective is that female children are born with approximately seven million egg 
germ cells which diminish in number and quality throughout their lives (Konrad 1999:662n10). 
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cases from someone who has died, critically undermines the generalised anonymity 
enjoyed by their reproductive counterparts. 
Yet, once again, we have a situation which manifests tensions and 
contradictions. TU staff have told me of recipients who do not think about their donor 
at all, who have felt that a transplant was their right. Staff can be upset by such 
sentiments, and one or two nurses explained that they would gently try to get 
recipients to give some thought to their donor and grieving family. Conversely, staff 
were concerned when recipients were regarded as `dwelling on the death' of their 
donor, and thinking too much about the bereaved family. As for recipients, they 
struggled to find their own ways of coping. All the recipients I met were conscious of 
the fact that their continuing life derived from someone having died, and that there 
was now a direct link with the donor and his or her family, via the donor's organ. I do 
not mean, here, regarded having died in order that their organs 
could be transplanted. None of the recipients I interviewed seemed to regard the 
donation as some sort of sacrifice, though many did speak of the generosity of the 
donor and his or her family. Rather, recipients were aware that they but not their 
donors had got a `second chance' at life, that another family rather than their own 
had been bereaved. 
Other aspects of receiving a transplanted organ can intensify a recipient's 
sense of connection to his or her unknown donor, and here I am suggesting a marked 
contrast with other kinds of body tissue. Promotional materials for donation certainly 
suggest that solid organs hold a comparable status with `discardable' body parts. 
Donors are deceased, and hardly need their organs, which are therefore discardable as 
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dead bodies are discardable -- we bury or cremate them. Yet the difference is 
significant in its ambiguity. On the one hand, recipients did speak about their 
transplanted organ arriving "like a new washing machine" or being "like a central 
heating pump" -- a utilitarian, even commodified view.40 Conversely, organs may be 
discardable but they are not waste products. From the perspective of someone who 
needs a transplant they are beyond price, and beyond being marked as anonymous. 
somatic identity 
A further factor working to destabilise donor anonymity is the point that the donor's 
somatic identity may well matter very much to the recipients of his or her organs. 
Human organs vary proportionately with body size, and while donor identities are 
generally a well kept secret, the recipients I met laboured to arrive at some 
conclusions as to their donor's age, sex and physical size.41 Jane said she thought the 
heart she received was from a healthy teenage boy because "I'm small ... I needed a 
small heart, so the donor had to be small, but I feel it beating so strongly, it had to 
come from a healthy young man." Robert similarly concluded that his donor must 
have been of a substantial build, and probably therefore male, otherwise the lungs 
would not have fitted the space available to them. He told me of other recipients who 
wonder about their donors and "make up what they don't know." Beyond this sort of 
musing over somatic identity, recipients would wonder about the family of their 
donor. Some might ponder on what their donor's family would think of them, like the 
70 `Conunodified' denotes treatment `as if a commodity, without the attachment of monetary value. 
These examples reflect gendered assumptions about male and female physiology. I did not find 
gender an immediate concern for my subjects of study though it has broad relevance given the 
gendered nature of the Western `individual'. Of greater significance here for `imagining the donor' 
is the fact that external body size dictates internal organ size. Transplanted organs 
must fit the space. 
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recipient who wondered how the family would feel that the organ had been given to 
him -- "an old fogie" -- instead of a young person. While this resonates with the guilt 
older recipients can feel that they got a chance for life when younger people also need 
it, this particular recipient appeared to be managing his feelings very well. Many 
recipients, as I will presently illustrate, also enter into the grief of their donor family. 
Whether right or wrong in their assumptions, the recipients I met were turning an 
anonymous somebody into a specific someone, with a family who were mourning. 
Lastly, and contrary to Western `presents' which take on the identity of the 
recipient (Strathern 1997:295), organ recipients may hold ambivalent views about 
their control over their own identity, and wonder about the possibility of their 
becoming like their donor. One woman in the USA noticed such profound changes to 
her personality -- habits, tastes, behaviour -- that she felt compelled to contact her 
have that her acquired characteristics closely resemble 
those of her heart donor (Sylvia 1997). Several recipients I interviewed mulled over 
this possibility when they described various physical, emotional and behavioural 
changes they had noticed. Then they shrugged it off, saying "but I know that's not 
possible." Recipients can experience profound physical and psychological changes 
following their operation. Some of these, like an increase in body hair, can be linked 
to their regime of drugs. Others, like a heightened emotional sensitivity, are less easily 
pinned down. 
Recipients also told me they were more inclined to `seize the day', as it were. 
One male recipient, George, started to chat with me in the bar, after a day at the 
BODY Convention. It was quite early on in my research phase and, not the 
most 
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accomplished person at casual chat, I had been wondering how to approach 
Convention delegates, so I was grateful when he began the conversation. In response 
to my question about any particular changes he had noticed since his operation, 
George said, "Well, I would never have started to chat to a complete stranger of the 
opposite sex, in a bar!" Since his operation, he had been much more outgoing and did 
wonder if this was coming from the personality of his recipient. "They do say you can 
take on aspects of your donor's personality, and I can't help wondering ... then I think 
no, don't be silly. Its just because I've had a second chance, and intend to make the 
most of it." Even when recipients discount the possibility of taking on aspects of the 
donor's identity, they are aware of a specific, albeit anonymous, person who has died 
and left a family in mourning, and they may find that anonymity disturbing. 
While the anonymity of their donor might unsettle, recipients could find 
contemplating the death of the grief of that bereaved family, and the 
magnitude of the gift they themselves had received an emotionally volatile 
combination. However, like the bereavement of donor families, I found that there 
were widely differing views among TU staff and recipients on the best way to manage 
these feelings of guilt and gratitude, as I now go on to discuss. 
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Ill Of Guilt and Gratitude 
In their initial interviews, recipients spoke quite calmly to me about their illnesses, and 
with a contentment bordering on elation about their operation and the difference it 
had brought to their lives. Subsequently I found that below the surface, recipients 
were struggling, with various degrees of success, to come to terms with emotional 
ambiguities of their continuing life as a direct result of someone else's death. Most 
recipients said they would never forget their donor and would always be grateful for 
their `gift of life'. 
At the same time, while on the waiting list, recipients are hoping and wishing 
for an organ transplant, perhaps employing macabre humour to mask the realities of 
that wish -- that someone else die and leave a grieving family, instead of them. 
Consequently, recipients can feel `survivor guilt' reported, for example, among 
concentration camps during World War Two (Myerhoff 1984). One 
or two recipients coped with their survival by deliberately not thinking about their 
donor and his or her family. As one said, speaking through tears, "If I thought about 
my donor, I just couldn't go on." Similar intense feelings arise when she hears of 
young people dying. "Why them and not me? It doesn't seem fair." 
In this opening paragraph I have tried to convey what emerged very strongly 
during the present study; that feelings of guilt and gratitude, and ongoing health 
problems, all intertwine for organ recipients. When I first approached transplant units 
in the hope of gaining access to organ recipients, their emotional and physical 
problems were frequently emphasised as reasons it would not be appropriate for me to 
talk to them. In particular, talking about their donors would not be beneficial 
to 
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recipient's health and well -being. The physical and emotional difficulties faced by 
recipients following a transplant operation can certainly be immense; contrary to 
popular imagery, recovery from a transplant operation is not immediate. Yet I found 
recipients well able to inform me themselves if they did not wish to talk about their 
donors; most managed to discuss their feelings, albeit through occasional tears. 
Directing Gratitude 
When recipients spoke of the lifesaving nature of their operation, gratitude was 
invariably directed towards their transplant unit's staff, particularly the surgeon who 
was often regarded with awed respect. Feelings of gratitude can be magnified because 
other health care professionals had said "there is nothing more we can do for you." 
Transplant surgeons step in and throw the lifeline, or as one recipient had expressed 
it, dangled the golden key. intense respect also apparent when a prominent 
transplant surgeon spoke at a BODY Convention I attended, where he was publicly 
thanked by a donor family (he had carried out the removal operation on their son), 
and by a recipient on whom he had operated several years earlier. 
As this latter instance suggests, recipients also feel that it is the TU staff to 
whom they owe their continuing life, leading recipients to feel a strong connection 
with the transplant unit and staff Several recipients told me they were reluctant to go 
abroad on holiday, in case they took ill far away from the unit. One couple gave up 
their plans to retire to New Zealand, despite assurances from the surgeon that health 
care provision was just as good there. Other recipients waited until they were into the 
second year after their operation before planning holidays. As one recipient bluntly 
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put it, "these people are keeping me alive" -- a reminder that the transplant operation 
is by no means the end of the matter. Considerable aftercare is also required by organ 
recipients, hence their ongoing links with the unit, and sense of gratitude to the staff. 
Transplant unit staff generally understood and accepted the gratitude expressed by 
recipients. 
However, when gratitude was directed towards their donor, and recipients 
talked of expressing thanks in a letter, some staff overtly attempted to `conduct the 
conduct' of organ recipients, to divert their gratitude into other channels. Various 
alternatives are available, as TU staff explained to me in interviews. One is to 
encourage the recipient's own adherence to the aftercare regime: "Take care of 
yourself and the organ; that is the best thanks you can give." Another path for 
deflecting gratitude to one's donor lay in suggestions of fund- raising or campaigning 
for the transplant programme. Quite recipients spontaneously enter into 
such activities anyway, knowingly or unknowingly responding to their `gift of life' 
with a form of generalised reciprocity. 
A third path was offered to some of the recipients I interviewed. They were 
asked by unit staff to speak to potential recipients or very `new' recipients, and their 
families, "about having a transplant," from the perspective of someone who had 
actually gone through it. Some recipients told me they did this anyway, without being 
asked. What was said depended very much on the individual recipient. Gail said the 
surgeon asked her to be honest, not to hide the problems, while Chris felt he had to 
emphasise the more positive aspects, not just to support those to whom he spoke, but 
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also for his own sake. He coped, he told me, "by ignoring all the negative stuff," like 
episodes of rejection. 
As these alternative and well- trodden paths for the expression of gratitude 
suggest, I was to discover that the issue of direct forms of communication between 
donor families and the recipients of their relative's organs was a thorny one. Since this 
is a material manifestation of connectivity, I give the issue some attention. 
Direct(ing) communication between recipients and their donor family 
The degree of communication permitted between recipients and donor families 
appears to be a matter of transplant unit policy though my research suggests that there 
is no uniform approach to formulating such policies. The subject sometimes created 
what I rightly or wrongly interpreted as an aura of discomfort among transplant unit 
staff when I raised it. Some said it "not to allow communication 
between recipients and their donor's family; others offered a more personal point of 
view, saying they did not think it was a good idea. A senior surgeon admitted that his 
registrars possibly discouraged recipients from thinking about contact with donor 
families, though letters would be handed on if recipients wanted this to be done. I am 
aware of one unit where the co- ordinator could apparently overrule the wishes of the 
senior consultant. Another co- ordinator told me "we don't listen to managers" and a 
third would "argue strongly" for what she feels is the best service. 
In practice, I found a continuum of communication control. At one end is the 
situation of a recipient who said he had to promise not to ask for any information 
about his donor; it seemed to be "the way things were done" in his 
unit. Where it is 
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permitted, communication usually takes the form of letters of thanks conveyed either 
from the recipient to the recipient co- ordinator, from there to the donor co- ordinator, 
and on to the donor's family, or vice versa. On route, letters could be screened to 
ensure maintenance of anonymity; in one example known to me this involved covering 
names and addresses with sticky labels. I also learned of two units which provide a 
small leaflet with suggested points to put into the letter. In one leaflet, recipients are 
told that they must not give their name or address to the donor's family. Another 
recipient said his unit had standard, but attractive, cards with the donor's first name 
on them. All recipients had to do was sign it. At the other end of the continuum is the 
co- ordinator team at Birmingham's Queen Elizabeth Hospital, which has for some 
time facilitated face to face meetings between recipients and their donor's family, if 
both parties wish to do this. 
In contrast with the idea that for recipients not writing to donor 
families, I suggest that writing might offer a sense of completion to the gift 
transaction, if not to any ongoing feelings of connectivity. Cunningham's (1998) 
survey bears this out; the co- ordinator encourages recipients to write letters, and 
provides them with practical guidance. There was no evidence to suggest that 
recipients were emotionally harmed as a result. Attempts to direct the thoughts of 
recipients away from their donor and his or her family have limited potential for 
success, without significant efforts on the recipient's part, and it could be argued that 
denying recipients the opportunity to send a letter of thanks can also be detrimental to 
their recovery. 
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Like deciding whether or not to talk to me about their donors, recipients 
demonstrated the wish and the ability to reflect on the question of communication 
with their donor's family, and to reach their own decisions. At the same time some 
decisions reflected assumptions about donor families which, as Chapter Four has 
shown, do not necessarily accord with the assessments of donor families themselves. 
And so we are compelled to return to donor families, implicated in the lives of organ 
recipients as much as recipients are implicated in the lives of those donor families. To 
conclude this chapter I present comments about inter -family communication, 
emerging from recipients and donor families in interviews and questionnaire 
responses.42 These comments reflect central themes and foci from the current 
chapter, and offer an introduction to Chapter Six. 
I asked all the recipients who participated in my research if they had tried to 
write a letter of thanks to their donor family. The majority of recipients had written 
letters, often with encouragement from transplant unit staff, and were glad they had 
done so. Responses to my survey were returned with comments expressing the sense 
of relief, or of joy, which writing had brought, and the even greater joy of receiving a 
response from their donor family. Sadly, some recipients had no idea whether their 
letter reached its destination. One respondent had tried to ask unit staff to find out for 
him, but all they would say was "it was passed on to the hospital where the donor 
died." 
A small number of recipients had wanted to write, but transplant unit staff 
would not allow it, or else they got the strong impression it was not `the done thing' 
42 Quantitative data from the survey are reproduced in the Appendices. 
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in their unit. Mary's situation is illustrative. Despite her emotional problems, she 
would have liked to write to her donor family, but understood this was frowned upon 
by the transplant unit staff. I later discovered that recipients in this unit are told they 
must not ask about the donor, but letters of thanks will be passed on to the family if 
recipients wish to write. It was suggested that my informant misinterpreted the 
information, though I met staff from this unit at an early stage of my research and 
must admit I interpreted their description of ̀ unit policy' in the same way. 
A few recipients who had not written letters wondered, "How do you thank 
someone for your life ?" This question was usually accompanied by comments on the 
lack of information recipients get about the donor and family. Not requesting 
information about donors may be pressed home as strongly as that of not asking about 
writing. These recipients felt it was impossible to write when they did not know if the 
was or middle aged, and what relationship they had had 
with surviving family members. While there is validity in such comments, I have seen 
two anonymous letters, sent to donor families by co- ordinators, which offer a 
different perspective. The first letter was not from someone who had benefited from 
that family's act of donation, but the co- ordinator had felt the simple words were so 
sincere "they apply to all donor families and I'm sure you will find it uplifting." The 
second letter was written by the recipient's wife. Both expressed the difficulty of 
thanking a donor's family for their life, when they were in the midst of bereavement; 
the families who received these letters said they were touched by the sentiments. 
The physical frailty of recipients, after their operations, was often cited by TU 
staff as one reason why recipients could not be expected to write to their 
donor 
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family. At the same time, judgements about the appropriate time to write reflected 
assumptions about untimely or inappropriate intrusion into a family's grief. One 
recipient said by the time he felt able to write, he thought it was too late -- but he 
"regrets this decision more strongly with every year that passes." In one unit, it was 
felt that writing eight months after the recipient's operation was too soon. Another 
recipient said it was at least a year before he could give any thought to his donor's 
family and by then it was too late to write. In Cunningham's (1998) survey, letters 
were sent as far apart as one month and six months from the date of the recipient's 
operation. Four respondents to my survey wrote more than a year after their 
operation. Minoring Cunningham's (1998) findings, no donor's relative who 
completed my questionnaire made any comment about the untimely arrival of letters 
from recipients. Indeed, I have seen a letter written by one recipient fourteen years 
after his operation. Unable to trace his own donor, he sent the letter to Jane and 
David Nix, who set up the Midland Donor Family Support Group. They were 
delighted to receive the letter, stressing that "it's never too late to say thank you." 
The issue of expressing gratitude for the `gift of life' requires careful 
consideration. Donor families have told me that they do not expect thanks for what 
they have done; any gratitude expressed by organ recipients is deflected by them, on 
to the donor. Conversely, I have not encountered any situations where a donor family 
refused to accept a letter of thanks; they seem rather to be highly valued, symbolising 
the generous nature of the donor and are treasured as such, possibly kept in an album 
with photographs of the deceased (Plate 11). 
191 
Expecting thanks 
I did encounter a situation where a family expected thanks and it created considerable 
discomfort among those present. It happened at the BODY Convention in 1997. A 
distinguished transplant surgeon had just given a potted history of its development, 
resonating with the `heroic journey' outlined in Chapter One's historical review. We 
were a few minutes into the question and answer session which followed, when 
someone asked why donor families received no thanks from the recipients whose lives 
had been saved. He and his wife had agreed to the removal of organs from their son; 
seven people had benefited, as they learned in a letter from the co- ordinator, but they 
had expected letters from recipients. "Why didn't they write? Weren't they grateful ?." 
I was sitting behind the couple and had observed their distress throughout the 
presentation; I now also saw their anger at this apparent lack of gratitude. The 
speaker said something which I did not catch -- all my attention was taken up by the 
couple. Discussing it later with Tom and Catherine, Tom said he was furious at the 
speaker's reply -- that families are not supposed to expect thanks. 
By the time I had drawn my attention back to the hall, a silence had fallen. 
People looked at the floor, the ceiling, sometimes at each other, but no -one spoke. 
The silence stretched on -- until the anthropologist, more fool than angel, stepped in. I 
read my own interpretation into the silence, and sought to offer a reply without the 
embarrassment I assumed others must be feeling at this overt expectation of gratitude. 
With apologies for presuming to speak in the place of any recipients present, I began 
to outline the diverse policies of transplant units, which may discourage any form of 
contact between recipients and donor families, as well as the problems many recipients 
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still have after their operations, guilt over the death of the donor being a significant 
factor. John Evans, in his capacity as Convenor, then pointed out that this was not the 
time or place to discuss the issue, and suggested we focus on asking the speaker 
about current and future developments in transplantation.43 Questions turned to how 
the number of donors could be increased. By the time a recipient had recalled a 
humorous story about his operation, which the speaker had performed, the 
atmosphere seemed to relax. 
When I spoke to the couple -- Rita and Conrad -- later, they said the surgeon 
had seemed embarrassed by the question and maybe he was not the person to ask but, 
after all, it was he who did the operations. However, they had not realised that 
recipients could be ill after their operations. They have managed to take this on board 
now, but it has remained difficult for them to accept that recipients can feel guilty 
about being alive. Fortunately, at the BODY Convention, they met other bereaved 
couples, a recipient who spent a great deal of time with them, and a senior nurse from 
their home town who was able to find out more about the recipients of Philip's 
organs. All these gestures of concern have helped them to feel less isolated, sadly a 
common occurrence for many bereaved people. 
Summary 
This chapter has reviewed and questioned some of the arguments against any kind of 
direct communication between donor families and the recipients of their relative's 
organs. Whether all organ recipients should be required to write a brief letter of 
43 John and his wife Margaret founded the British Organ Donor Society when their son 
died and 
became a multi -organ donor. The topic was further discussed at BODY'S AGM the 
next day, which I 
could not attend. 
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thanks -- which may well be enough for most donor families -- I leave to those who 
decide such matters of policy. From my research, I would argue that organ recipients 
may well derive far more emotional benefit from performing this tangible expression 
of gratitude, than they do when the choice is taken from them by others, albeit acting 
`in the patient's best interests'. This is not to imply that `making a return for the gift' 
cancels all sense of obligation. The transacting of human organs, as it was conducted 
by the participants in this study, bears scant resemblance to transactions of a 
commodity form where the relationship is between the objects exchanged, say, `letter' 
for `organ', the reciprocal exchange thus cancelling the relationship. As I have argued, 
donor families and organ recipients both participate in the intangible substance of the 
donor which accompanies the organ and thus establishes not just a connection, a 
`between', but a connectivity, whereby "the self [is] defined and experienced through 
an array of significant with others, past and present, living and dead" 
(Battaglia 1990:188). It is to the tension between connectivity and autonomy in the 
organ donation and transplantation process that I turn in the last Part of this thesis. 
Images from a Life: Son, Brother and Uncle 
Top left; Photo 1: Philip, aged eighteen months 
Top right; Photo 2: Philip aged four years 
Above left; Photo 3: Conrad and his sons, Robin, Glen and Philip, the eldest 
Above right; Photo 4: Rita with Philip and his nephew 
Plate 9 
Photo 5: 
Some of the many messages of condolence received by Rita and Conrad 
when Philip died. His photograph is to the right of the mirror 
Photo 6: 





A photograph of John, surrounded by commemorative albums 
Photo 8: 
Photos of John's memorial tree and its certificate. BODY arranges 
the planting of these trees in memory of deceased donors and 
recipients 
Photo 9: 
A collection of cards, newspaper articles and letters commemorating 
















Christmas card designed in John's memory by his father,Tom 
Plate 13 
Right; Photo 12: 
John as a young boy 
Below; 
A Mother's Day Card for 2000: 
John continues to be a part of 
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PART THREE REVISITING THE WESTERN PERSON 
Chapter Six 
From Sovereign Individual To Connective Self: Personhood As Multiplicity 
Throughout the course of the current study I was constantly called to reflect upon 
tensions, ambiguities and inconsistencies within the performance of organ donation 
and transplantation. The transacting of human organs can be understood as voluntary 
and coercive, organ donors can be anonymous and all too poignantly familiar, human 
organs are treated as detached objects yet they can also be invested with the 
emotional significance and connective capacities of valued and cherished memorabilia, 
the very thought of which recalls to mind the person to whom they once belonged. 
This chapter draws together all these shifting perspectives on organ donation, 
tracing one more path from individualism to connectivity. Within three broad sections, 
I offer fleeting glimpses of bodies, organs, individuals and persons, none of which 
would stand still to be unequivocally named. 
Section One locates organ donation within hegemonic discourses of consumer 
values and political individualism, where social responsibility and civic duty reside in 
tension with individual rights. 
Section Two looks at the shifting and inconsistent perspectives which emerge 
within what I shall very broadly term `the clinic' -- encompassing promotional 
literature, official and unofficial policies and codes, and the individual views of health 
care professionals and lay people. 
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Section Three returns to donor families and organ recipients whose self - 
making has been profoundly affected by their participation in the transacting of human 
organs. 
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1 Individual Rights and Consumer Values 
O'Neill (1985:85) has argued that "capitalism desires, in terms of its own 
technological myth, to replace human beings with machines [and thus seeks to 
produce] a consumer or service society [of] beings whose rights and duties are 
defined through the therapeutic state." He further contends that capitalist societies 
consist of "competing and incongruent interests whose ... affiliations are modified by 
the ideology of the public good" (O'Neill 1985:89). Bracketing the suggestion of a 
`higher order of entity', namely Society, in O'Neill's argument, and recalling the 
reader's attention to my alternative of jural individuals' and `the nation -state' 
(above, p.5.5), aspects of O'Neill's analysis of contemporary Western consumer 
societies resonates with issues which arose in the context of the current study. Within 
the UK's therapeutic state, where bodies are defined through a medical model 
(Crossley 1996:111), and health has become a consumer issue (HMSO 1995), organ 
donation and transplantation are understood to be a common good, organs not to be 
wasted. Taking autonomy to its extreme conclusion within a doctrine of political 
individualism an organ transplant becomes a right. 
Recycling -- you know it makes sense 
In a letter to the Daily Express (6.4.00) Steve Belk deplores the fact that nurses do 
not support legislative change to a system of presumed consent (see below). Briefly 
but graphically illustrating one of the many restrictions he faces as someone with 
kidney disease, on dialysis, and commenting that a transplant operation 
is less costly, 
Mr Belk asks, "Does it still make sense to waste all these organs ?" 
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For `waste' we can read the burial or cremation of organs because, in this 
particular context, individual people have not made the effort to translate their 
support for organ donation into formally registering or carrying a donor card, a view 
which surfaced frequently during my research. Consequently I am suggesting that the 
`altruism' of organ donation today is undergoing a metamorphosis into `political 
correctness'; using the otherwise `wasted' organs of the dead to save lives has 
become an almost routine clinical practice for which unconditional approval and 
compliance are expected, even demanded, as a social responsibility -- leaving limited 
moral space within which it can be questioned. 
Contributing to this situation, the provision of health care in Britain has been 
subsumed, during the late twentieth- century, under a rhetoric of individual rights. A 
high standard of health care has come to be expected; indeed one's right to it has been 
enshrined in the Patient's Charter (HMSO 1995), part of the Citizen's Charter 
instigated during Margaret Thatcher's sojourn as Prime Minister. In a `Foreword' to 
the Patient's Charter Ian Lang, then Secretary of State for Scotland, emphasised 
choice and value for money as central entitlements in health care (HMSO 1995). 
Patients have been transformed into consumers (cf. Strathern 1997). 
In my conversations with transplant recipients, the financial costs of Britain's 
health care system were considered, and it was acknowledged that an extremely 
disproportionate amount of money was available to us, in Britain, when contrasted 
with many poorer nations. Yet, as recipients also acknowledged, "it's what we 
expect." Recipients themselves did not speak directly in terms of having the right to 
a 
transplant; they were instead overwhelmed by feelings of gratitude, 
and guilt, at 
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having been `the lucky ones'. Those still waiting may understandably have very 
different views, echoed by the relatives of people who died without a transplanted 
organ. 
The Right to a Transplant 
An article in the Scotsman newspaper (29.4.97a) carried almost a full -page report 
about a fatal accident inquiry into the death of a young girl, Michelle Paul, in 1995, as 
a result of taking the drug `Ecstasy'. This caused liver failure, but she was rejected as 
a transplant recipient by Edinburgh Royal Infirmary. The newspaper also featured a 
response from Jim Baxter, a former Scottish football player, who received two 
transplants (Scotsman 29.4.97b). His situation had been referred to by Miss Paul's 
grandmother, at the inquiry. She wanted to know why 'a former alcoholic' got two 
transplants and her granddaughter was refused; she clearly felt her grand -daughter had 
as much right to an organ as anyone else. 
While the distress of Miss Paul's family is understandable, this perspective 
reinforces the idea that health care professionals should be obligated to save lives. 
Organ transplantation is viewed as a right. Donors and their families are VéÿoñaPly 
anonymous; they are absent and, as my frequent and deliberate use of the term 
illustrates, human organs have been transformed into a clinical practice, 'a transplant'. 
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11 Imagining, Acknowledging and Severing Connections 
A study of the messages carried in organ donor cards found that `altruistic behaviour', 
i.e. the willingness to donate organs, had to be elicited through empathy arousal; the 
best way to provoke this was to include an emotive story (Skumanich and Kintsfather 
1996:401 -8). One of the two messages tested "was prefaced by ... an emotive media 
story concerning a person undergoing a transplant procedure" ( Skumanich and 
Kintsfather 1996:404). Readers can imagine a connection with a `real person' whose 
situation motivates them to act; it is an attempt to `conduct their conduct'. 
Promotional leaflets produced and distributed in the UK illustrate these 
analytical points. Anonymity, as a feature of organ donation, vies with the 
provocation of ̀ imagined relationships' -- potential recipients could be people like us - 
- which call forth our care and hopefully our generosity by registering as donors. 
Three leaflets came to my attention, in serendipitous fashion, during my research. The 
changes identifiable in form and content illustrate how the `voluntary, unrequited 
surrender of resources' turns into subtle and not so subtle coercion. 
Giving to Strangers: eliciting organs through imagined relationships 
The leaflets reproduced in Plates 1 -6 provide, with various degrees of concreteness, 
textual images of potential and actual recipients. What follows is my own 
interpretation; the reader may reach other conclusions. In the first leaflet, particular 
though brief mention is made of people whose lives could be improved 
with a 
transplanted organ. In the second leaflet, `real people' speak directly 
to the reader 
through quotations; a potential donor talks about giving life to 
others; two recipients 
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describe the dramatic and positive change a transplant has made to their lives; a 
donor's relative expresses the comfort derived from knowing that donation "will help 
to bring joy to somebody else." Providing an opportunity for spontaneous altruism is 
clearly not sufficient. This is a `feel good' message, directed towards the public, to 
encourage registration as a potential organ donor. The message is about happy, 
healthy recipients, a comforted though bereaved family -- and responsible citizens 
who identify themselves as willing to donate organs. It says `look what you could do, 
if only you carried a donor card or joined the Register'. 
The second leaflet also carries photographic imagery but who is it we are 
looking at? Are they potential donors and recipients, with families and friends? Or the 
relatives of actual donors? One cannot say for sure but this is part of the power of the 
message -- we can imagine them to be whoever we want. Taken as potential donors, 
the people featured in the photographs span a wide range of ages and ethnic 
backgrounds, emphasising that anyone can be a donor "in the right circumstances. "44 
The leaflet's general message of optimism contrasts with a small photograph of a 
youngish man wearing a rather pensive expression. Placed above the quote from a 
potential donor, it appears to reflect the sentiment -- some careful thought being given 
to "when I die. "45 Having made the decision, one can get on with living, assured by 
the fact that, when one dies, one's organs will be available to save other lives. 
As families and groups of friends, including potential donors or recipients, the 
photographs reflect significant relationships, the joys of life, and continuity of the life 
94 The right circumstances refers to the fact that donors must be declared brain 
stem dead. and 
organs must be healthy. 
45 Alternatively, a colleague suggested it could be a recipient, considering 
his donor's death, though I 
feel this would tend to detract from the general `positive' message 
about recipients. 
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cycle. One photograph features a wrinkled, grey- haired man towards the end of life, 
and a small girl just beginning hers. Are they grandfather and grand- daughter? A 
second shows a young adult woman giving a small girl a `piggy -back'. Are they 
mother and child? A third photograph features three young people studying what 
could be a map. Are they college friends planning a holiday of discovery and 
adventure? Whoever they are, I am suggesting the photographs depict the sort of 
relationships which draw forth our care, commitment and love. In doing so, they seek 
to elicit the desirable empathetic response of signing a donor card or placing one's 
details on the Register. 
These relationships offer further suggestions about why one should consider 
donation. The sad image suggests these little girls are too young to lose their mother 
or grandfather, and are certainly too young to die. Similarly, the college friends are 
too young to be separated by death. Alternatively, on a happier note, another 
photograph of an older man has been placed next to the quote from a recipient, 
explaining how he was able to continue working until his retirement. He and the other 
older man were not old enough to die. They still had much to contribute to society, 
and have been able to do so, thanks to a transplant operation. Paradoxically, given the 
notion of individual choice presumed to apply to organ donation, which stems from 
the politically dominant ideals of individual autonomy and independence, the very 
interdependence of the people in these relationships forms the implicit basis for 
making each one's survival an urgent, essential, social issue. They are socially (and 
economically) productive people, and will continue to be so -- if given a transplant. 
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What of the imagery in the third leaflet? The verbal message offers a theme of 
continuity through the phrase "So life can go on." Concern towards potential 
recipients and their families is strongly evoked through confrontation with the idea 
that `it could happen to you'. Readers are explicitly invited to contemplate the 
possibility that we, or someone in our family, might need a transplant operation. How 
would we feel? Think of our own grief. Now think of the grief of others. Concern for 
others is also evoked through the use of the heart motif. Not only is this one of the 
organs which can be donated; Heiman (1991:2 -3) argues it is "a universal symbol of 
emotion, courage, intimacy and will." While the cross -cultural applicability of this 
symbol could be challenged, the heart literally embodies some of the most 
provocative metaphors in the English language. Many refer directly to love 
(Youngner 1996:51: Doniger 1996:207). Hearts adorn the gift wrap and cards and 
even the presents we give to and receive from our loved ones as selfless and free 
expressions of regard; the heart serves as a symbol of the spirit of altruism in our gifts. 
Acknowledging Connections: notions of family' 
By adopting the foregoing approach in promotional materials, health care 
professionals acknowledge `something' beyond the autonomous, separate, jural 
individual. Superficially, one might call it kinship in the narrow sense of that word, 
meaning consanguines or affines. Where the women in Konrad's (1999) study could 
not name the `something' which connected them to the anonymous recipients of their 
ova, Konrad suggested `the sociality of anonymity'. I am arguing that the `something' 
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health care professionals acknowledge is the connectivity of personhood, though the 
full significance of that connectivity may not be appreciated. 
Who counts as family? 
In the actualities of human organ transactions, shifting, fluctuating ideas are apparent 
about families and how they are constituted. Here individual rights, as they are 
established in legislation on the transacting of human organs, may conflict with the 
connectivity of families and the need of bereaved people to be involved in decisions 
about what happens to their loved one's body. 
On point of law, where a hospital patient can be positively identified as an 
organ donor, the Health Authority or its "designated representative" is empowered to 
remove organs without approaching the family; where the patient cannot be identified 
as an organ donor, organs may only be removed if "reasonable enquiry" has been 
made to ensure that neither "the deceased" nor "the surviving spouse, partner or any 
surviving relative" would object (Dept. of Health 1998:10, 13) . In practice, health 
care professionals do make every effort to approach family members for their views, 
though quality of those approaches might be interpreted variably. I am not aware of 
any recent situations where organs were removed from a hospital patient contrary to 
the stated wishes of his or her family members. 
Of course, there is already a context in which a family may not actually be 
approached at all. Health care professionals are not legally obligated to inquire about 
the possibility of organ donation, and they may choose not to approach the bereaved 
parents of deceased babies and children, because these deaths are considered to be 
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particularly traumatic. Baby deaths are simply `wrong' in a country with a very low 
infant mortality rate. Indeed, a personal friend of mine astonished the local donor co- 
ordinator by asking about donation in the event that her very ill baby were to die' . 
The co- ordinator had never been involved with a donor so young, and she had to 
prepare special paperwork. 
Spouses, or parents in the case of unmarried people, tend to be the ones who 
are sent any information about how their relative's organs were used. In one case, this 
caused a substantial degree of distress to the mother of a young adult woman who 
became a donor. The woman's husband was legally next of kin, but he declined to 
receive any information about recipients of his wife's organs. The donor's mother was 
not aware she could ask for information independently, though she did say, "to be fair 
to the co- ordinator," that she might have been told but, at the time of her daughter's 
death, she could not take in anything that was being said. In another case, the 
deceased's estranged sister was given priority over her house -partner of thirty years. 
Severing Connections 
When, in conversations with me, transplant staff expressed doubts about maintaining 
long term communication with donor families, it was often in the context of the 
possibility of a recipient's death. Learning about this would be too distressing for the 
donor family, it might suggest that something had been wrong with the organs, that 
they had failed in some way -- an unhappy reflection upon the donor. At the time, the 
point seemed reasonable, though I have subsequently wondered about the situation 
46 Child donors are treated `as if they were adults, "providing the child is of an age when it is 
reasonable to believe he or she would have understood what [organ donation] 
involved" (Dept. of 
Health 1998:15). This applies to the legal and ethical issues dealt with by the Code of Conduct. 
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where more than one organ was donated. One could surmise that the distress of 
learning about one death was seen to outweigh any comfort derived from knowing 
there were other surviving recipients. Conversely, my own survey showed that while 
donor families would be sad to hear about a recipient's death, none felt the 
information was inappropriate. A few the families had actually received this news. 
Rita has now learned that five of the seven recipients of Philip's organs have died. 
Those families I have come to know as friends consider that at least recipients had got 
a second chance for life, which was rather more than could be said for their loved one. 
The possibility of recipients becoming emotionally attached to their donor's 
relatives, or vice versa, was considered to be sufficient reason for preventing 
communication. The point was illustrated to me through two similar stories from two 
different co- ordinators. Basically, a donor's surviving widow writes a `very 
emotional' letter to a male recipient, which would have put undue stress on the 
recipient had the letter been passed on. In a version with a twist, another co- ordinator 
cited an example of a very emotional letter from a recipient to his donor's family, 
which would have been equally distressing to them. Emotional dependency of this sort 
was viewed as harmful to a bereaved person, if it prevented his or her progress 
through the bereavement, and harmful to °ua recipients, since it could 
exacerbate their already strong feelings of guilt or of gratitude. 
Both of these examples sit awkwardly, to say the least, with the imagined 
relationships evoked in promotional materials where we are explicitly called upon to 
consider becoming organ donors for `people like us', people we love and care about. 
In actual cross -bodily transfers of human organs, donor families and recipients may 
be 
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expected to ignore these emotional ties for the sake of their own well -being or, 
paradoxically, the well -being of the other. 
Yet, I am suggesting that the kinds of people we can glimpse in such 
perspectives are not persons; they comply with the depiction of ̀ individual people' in 
Chapter Two, "linked merely by `social' or `emotional' or `moral' relationships' 
(Bloch 1988:16, emphases in original). But they do not reflect the kind of self -making 
donor families and organ recipients appear to be engaged in, through "mutable 
entanglements with other subjects' histories [and] experiences" (Battaglia 1995:2). 
Severing connectivity 
Those who decide to formally indicate the wish to become an organ donor in the 
event of death are urged to discuss the matter with their family. In the midst of 
bereavement, relatives should not have to be making decisions about donation. In a 
paradoxical twist, though, the pain of bereavement has also been cited as a reason for 
excluding families from the decision -making process. 
The `constant refrain of shortage' which underpins public campaigning on 
organ donation foregrounds a discrepancy between those who express support for 
organ donation and those who actually register their wish to become a donor. An 
absence of any such tangible declaration can lead families to decline organ removal in 
the event of their relative's death. During the present study, in an effort to rectify this 
discrepancy, the British Medical Association began pressing the government for a 
change to the law, in favour of presumed consent -- `opting out'. Arguments in favour 
of presumed consent rest on the assumption that the shortage of donor organs exists 
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because people do not take action to formally record their wishes. Presumed consent 
would mean those in favour of donation, currently the majority of the population 
according to statistics, would be saved the hassle of having to formally register as 
donors while those not in favour, currently the minority, would have to take action to 
register objections. The advantage to potential recipients also seems clear - more 
organs would be available. In media coverage following the BMA's announcement to 
press for legislative change, public opinions seemed reasonably evenly divided, though 
I cannot claim to have conducted a systematic review. 
My own interest in presumed consent lies in its potential impact on bereaved 
families. A weak form exists whereby the family is still consulted; the strong form 
excludes them altogether. Excluding the potential donor's family can be justified from 
two opposing directions. In a radio debate on the issue (BBC Radio 4, `Woman's 
Hour', 5 Feb. 1999) Dr. Michael Wilkes, then chairperson of the BMA's Ethics 
Committee, presented the exclusion as being in the best interests of the family, who 
were already going through enough grief, before going on to emphasise the number of 
people waiting for kidney transplants. Approaching the issue from the other direction, 
so to speak, Mrs Elizabeth Ward, President of the British Kidney Patient Association 
(BKPA), has stated that "Our next of kin should have no right to overrule our wishes. 
If you've declared your wish to be a donor that should be the end of it." (Daily 
Express 3.9.96). 
Excluding the family from the decision about organ removal is questionable in 
its possible quantitative impact upon waiting list figures. John Evans of BODY has 
spoken publicly on many occasions, about its probable detrimental qualitative effects 
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on bereaved families. In conversations with donor families, organ recipients, 
representatives of various voluntary groups, and health care professionals, I found 
that presumed consent as `having to opt out' was contrasted unfavourably with the 
present system of `choosing to donate'. The latter system clearly felt as if it offered a 
greater element of free choice, since action -- obtaining a donor card or formally 
registering -- was only required if one wished to be a donor. Similarly, excluding the 
family from the donation process was also viewed with disapproval. Discussing it with 
Tom, he regarded the idea as offensive. Were it to proceed, in a strong form which 
excluded the family from any role in the decision about organ removal, potential 
organ donors may have more rights, but families would be assumed to have no 
connectivity. Such a view of persons as jurai individuals clashes with the findings of 
my research where the need to openly enact relationality with `the other' could be 
compelling. 
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111 Making Selves, Making Others 
Imagining the other as self 
On the first anniversary of John's death, Catherine telephoned the co- ordinator to ask 
why no more information had been sent about recipients. The shock and numbness of 
grief had eased and she realised she wanted to know more about them. The co- 
ordinator said not everyone wanted further information, and also that bereaved people 
tended to move house within a year of the death; it was hard to stay in touch. 
Catherine was very angry at what she perceived as excuses, and she "had a go" at the 
co- ordinator. She begged for information -- were the recipients old or young, male or 
female, still surviving, where were they from -- anything, but the co- ordinator was 
adamant. Nevertheless, a few days later, she received a letter from a recipient of one 
of John's kidneys, which meant a great deal to her, as her own grandmother had died 
of kidney disease. Catherine "felt proud," she told me, "that John had helped someone 
in this way," engaging John's act of donation as a personal link between a (no longer) 
anonymous recipient and a loved member of her own family. Concurrently, Catherine 
can be understood imagining herself as other, in the manner evoked by the third 
promotional leaflet described above (Dept. of Health 1998); she, too, had a dearly 
loved relative who might have benefited from a kidney transplant. 
Imagining Identities 
The story told to me by Robert provides a forceful example of the attempts recipients 
may feel compelled to make to turn their anonymous donor into `a person', 
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concurrently illustrating in sharp relief that `making the other' inevitably also involves 
`making the self. Robert had already concluded that his donor must have been "a big 
man, like myself," otherwise the lungs would not have been able to "do the job." 
Recovering from his operation, Robert also overheard a member of staff recalling 
when " the surgeon had gone to such and such a town to get...," stopping mid - 
sentence. As Robert understood it, the location of a donor had been inadvertently 
revealed -- let us call it Anytown. Over the course of the next few weeks, as he 
recovered from his operation, Robert created an elaborate story in his imagination. He 
went to Anytown and consulted newspaper death notices for a mature male who had 
died suddenly, in hospital, just before his own operation. He found one, and turned 
up on the doorstep of the widow. She was distressed and sent him away, but he 
persisted, leaving his own wife and children in order to move to the same town as his 
donor's family. At this point the story "began to take on a life of its own," with 
Robert "watching himself' stalking the donor's children to and from school. No 
matter how hard he tried to imagine a different ending, Robert told me he kept getting 
drawn into this one, and eventually forced himself to stop thinking about it altogether. 
Fond of a good story, Robert related this one to me with dry humour. At the time, the 
`self he had defined through his indeterminate relationship with his donor's imagined 
family was "very scary." 
I have no intention of attempting to analyse this story in the manner of a 
psychological evaluation, but I will offer Robert's own interpretation. He said he felt a 
sense of responsibility towards the donor's family, whoever they were and, five years 
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later, he did still wonder about his donor. He mused on the possibility that he made 
the story up because he could not make actual contact with the family. 
These two examples have illustrated how donor family members and 
organ recipients make imagined persons; neither has been intimately implicated in the 
history of the other -- until the actual transaction event. In sharp contrast, I turn now 
to consider how families remember their deceased relative. 
'Like a bright spot': the present absence of organ donors 
Thinking about how donor families remember their relative recalled to me the closing 
words of Battaglia's ethnography of death rituals on Sabarl (1990:199). One 
informant said remembering the dead was like the bright spot left behind when a mark 
is scrubbed off the floor. There is an absence but also a presence, evoking 
remembrance of what used to be there. For donor families, their relative is poignantly 
present in photographs and personal belongings, concrete expressions of a lifetime of 
memories (see Plates 9- 12).47 What they do not have is a future together though even 
this can be turned into a consoling thought. As Tom remarked, "John will always 
remain 24 and never grow old." 
He had written to me, in response to a letter of mine which had coincidentally 
arrived close to John's birthday. This can be a very hard time for families, as is the 
time of their relative's death. Significantly, recipients can treat the day of their 
transplant as a second birthday. Rita has spoken of this with distress, especially 
incensed when one recipient, in a newspaper report, said it was like winning the 
47 Contrastively, recipients have no concrete details of the donor's physical appearance, personality 
or background, but aswe have seen, recipients may endeavour to sketch in an identity. 
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lottery. People may applaud the use of organs for transplantation, and emphasise its 
life -saving potential, but for donor families organ donation can be suffused with a 
deep ambivalence. The date of a transplant operation may be celebrated by recipients 
and their families, but for donor families the anniversary of the donation event can be, 
as Rita said, "a tragic time." Someone suggested she write to a newspaper or 
magazine to say how she felt, but her husband pointed out that "it wouldn't go down 
very well with the medical profession." As I remarked earlier, donor families may be 
reluctant to voice their variegated experiences, since they do not wish to appear to be 
jeopardising organ donation. 
Expressing doubt or mixed feelings about donation are complicated by the fact 
that particular problems may seem, on the surface, to have nothing to do with 
donation. Although the donor families I have interviewed have been traumatised by 
different aspects of their participation in organ donation -- from their treatment by 
ICU staff to a lack of information after the donation event -- all are ultimately linked. 
As intimately implicated in their relative's dying and death as they were in his or her 
life, these families do not perceive their loved ones as detached, autonomous 
individuals, nor their bodies and body parts as detached, alienated objects in the 
manner of impersonal items of property. A donor's family may find it hard to 
disconnect the person they know and love from his or her corporeal body, and 
impossible to disconnect the organ from the donor. 
Tom remains ambivalent about agreeing to the removal of John's organs 
although at the time he was prepared for the question. His fears came to centre on 
what he allowed to happen to John's body. "Not religious myself," Tom had never 
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wondered about an afterlife and was not concerned about what would happen to his 
own body after death, "but it's different for John's body." Although John carried a 
donor card, and Tom knew he was following his son's wishes he is deeply troubled 
now about giving his consent to organ removal. As he said, "John made the choice 
but we have to live with the consequences." When we first met, a year after John's 
death, Tom was having difficulty accepting that John was dead and the fact that parts 
of his body were "scattered all over the country" was almost too much to bear. 
Tom and Catherine have displayed very different levels of interest about the 
recipients of John's organs. Catherine needed to know them as specific people, and 
that need developed over the first year of bereavement. Receiving a letter from a 
recipient of one of John's kidneys enabled Catherine to establish her own connectivity 
with that person and her own grandmother. Originally, Tom had no interest at all in 
recipients. His fears about John's dispersed body precluded such thoughts. Five years 
on, he tends to view his concern for the recipients as `grand -parental' -- "the once - 
removed love for your child." 
In Chapter Two, I suggested human organs were `a kind of property.' I have 
found it helpful to consider that, for a donor family, the organ is more in the nature of 
an heirloom, handed on from one family member to another, but where the original 
owner is always remembered. This is not to suggest that bereaved people require the 
presence of a body or body part to facilitate remembrance of the person who died. I 
am arguing that, for the donor's family, the organ will always be first and foremost 
the donor's; it is simply now in someone else's keeping. Yet it carried with it the 
narrative of the donor's life and death, intangible substance intermingled with the 
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narratives of those left to grieve, and those who received the organs. For this very 
reason, a donor family may be intensely curious about recipients of their relative's 
organs and, indeed, their peace of mind may depend upon knowing in some concrete 
fashion what has happened to those organs. 
It could be objected that open acknowledgement of the donor family -recipient 
relationship flies in the face of an act which is publicly performed as anonymous, 
voluntary and altruistic. On the other hand, Renee Fox recently retired from a long 
academic career of sociological research on transplantation in the USA because of her 
concerns about the extent to which transplantation was becoming routine, 
"commonplace" as the UK Department of Health's 1998 promotional leaflet stated. 
Consequently, Fox argued, 
awed respect for what is offered and taken, given and received, and 
accepted and rejected through this medical -surgical act is progressively 
eroded. (Fox 1996:260) 
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Conclusions and Inconclusions: Transacting Human Organs as a Moral 
Economy 
The events of my birth ... and finally of my death are not accomplished in 
me or for me. The affective weight of my life as a whole does not exist for 
me. Only the Other is in possession of the values of the being of a given 
person. (Michail Bakhtin, cited in Battaglia 1990:35) 
To conclude I return to the model of the `Western person', as an autonomous and 
bounded individual, outlined in the Introduction to this thesis. The model is employed 
in anthropological analyses as an illustrative foil for `other' economies of bodies and 
persons which invariably demonstrate multiplicity. Elsewhere, the person is envisaged 
as "fundamentally interpersonal" ((Becker 1995:4 -5; cf. Kirkpatrick and White 
1985:25), a site or locus of relationships (Battaglia 1990:11 -12; Lieber 1990:74; 
Strathern 1988:13), so that "bodies do not circumscribe individual experience" 
(Becker 1995 :5). 
At the same time, Becker (1995:3) acknowledges that the "monolithic 
depiction" of Western persons as independent, individual and differentiated is 
"partially misrepresented ". We are dealing with a `folk model' not necessarily 
reflected in the fine grain of ethnographic investigation. My concern has been with the 
unreflexive deployment of this model, within academia, as an analytical tool for 
understanding the transacting of human tissue and organs in Western contexts. 
Particular attention has been given to its reinforcement of organ donation as a 
voluntary, anonymous and altruistic gesture. 
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Certainly, in the public performance of organ donation, we have caught 
sustained glimpses of apparently autonomous and bounded individuals voluntarily 
surrendering what appear to be anonymous and detached organs with no entailment of 
relationality. Closer consideration of the moments at which this model surfaces 
illuminates the politics of relationships which permeate not only the transacting of 
human organs but, I would argue, the ongoing process of social life within which this 
clinical practice is embedded. The notion of `ownership' of one's own body, the idea 
that we should have the right to dispose (of) our bodies and their parts as we choose, 
is compelling and readily co -opted in the transplantation programme's pursuit of ever 
more organs. As Strathern (1996) has shown, the idea of ownership is also a powerful 
mechanism for manipulating the perception of connections between people. 
Foregrounding a potential organ donor's right to choose how his or her body parts 
are used after death denies connectivity with family members while simultaneously 
foregrounding a socially approved ethic of moral responsibility towards unknown 
others. Similarly, a sense of proprietorship is encouraged when human organs are, 
knowingly or not, treated like commodities -- detached objects which can be acquired, 
personalised, owned. 
Though prominent and popular as political representation, the twin ideals of 
autonomy and boundedness foreground a jural individual as a single and impoverished 
aspect of personhood (cf. Ingold 1986). This model readily accords with the idea that 
relationships happen externally, between people, so that they can be forged or 
terminated with no material effect upon the people concerned. I have argued that the 
model of detached and autonomous individuals carries limited explanatory potential 
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when confronted by the kinds of personhood I found manifest in everyday, 
ethnographic settings in Britain. 
Actual participation in the transacting of human organs, and the ongoing 
effects of that participation, reveals a shifting, oscillating multiplicity of bodies and 
persons. Accounts from donor families and organ recipients reveal a process of self - 
making as connective personhood, inadequately represented as the `betweenness' of 
relationships conducted by autonomous and bounded individuals. I have argued that 
this connectivity derives from mutual participation in the tangible and intangible 
substance of the organ donor (cf. Helman 1991:100; Battaglia 1995:3). 
Jean -Klein's (2000:) study of the `dispersed enactment of self has been 
illuminating in this regard. She notes that the notion of `connective selves' proposed 
by Joseph (1994) "points at other human bodies (as well as objects) as loci where 
subjects make `themselves' concrete "; thus, `other' bodies have the potential to act as 
"registers of the efficacy of [one's own] subjective actions" (Jean -Klein 2000:4; cf. 
Becker 1995). Where the cross -bodily transfer of human organs is enacted, we have 
seen that the self -perceptions of all those involved can be affected by the actions of 
others. I have particularly amplified this effect insofar as the action, or inaction, of 
health care professionals and organ recipients impacts upon the ongoing production of 
self for donor family members, and their ongoing production of their deceased relative 
as a valued and generous person. 
In doing so, I follow Battaglia's argument that a "critical anthropology of 
selfhood [must address] the problematics of self -action in their relation to issues of 
power" (1995:2 emphases removed; cf. Jean -Klein 2000). The donor families, and 
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indeed organ recipients, featured in the current study perceived themselves to be 
disadvantageously located vis -a -vis health care professionals who controlled their 
ability to demonstrate or observe, in the bodily actions of the `other', the efficacy of 
their own or the organ donor's subjective action. 
What I am describing here is a very different quality of self representation 
from that offered by the model of the autonomous, bounded individual which 
underpins the public performance of organ donation. Yet I have found it to resonate 
effectively with the notion that human organs can be more usefully regarded as a kind 
of property with dispersed ownership in diverse bodies. Attending to "the cross - 
subjective articulation of self' (Jean -Klein 2000:2) as connective personhood in the 
transacting of human organs also facilitates our understanding of participation in the 
cross -bodily transfer of organs as ongoing and open -ended for donor families as much 
as organ recipients. Consequently, drawing upon the anthropology of selfhood might 
offer an alternative to the impasse of individual rights, and the culturally unsavoury 
connotations of obligation, with which popular and academic discourses on Britain's 
transplantation programme are currently beset. 
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Appendu 1, Page 1 
DONOR FAMILY QUESTIONNAIRE A - COLLATED RESULTS (24 returned) 
Anonymity was assured. Fourteen respondents included addresses, with offers of further assistance to 
the researcher. 
Time since under12 mths 1 -3 years 4 -5 years over 5 years Not clear 
death 3 12 5 3 1 
Family status Child Sibling Spouse Partner 
of donor 15 1 7 1 
Info letter up to 1 mth up to 3 mths over 3 mths No info# Other* 
received 11 4 5 1 3 
(# told not policy': *1 gave date, possibly up to 1 mth; 1 stated any time I asked'; 1 gave two 
answers) 
Recipient letters Yes No Other 
received 18+ 5 1 (second section of form not 
returned) 
(+ included multi donations - letters received from some, but not all, recipients) 
Donor relative Not Replied Replied Ongoing contact Met Recipient 
responses 4 14 9 5- 
(- recipient subsequently died. Respondent wrote ̀ very distressing for us but I still feel the richer for 
knowing her. ") 
KEY QUESTIONS ON DONOR FAMILY QUESTIONNAIRE 
`What are your views on donor families being told about the death of a recipient ?' 
No view expressed - 6; View not clear - 3; Info should be available - 15 ( Families told - 2); Section 
missing - 1. 
`What are your views on contact with recipient(s) via letter' 
No view expressed - 3; View not clear - 1; Favourable view - 20; Section missing - 1. 
`Please give reasons for not replying to a recipient's letter' 




Appendix 1, Page 2 
SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS FROM DONOR FAMILY QUESTIONNAIRE A 
Two respondents did not get information about the use of the donor's organs as they were not 
considered next of kin. One was the donor's mother; the donor's husband was next of kin and 
declined any information. The other was the donor's long term house partner (30 years); the donor's 
estranged sister was next of kin and would not pass on information. Two respondents initially 
declined information, but subsequently changed their minds. 
One respondent reported serious distress about consenting to her husband's wish to be a donor, and 
also expressed guilt about her feelings. People do not understand why she has such negative views 
towards donation. 
One respondent now wishes she had made the effort to reply to a recipient's letter. 
Two donor family questionnaires were sent out via recipients, to their own donor's family. 
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Appendix 2 
DONOR FAMILY QUESTIONNAIRE B - COLLATED RESULTS (32 returned) 
Questionnaires distributed by the Donor Family Network. Anonymity was assured. Sixteen families 
replied, enclosing addresses, and offering further help to the researcher. 
Time since death underl2 mths 1 -2 years 3 -5 years over 5 years 
of donor 2 10 11 8 
Family status 
of donor 
Child Parent Spouse Partner 
22 2 5 2 
Info letter up to 1 mth up to 3 mths over 3 mths No info Unclear* 
received 8 12 6 1 4 
( *Respondents did not delete `week/month') 




(+ included multi donations - letters received from some, but not all, recipients) 
Donor relative No Reply Reply Ongoing contact Met Recipient 
responses 5 12 9# 6 
( #1 intends to meet) 
KEY QUESTIONS 
`Could you give your views on donor families being told about the death of a recipient ?' 
(Families told - 5) 
View not clear /not expressed -13; Favourable view - 14; Prefer not to know - 4. 
`Please give your views on contact with recipient(s) via letter' 
View not clear /not expressed - 2; Favourable view - 27; Prefers no contact - 2 
'Please give your reason for not replying to a recipient's letter' 
Prefers no contact - 1; Intends to write - 1; Reply not permitted - l; Address excluded - 2 
NB This data has been kept separate from the other study because a) the DFN has strong ties to 
Queen Elizabeth Hospital Transplant Unit, Birmingham, which has a policy of encouraging donor 
family /recipient contact, including face to face meetings and b) it maintains a reasonable balance of 
donor family /recipient replies in the main data. Despite the supportive atmosphere in QEH, however, 
group members have experience of hospital units /co- ordinators where minimum info is given out and 
contact not encouraged. 
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Appendix 3, Page 1 
DONOR FAMILY QUESTIONNAIRE sample 
Please indicate how long ago your relative became an organ donor - 
.... under 3 mths .... 3 -6 mths ....6 -12 mths .... longer ( years) 
and his or her relationship to you - 
SECTION A - INFORMATION ABOUT RECIPIENTS. 
1) If you received information about recipients of your relative's organs, please tick - 
..., age .... sex .... family status organ received 
please specify any other details 
* This information was given by the co- ordinator other hospital staff 
over the phone in a letter 
*How long after your relative's death? Please specify number of months 
Could you give your views on donor families being told about the death of a recipient? 
2) If you received no information about recipients please tick A, B or C - 
A* I was told it was the policy not to give out information 
B* at the time of my relative's death, I did not want any information 
If B, have you since changed your mind? YES NO 
If yes. did you contact the co- ordinator to ask for information? YES NO 
If you did, what happened? 
If you did not, can you say why not? 
C* any other reason given to you for a lack of information about recipients - 
Appendis 3, Page 2 
DONOR FAMILY QUESTIONNAIRE sample 
SECTION B -CONTACT WITH RECIPIENTS 
1) Have you received any letters /cards from recipients? 
If NO, how do you feel about this? 
YES NO 
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2) If you received a letter /card, did you reply? YES NO 
If NO, can you say why - 
I did not know what to say I found the idea too distressing 
the co- ordinator said it was not appropriate 
I got the impression it was not allowed, so I did not ask 
other reason 
If YES, did it lead to ongoing exchange of letters or cards? YES NO 
Please give your views on this sort of contact 
3) Have you met any recipients of your relative's organs? YES NO 
If YES, who initially suggested a meeting? 
me /my family recipient co- ordinator 
If NO, could you say why not? 
it has not been suggested by anyone 
I did not wish to meet them recipients did not wish to meet me 
Any further comments 
Appendix 4 
RECIPIENT QUESTIONNAIRE - COLLATED RESULTS (15 returned) 
Recipients who have written to their donor's family (Total 13) 
Info given to recipient None 
5 
Did info help with 
writing the letter 
Yes 
5 
On Donor On Donor Family 
8 4 (3 relationship to donor) 
(1 sex of surviving relative) 
No 
3 
Time between transplant under 3 mths 3 -6 mths 6 -12 mths over 1 yr 
and letter to donor family 6 0 4 
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4 (1 wrote twice) 
Writing letter Recipient Family member Joint Decision Unit staff 
suggested by 7 1 2 3 
Reply received 
Result 
Yes -4 No -9 
2 ongoing contact 
1 lead to meetings 
1 no reply expected 
8 would have liked response 
`Do you remain happy that you wrote to your donor's family ?' Yes - 13 
SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS FROM RECIPIENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
One transplant unit supplies a standard card for recipients to sign, containing donor's first name. 
4 respondents were not sure that their letters were actually passed on the donor's family. 
Recipients who have not written to their donor's family (Total 2) 
Respondent No 1 - "It was at least a year before I gave the donor family a thought. Then I think it 
was too late." 
"I think I must have shut out any thoughts of the donor family. I think I felt it was a taboo subject 
and that any thought of contact was out of the question." 
Respondent No 2 - "I felt guilty about my donor" - questionnaire response ticked. 
"I felt too sensitive to their feelings at that time, and that later it was too late. As more time passes 
the more I wish I had written." 
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TRANSPLANT RECIPIENT QUESTIONNAIRE sample 
SECTION A - FOR THOSE WHO HAVE NOT WRITTEN TO THEIR DONOR'S FAMILY. 
How long ago did you receive your transplant? 
.... under 3 mths .... 3 -6 mths ....6 -12 mths .... longer ( years) 
Please tick the answer (or answers) which best reflect your experience: 
1) I did not write because 
I was too ill, and by the time I felt better it was too late to write 
I felt guilty about my donor and/or donor's family 
If transplant unit staff had explained that donor families were often very grateful for letters from 
recipients, no matter how long after the transplant event, do you feel this might have made a 
difference to your decision? .... YES .... NO 
2) I did not write because 
I did not know what to say 
I did not have enough information about the family to write a suitable letter 
If you had been given help to prepare a suitable letter, would you have written it? .... YES NO 
3) I did not write because 
when I asked transplant unit staff about it, they said it was not allowed 
I got the impression it was not allowed, so I did not ask 
4) I did not write because (please give any other reason) 
5) Do you now wish you had written to your donor's family? .... YES .... NO 
Appendix 5, Page 2 
TRANSPLANT RECIPIENT QUESTIONNAIRE sample 
SECTION B - FOR THOSE WHO RAVE WRITTEN TO THEIR DONOR'S FAMILY. 
How long ago did you receive your transplant? 
.... under 3 mths .... 3 -6 mths ....6 -12 mths .... longer ( years) 
Please tick the answer (or answers) which best reflect your experience: 
1) Who raised the subject of writing to your donor's family? 
.... Recipient .... Member of recipient's family .... Unit staff 
2) Who wrote the letter? .... Recipient .... Member of family 
3) How much time had passed. since your operation, when the letter was written? 
.... less than 3 mths .... 3 -6 mths .... 6 -12 mths .... longer (.... years) 
4) How much information did you have about your donor and family? 
Donor .... age 
.... sex 
.... family status 
Family .... ages 
.... sex 
... relationship to donor 
Do you feel the information helped you to write a suitable letter? .... YES .... NO 
5) Did the donor's family respond to your letter? .... YES .... NO 
How did you feel about this? 
6) Do you remain happy that you wrote to your donor's family? 
Do you have any other comments? 
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Providing Support For patients, Carers and Families 
Involved In Transplan ta l i on 
THE T S N NEWSLETTER 
Issue No 13, September 1999 
Making donor contact should be our decision 
"The majority of donor ,families and recipients 
Jill that they should be allowed to decide ,/ r 
themselves whether or not to communicate with 
each other rn thernrore, each party expressed 
their willingness to d %r to the wishes of the 
other" 
These arc two of the conclusions drawn from 
a small -scale survey carried out among our 
readers by Joni Wilson MA, of the Department 
of Social Anthropology at the University 
of Edinburgh. 
Ms Wilson is conducting research into the social 
and emotional aspects of organ donation and 
transplantation with special reference to contact 
between recipients and donor families. The 
provisional findings from her questionnaire 
survey arc reprinted below. They may indicate 
the need for a softening of the current policy of 
most health professionals which discourages 
contact of this sort in the interests of not 
distressing either of the families involved in a 
transplant operation. 
Inside this issue: 
Page 3 - Your letters 
Page 8 - A Granny's Experience 
Page 10 - Getting what's due to you 
Page 12 - The Transplant Games 
Page 14- Chairman's Report 
Questionnaires were distributed by Ms Wilson 
between April and June 1999. The survey was 
not conducted to produce representative 
percentages or any form of randomised, or 
allegedly objective results. Rather, the 
researcher sought to elicit the personal 
viewpoints of transplant recipients and donor 
families, on certain arguments presented to 
her by health -care professionals working in 
transplantation - which were offered to support 
policies of minimal or no contact between donor 
families and the recipients of their relative's 
organs. 
Transplant recipients were invited to respond 
via a letter placed in the Transplant Support 
Network's newsletter. Donor families were 
invited to respond via letters distributed by the 
British Organ Donor Society, (17 responses), 
the Coordinators at Freeman hospital (live 
responses) and two recipients who made contact 
with their donor's family direct. 
In general, the responses received to date tend 
to support the overall conclusions drawn from 
four years of research. These involved one-off 
and multiple open ended interviews, and many 
informal conversations, with health care 
professionals, transplant recipients and donor 
families. Further supporting information has 
been drawn from a range of bereaved people, as 
well as the professional and lay persons who 
offer services before, during and alter a death. 
Recipients' letters appreciated 
A significant research finding was an 
understandable desire on the part of health care 
professionals to protect bereaved people from 
The Transplant Support Network, Room 8, Temple Row Centre, 23 Temple Row, Keighlcy, BD2 12ÁH. 
Office St Fax 01535 692323 Support Line 01535 210101. Registered Charity 1052328 
e- mall :plaitton @tsiet.dentott.co.uk wwwt littp : / /www.usets.zenet.co.uk /tsn /;. 
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distress. Specifically, this was one of the main 
reasons given for preventing communication 
between a transplant recipient and the family of 
his or her donor. 
lids survey, coupled with the long -term, 
intensive study of two donor families, suggests 
that at the very least a letter of 
acknowledgement can be beneficial. Of the 17 
situations where a recipient's letter was 
received, I6 donor families expressed 
unequivocal appreciation and 13 of those sent 
back replies to the recipient. 
Eight families have retained ongoing contact 
and liver of those have met the recipients. 
All expressed their satisfaction with these 
situations. 
'Hie subsequent death of a recipient was also 
l'requently cited as a reason for minimising the 
flow of information to donor families. ( "Hearing 
of a death would be too distressing. ") While the 
researcher cannot say donor families would not 
lind the news distressing, she can say that 16 
donor families were in favour of such 
information tieing given. Six did not express any 
view and one was not clear. Four families had 
been told of a recipient's death and were 
saddened, but seemed able to manage the 
information. 
Information is wanted 
A less commonly cited reason for not providing 
information on recipients was that "many" or 
"some" donor families do not want ally. Only 
two respondents in this survey said they 
declined to receive details about the recipients 
of their relative's organs; both subsequently 
changed their minds. Sadly, in one other case, 
the donor's spouse was regarded as next of kin, 
and as the spouse declined to receive 
information, the donor's parent was also left 
with no details, although they would like to 
have received them. 
The most common reason given, by transplant 
unit staff, for preventing or discouraging 
recipients from writing to their donor's fancily 
was Ihcir often overwhelming sense of guilt that 
they arc alive as a result of the death of another 
person. While comments from recipients 
certainly included their feelings of guilt, and 
extreme gratitude, only two recipients had not 
2 
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written to their donor's family. By the time 
they felt able to do so, they both thought it was 
too late. 
In contrast, no donor family remarked lhat 
letters arrived at inappropriate times, but one 
recipient said staff in his unit thought writing 
eight months after his operation was "too soon" 
while the other recipient felt that writing a year 
after the operation was "too late". 
No regrets 
Of the 11 recipients who wrote to their donor's 
family, the suggestion to do so came from 
transplant unit staff in two cases, a spouse in 
one case, and was a spouse /recipient decision in 
another. No recipient regretted the decision to 
write. In one case, there has been an ongoing 
exchange of letters; in another, the recipient had 
met members of his donor's family. Of the time 
who did not receive replies, one recipient said a 
reply from the donor's family was not expected, 
while eight would have liked a response. 
However, in four cases recipients said they 
did not even know if their letters had been 
passed on. 
The questionnaire asked recipients if a decision 
not to write to their donor's family might have 
been different, had it been explained to them that 
such a letter is often very gratefully received. 
Both recipients who did not write said yes, this 
would have altered their decision. 
When placed in the context of any longer term 
qualitative contact with transplant recipients. 
these findings suggest that writing to express 
gratitude may actually be more beneficial to 
recipients than leaving them with a sense of 
"unfinished business ". 
Deciding for themselves 
In conclusion, the majority of donor families and 
recipients felt that they should be allowed to 
decide for themselves whether or not to 
communicate with each other. Furthermore, each 
party expressed their willingness to defer to the 
wishes of the other. 
Thanks to all readers who volunteered 
information. I am particularly grateful to two of 
TSN's regional organisers, for their support in 
promoting responses (13 responses). 
No 1 1»7 
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A practical guide for applications to medical ethics 
committees 
Anthropology in inaction? 
Joni Wilson 
Doing research on sensitive sub- 
jects has generated a 
considerable literature within 
sociology and social anthropology, to 
which the present article can make only 
a modest contribution. Hopefully, it will 
be a useful one for postgraduates ventur- 
ing into the domain of biomedical 
science, where medical ethics and gate- 
keepers combine to offer a daunting, but 
understandable, challenge. A brief out- 
line of my research will serve to set the 
scene. 
I am exploring the categories life, death, 
body and person - their construction, their 
linkages with each other, and the extent to 
which both can be manipulated as strate- 
gies for, and as a result of, the management 
of life crises and death, particularly in hos- 
pital contexts. The technical maintenance 
of patients in long term coma or persistent 
vegetative state (which could be viewed as 
liminal areas between life and death), and 
organ transplant surgery (which creates 
biological and social links between strang- 
ers), appeared to offer highly pertinent 
contexts for my research, as well as a sub- 
stantial literature on the ethical and social 
dilemmas involved. 
Getting started - patience is a virtue 
Research is being conducted in Scotland, 
my home country, and as first year classes 
ended in May I was all set and raring to go 
at the beginning of June. It is now Novem- 
ber, and I have set foot in hospitals six 
times, though my correspondence and tele- 
phone call files are pretty weighty! The first 
helpful comment I can offer, naive as it may 
seem, is to be prepared for a lengthy wait 
before actually getting near any patients. 
The reasons for this are complex and inter- 
woven, but I shall endeavour to separate 
them into a few key points. 
Issues of access 
Generally, in anthropological research, 
physical access to a field location is avail- 
able before one begins to negotiate social 
access to potential informants. However, 
health care professionals have an ethical 
responsibility to protect patients from inva- 
sion of privacy and untoward distress, 
though the individual exercising of these 
protective roles can vary considerably - in 
my case from immediate agreement to ac- 
cess, to immediate refusal. Nevertheless, 
for research in hospitals, both aspects of 
access have to be negotiated simultane- 
ously due to the need for ethical approval, 
and the requirement of Informed Consent 
which should be obtained from participat- 
ing patients before research begins. 
Although I also wish to include health care 
professionals as informants (which does 
not require ethical approval), no hospital 
unit has allowed access for opportunistic 
chats with them before ethical approval has 
been granted. 
Access to health care professionals can 
also be difficult. In retrospect, trying to 
establish contact was not assisted by my 
concern that any attempts to press for a 
prompt response from units would result in 
outright refusal. Health care professionals 
are very busy people and considering re- 
quests for research access, especially 
non -medical, is not a priority until formal 
application has been made. An application 
can be submitted without prior contact with 
selected units but it would be prudent to 
speak to their health care professionals 
first, not least because a refusal would ne- 
gate the point of submitting an application! 
It may be necessary to contact directors of 
medicine and nursing at hospital level, the 
medical and /or surgical heads at unit level, 
the senior nursing sister and /or quality 
manager of the unit, and other relevant 
personnel. I also contacted chaplains (see 
below). I can only suggest that researchers 
select a first contact and ask who else 
should be involved. Alternatively, write to 
all of the above in a `belt and braces' ap- 
proach. 
The location of particular groups of pa- 
tients may not be readily apparent and is 
complicated by the fact that different hos- 3' 
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pitals have different arrangements, so pre- 
cise and early inquiries should be made. 
Isere, I admit my own discomfort with re- 
spect to asking where I would find 
comatose, persistent vegetative state and 
brain dead patients. The questions took on 
a vulture -like quality given the extent to 
which health care professionals repeatedly 
emphasised the sensitive nature of my re- 
search, the potential for distress to patients 
and their families, and their own doubts 
about my personal and professional quali- 
fications for the research. To help allay 
these concerns, 1 havetaken an introduc- 
tory training course with a recognised 
bereavement counselling organisation - a 
substantial budgetary consideration as it 
cost £400. 
Ethics applications - the committee 
There may be a single committee for all 
hospitals in a region /city, or individual 
committees at every hospital. In the former, 
one has to juggle negotiations with all the 
hospital units and only submit when the last 
one has agreed, which can seriously extend 
the process and is very frustrating. In the 
latter, an application to any one committee 
can overlap with approved research in 
another, but this increases administrative 
work, as forms may vary in style, length 
and information requested. Either way, an 
inquiry about ethical approval in `first con- 
tact' letters would be useful, to ascertain 
which system applies. 
Learning from my experience, I suggest 
the next step is to contact the secretary to 
the committee and ask for the form and 
information on procedures (this may be on 
disk), deadlines for submission, and the 
committee meetings to which they are 
linked. These can be several weeks apart, 
and the researcher may be required to at- 
tend. Once a decision has been reached, it 
is sent out promptly, but further work may 
be necessary before approval is granted. On 
a practical note, be prepared for printing 
costs. In my case, one application costs 
£33, not counting several drafts, distributed 
to several people. 
The form 
This is designed for medical /scientific re- 
search and does not readily adapt to 
anthropological research. Information 
must be given in fairly basic language, as 
committees usually have several lay mem- 
bers unfamiliar with academic or technical 
jargon. It should describe, in a very limited 
word count, research purposes, aims and 
methods, and possibly procedures for se- 
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lecting and recruiting informants, as well as 
the benefits of the research which, in medi- 
cal contexts, is expected to contribute 
generally to medical knowledge or specifi- 
cally to patient treatment. Social research 
occupies a rather precarious position and a 
trawl through medical /nursing journals 
may help identify an angle of approach, as 
might discussions with medical or nursing 
personnel in teaching faculties. One might 
also adopt the simple expedient of asking 
the head of the unit for an opinion about any 
contribution which could be made, but be 
prepared for negative responses - even 
when gaps in social aspects of health care 
have been identified from within the health 
care professions. 
Information for patients 
You will be expected to submit a Patient 
Information Sheet (details of research pur- 
pose and methods) and a Consent Fonn 
(details of participation and withdrawal op- 
tions). One A4 page for each is best - 
suggested formats and essential details for 
inclusion are usually supplied - and it may 
be necessary to produce different sets for 
patients with different medical conditions. 
Language should be even more basis 
( "about the level of a Star reader" was sug- 
gested to me), but it must show sensitivity 
- no bald statements about dead bodies - or 
it may require redrafts. Patient access to an 
independent person may be required - 
someone who can give impartial advice 
about participating in the research. I ap- 
proached hospital chaplains, who have 
been very supportive, but this may also 
involve a lengthy discussion phase since 
many chaplains are active in formal hospi- 
tal structures for patient rights and ethical 
issues, which could clash with the advisory 
role. 
The protocol 
To those of us familiar with a research 
proposal featuring reviews of theoretical 
and regional literature, the Protocol is a 
daunting task. It involves a wider and more 
detailed description of the research design 
- structure, methods, time scale, etc, 
though the language should remain jargon- 
free. Health care professionals may ask to 
see the Protocol before its submission (over 
and above any preliminary outline), and 
alterations may be required. In the main, I 
found this most helpful though it length- 
ened the process even further. However. I 
also found it necessary to tactfully draw the 
line where proposed changes illustrated 
taken for granted assumptions about the 
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very issues I want to research, for example 
why the word `disposal' cannot be used for 
what happens to dead bodies. 
Conversely, it has been an educative ex- 
perience to address anthropology's taken 
for granted assumption - that research is 
carried out through participant observation 
in long term fieldwork - and to convert this 
into a reasonably precise presentation of 
what is to be done, when, why and how. A 
very helpful document, recommended to 
me, is listed below and it includes further 
reading on how to approach'detailed ethno- 
graphic research design. I would also be 
happy to supply copies of my application 
documents, in exchange for copying /post- 
ing costs. 
And finally... 
Be prepared to encounter the sensitive is- 
sues of hospital politics and professional 
personalities. When working with more 
than one unit or hospital, maintaining loca- 
tional and informant anonymity can be 
difficult because medical ethics and anthro- 
pological ethics suffer a lack of fit. In the 
former, concern is for patient anonymity in 
written materials; in the latter, at least for 
me, health care professionals are also in- 
formants entitled to anonymity. However, 
describing my research in a country where 
few hospitals deal with the medical or sur- 
gical conditions involved means that health 
care professionals pretty much know where 
I am anyway. You may be confronted with 
a direct "Have you spoken to Dr X at Y 
hospital then ?" or "What did Z unit in Any - 
town have to say about this' ? ". Attempting 
to conceal locations or people may be met 
with "Oh, I'll give them a ring." 
Health care professionals may also have 
difficulty appreciating why their participat- 
ing patients /family members should remain 
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anonymous to them. My explanation that 
they may wish to relate negative as well as 
positive aspects of their hospital experi- 
ences, for which assurances of anonymity 
are essential, provoked a diverse range of 
responses, as did the idea of my observing 
interactions between health care profes- 
sionals, patients and family members, as 
they manage their experiences of life crises 
and death. Would I be there to criticise? The 
short and honest answer is "not exactly ". 
but I may observe instances where health 
care professionals' actions or modes of 
communicating (or not communicating) in- 
formation caused distress, which patients 
later commented on. To screen these but of 
my thesis would be a serious distortion. My 
positive counter argument, gleaned from 
medical and nursing literature. that health 
care professionals may need bereavement 
training and counselling support in a highly 
emotional and pressured environment also 
met with diverse responses. 
My only advice here is to hear in mind 
that health care professionals are also peo- 
ple, and none of us are fond of negative 
criticism, especially when we feel we are 
doing our best. On the whole. however. I 
have received much positive support and 
interest, for which I am extremely grateful. 
Joni Wilson 
Phi) .student 
Department of l ndvnpnlogy 
Edinburgh ('nireraiq' 
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Anthropological research in hospital settings 
Paths to a quagmire? 
Joni Wilson 
Ml' Initial article on applications to Medical 
Research Ethics Committees (RECs) appeared 
in Volume 4, Issue I. What follows is an 
t plate, which should be read In conjunction with the 
earlier article. 
As my original article stated, the second half of 1996 was 
spent in approaches to, and discussions with, health care 
professionals in selected hospital units, where I wished to 
speak to staff, patients and relatives. During the course of 
1997, I was able to submit three applications to RECs, two 
of which were rejected and went through an appeal proce- 
dure. This involved long and rather gruelling interviews 
with the REC concerned. Approval 
was not granted in either case and, 
while appeals can be made indefinitely, 
my own time restrictions eventually 
impinged, as work on appeals detracted 
from research in other contexts. I also 
frankly admit that I just got tired of it 
all. The whole process was very time 
consuming and frustrating. 
While it is not my intention to 
imply that RECs are deliberately 
obstructive, or that all anthropological 
research is rejected simply because it is 
anthropological, I maintain the view 
that anthropological methodologies 
offer particular problems for RECs - 
and that ethics applications offer the 
saine for anthropologists! That there is 
a lack of fit between anthropological 
and medical /scientific research is 
apparent front the design of application 
forms, as my original article staled. It 
was also emphasised in the letters of rejection which I 
received. One committee stated (after the appeal) that my 
research had no evident scientific or measured outcome to 
aSSCSs against base data, and the other (prior to the appeal) 
that the research lacked structure and definition. Despite 
substantial work on the applications and appeals, and 
lengthy discussions with both Committees, I was unable to 
convince them that my apparently 'vague' and 'woolly' 
methods could produce valuable data. On this point, it 
should be noted that the value of research is judged in terms 
of benefit to particular patients, or to medical knowledge 
generally. The lone anthropological researcher is not on firm 
ground here. 
Before proceeding further, I must acknowledge the 
strong opposition to my wish to speak to bereaved relatives 
of patients declared brain dead, which emerged during the 
negotiation and application process. The sensitivity and 
potential distress of this aspect of my research was con- 
stantly emphasised, despite a considerable literature which 
argues that bereaved people may be desperate for someone 
to talk to about their loss. This issue formed the bulk of dis- 
cussion at the appeal interviews, but I cannot say to what 
extent it influenced the final decisions of RECs. In one case 
the issue was not mentioned in the formal letter of rejection, 
and in the other I have not yet received formal notification 
with details of specific objections. Nevertheless, it is possi- 
ble to extricate some general comments front my particular 
circumstances. 
Should an application to an REC prove necessary, it may 
help to bring a clinical consultant on board as a supervisor, 
or 'member of the research team'. Application forms pro- 
vide for a research team, though I misunderstood its 
implications. It can be used as a nominal designation and 
does not imply joint thesis production, but does add clinical 
'clout'. Conversely, even senior consultants meet with rejec- 
tions, so it is no guarantee, but it may support arguments 
about the value of the research. 
Some unit staff and REC members were extremely 
uncomfortable with anthropology's standard approach of 
'just talking' to people. They wished to know exactly what 
I would ask, despite my assertion that this would impose an 
agenda on informants. However. I admit my own discipli- 
nary purism got in the way, as I struggled to defend 
anthropology's open -ended, conversational approach... 
Researchers may therefore find it useful to provide an 
innocuous questionnaire for the REC, since there is clearly 
a demand for, and understanding of this method. If access 
is granted, no -one can tell or prevent what else may arise in 
the course of administering it, but some caution is required 
if what is actually being done differs from the application 
submitted. Significant alterations to the project during the 
period of access have to be referred back to the REC. On the 
other hand, once contact has been established, it can extend 
beyond the period of access to a unit. While all medical or 
scientific research, even involving healthy volunteers from 
the general public, has to be submitted for ethical approval, 
RECs have no control over social research involving people 
who happen to have experience of a hospital admission - 
their own or someone else's. 
For this reason, arid unless direct observation is essential, 
would say avoid the need for ethical approval .entirely. 
Hospital politics and administrative structures, and the 
process of application and appeal, appeared to me to he a 
quagmire into which 1 was being irresistibly drawn, never to 
return! Avoidance may depend un one's initial contacts. I 
approached unit staff wino were of the opinion that the 
research required ethical approval. All the REC Secretaries 
I then contacted were of the same opinion. however, a 
recent chance encounter with a large display about quality 
management, located in a hospital foyer, let) me to contact 
the manager hiirnself. Ile and his colleagues held that the 
research was not clinical, and therefore did not need ethical 
approval. I was told that there is a great demand for qualita- 
tive research on the subjective experiences of hospital 
patients and their relatives, but a lack of funding and /or time 
to conduct it. Independently funded Phl) research could 
offer a possible solution. I have also recently learned that 
'audit' research does not require ethical approval. 
Researchers may therefore find it more fruitful to make ini- 
tial approaches to quality managers, research and 
development managers, or clinical audit managers, rather 
than unit staff who are more used to conducting research 
which does require ethical approval. 
There is a second option. In my original atiicle I stated 
that hospital units were reluctant to allow access to staff 
until ethical approval was given. However, this is not 
required where staff, rather than patients, are involved and I 
eventually persuaded one unit to let me contact a selection 
of staff, whom I met in the anit. Once into a unit, researchers 
would have access to notice boards which often display 
information about out- patients' support groups, where they 
exist, which is a further avenue for contact. Conversely, 
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some groups may he equally unwilling to facilitate intro- 
ductions, as 1 discovered in one case. A further difficulty 
arises if the group meets on hospital premises. If a 
researcher attends meetings, this is, strictly speaking, access 
to patients in NI IS premises - which requires ethical 
approval. 
A third option which occurred to me was to place notices 
in the press, asking for help. The level of response may 
depend on the clinical condition being researched. In my 
own case, for example, there are very few organ recipients 
as a percentage of the population, and they are very dis- 
persed, geographically. Several attempts might be needed 
but such a method of contact would in all probability be 
cheaper, less time consuming, and ultimately more success- 
ful than REC applications. 
The final option, to which I was seriously tempted, is to 
conduct research on RECs themselves. My experiences will 
forni part of my thesis. Indeed, they are central to it since I 
found that it was health care professionals, rather than 
bereaved people, who held that death is too distressing to 
talk about. Nevertheless, as a means to a beginning - contact 
with patients and their relatives - I had to abandon the 
process. As a means to an end, pursuing an application 
would offer the opportunity to study, in depth, the subjective 
foundations and workings of RECs - an intriguing project in 
itself. 
Joni Wilson 
PhD Student (3rd year) 
Department of Social Anthropology 
Edinburgh University 
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